Nightingale historian. Political scientist Valery Solovey revealed the scenario of the revolution. You also rule out mass repressions
- We are talking on the day of Dzhabrailov's arrest ...
Arrest already? Not detention?
- While the arrest, but the charge was brought: hooliganism. Shot at the hotel. Four Seasons. Near Red Square.
Well, that's okay. I think they will let you go. Maximum - by subscription. (While he was writing, he was released on subscription. Either someone knocks on him, or he writes the script himself. - D. B.)
- But before he was generally inviolable ...
May there not be inviolable now, except for the narrowest circle. The problem is not that there are no institutions in Russia, but that the typically Russian institution - the roof - stops working. A month ago, I was hinted that two banks are under attack - Otkritie and another, considered ethnic, and that there will not be enough funds to save both of them. The Otkritie was just saved. Does this mean that the remaining can should be ready? And there is such a roof!
- And Kadyrov? They don't want to change him?
They wanted to change him for a long time.
- After the murder of Nemtsov?
After the murder of Nemtsov, he even left Russia for a while. But the idea was even earlier, even, they say, a replacement was found - but that person had not been to Chechnya for a long time and did not come up. However, for Kadyrov it would have been an honorable displacement: it was about the status of deputy prime minister. But no portfolio.
- And in Chechnya knew about this alleged z-amena?
Yes. And Kadyrov, naturally, knew. After all, his famous phrase that he is "Putin's foot soldier" means his readiness to obey any order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
- Has Putin already made a firm decision to go to the polls?
Judging by the fact that the election campaign is in full swing, yes. Actually, everything became clear when the meetings with young people began: the Kremlin realized that they were missing them. However, the president meets with young people not only on duty: he seems to enjoy communicating with them.
- And them?
Im not sure.
- Why, I wonder: Schubert, syphilis ...
Schubert had syphilis. And there were problems with women. Still, young people are more interested in something else, and Putin does not speak quite their language. His PR does not yet look brilliant at all: a photo shoot with a naked torso is not the most successful replica of a photoset a decade ago.
- Do you think this is the last term - or will it stay forever?
I think that this is not even the last time, but transit. He will be elected and leave according to the Yeltsin scenario in two or three years.
When four years ago Khodorkovsky gave such a forecast - just to "Interlocutor" - everyone laughed, but today it is almost a common place ...
Well, now it’s definitely no laughing matter. There are signs that the situation is spiraling out of control. How exactly it will turn out, how traumatic it is - is not yet clear: in such historical bindings there is always a colossal number of unknown variables, and they are added. There is a smooth scenario - something like a repetition of December 31, 1999. There is a nonsmooth but peaceful scenario - involving the street, but without violence. As the events of 1991 and 1993 show, the army is extremely reluctant to shoot at compatriots. Well, if, God forbid, blood is shed, then the experience of the Kiev Maidan shows that even a peaceful revolution after the first killed dramatically changes its character. About 120 people were killed in Kiev, and after that, the Yanukovych regime was doomed, no matter what conditions and compromises it later went to. If everything goes smoothly, Putin will simply hand over power to a successor.
- Shoigu?
Unlikely. There is no complete, unconditional trust in Shoigu. It seems that the president and the minister of defense are very close, but the impression is that along with attraction there is also some kind of psychological repulsion. Perhaps because Putin and Shoigu are similar in something very important: they both have a certain messianism. At the same time, Shoigu is almost the most popular minister of Russia, which is largely due to his brilliant PR service since the times of the Ministry of Emergencies. True, I will never and never believe that, despite his messianism, the Minister of Defense is capable of some daring independent actions.
- Rogozin?
Of course not. He probably really wanted it.
- Then who?
The siloviki - both army men and special services - are discussing Dyumin's candidacy as a foregone conclusion.
- And what is Dyumin-President?
I very much doubt his ability to hold on and hold on to the situation. You see, the Putin system is a system tailored personally (I emphasize: personally!) For Putin. It is a pyramid at the top: wobbly, but holding on. If you remove the top, the pyramid will fall, but how it will fall is already unpredictable.
- And then territorial disintegration?
Lord, what kind of territorial disintegration? Why all of a sudden, where? The country is being held by three, pardon the expression, braces, each of which would be quite enough. Russian language. Russian ruble. Russian culture. The main thing is that no one is torn out of Russian Federation, even in Tatarstan, centrifugal forces are negligible - they can ask for a maximum of some symbolic preferences ... Even North Caucasus, the most dangerous region in this sense, does not understand with whom to get involved outside of Russia and how to live.
- And who can come to power if the successor does not hold out? Fashiki?
Firstly, I would not call them "fascists" either, because they have no real ideology, no program, no organization. They are capable of giving interviews, but they are not able to build a working organization. In addition, they are now driven underground and demoralized. Secondly, if you give them to be elected to parliament, they will receive five to seven percent (this is even better for them). And I am in favor of introducing them into parliament - this is very civilizing and reduces the level of danger. There cannot be any fascism now, because everyone is lazy. Remember real fascism: Italy, Germany - a colossal exertion of forces. And now, in general, no one wants to strain, there are no ideas, and such things cannot be done without an idea. And for those whom you call "fascists", the entire entourage from the last century, they did not provide any qualitative novelty.
- Do you also exclude mass repressions?
What's the point?
- Pure pleasure.
Even the FSB generals will not get real pleasure from this, whether it's a personal yacht. And their children even more so. I understand why you are asking about the repressions, but the Serebrennikov case is just an attempt by the security officials to show who is the boss. Unobtrusively so. And then some have already thought that they can influence the first person. Nobody can, and then - the first person in eternity, in History. And here and now the security forces rule. How was it chanted at the opposition rallies in 2012? "We are the power here!"
- And it seemed to me that this was a tunnel under Surkov.
Surkov is not in danger. He is just inviolable, because he is conducting all the difficult negotiations on Ukraine, on the Donbass.
- By the way, about Ukraine. What do you think is the fate of Don Bass?
The longer it stays outside Ukraine, the more difficult it will be to integrate it there, and the time line, it seems to me, is five years. After that, alienation and hostility can become formidable. As the Russian side says at the talks: if we weaken support for Donbass, Ukrainian troops will enter there and massive repressions will begin. However, there is a certain compromise option: Donbass goes under temporary international administration (UN, for example) and the "blue helmets" are included there. Several years (at least five to seven) will be spent on the reconstruction of the region, the formation of local authorities and so on. Then a referendum is held on its status. Currently, Ukraine is vehemently rejecting the idea of federalization, because Russia is proposing it. And if Europe proposes federalization, then Ukraine can accept this idea.
- And no Zakharchenko?
He will go somewhere ... If not to Argentina, then to Rostov.
- What do you think: in the summer of 2014 it was possible to go to Mariupol, Kharkov, then everywhere?
In April 2014, this could have been done much easier, and no one could have defended themselves. One local high-ranking character, we will not name names (although we know), called Turchinov and said: you will resist - in two hours the troops will land on the roof of the Verkhovna Rada. He wouldn't have landed, of course, but it sounded so convincing! Turchinov tried to organize a defense - but at his real disposal was only the police with pistols. And he himself was ready with a grenade launcher and in a helmet to climb onto the roof ...
- And why didn't you go? Afraid that SWIFT will be turned off?
I don't think they would. In my opinion, they would have swallowed it the same way they swallowed Crimea in the end: after all, we have the main sanctions for the Donbass. But, firstly, it turned out that in Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk the moods are far from the same as in Donetsk. And secondly, let's say you even annexed Ukraine as a whole - and what to do? There are only two and a half million people in Crimea, and even then its integration into Russia is going, frankly, not smoothly. And here - about forty-five million! And what will you do with them when it is not clear how to deal with yours?
- Actually, there is another scenario. Kim Jong-un will bang and all our problems will cease to exist.
It won't bang.
- But why? Did he launch a rocket over Japan?
He has few of these missiles. And he won't do anything with Guam. The only thing he really threatens is Seoul. But South Korea has the status of a strategic ally of the United States, and after the first strike on Seoul - and there really is nothing to be done there, the distance is 30-40 km to the border - Trump's hands are untied and the Kim regime ceases to exist.
- That is, everything will end there?
I think that under Trump, yes. My friends from Seoul ...
- Also sources ?!
Colleagues. And they say that no premonition of war or even a military threat is felt: the metropolis lives an ordinary life, people do not panic ...
- What, in your opinion, is the real role of Russia in Trump's victory?
Russia (or, as Putin called it, "patriotic hackers") did launch attacks, after which Obama, he said, warned Putin and the attacks stopped. But all this was before September 2016! Otherwise, Trump's victory is the result of his successful political strategy and Hillary's mistakes. She could not play on the factor of predestination. If you talk about your uncontested victory all the time, they will want to teach you a lesson. Incidentally, this is one of the reasons why Putin has been slow to announce the campaign. What has Trump done? His team clearly understood in which states to win. Trump has successfully politicized the Rednecks, an embittered and somewhat stagnant white middle class. He showed them an alternative: you are not voting for a man from the establishment, but for a simple guy, flesh and blood of true America. And he won on this. But Trump - and this was understood here - is not so good for Russia: rather, Moscow simply did not like Clinton very much.
- Isn't there a global revenge of conservatives in the world?
These myths could be believed in the sixteenth year, when Brexit happened at the same time, Trump won and Le Pen had some chances. But Le Pen never had a chance to advance beyond the second round. And then ... There are relapses, the era does not go away without them, but as the era of Gutenberg ended, so the era of political conservatism, as we knew it before, ended. People live by different oppositions, different desires, and the fight against globalism is the lot of those who want to live in the “mental Donbass”. Such people will always be, these are their personal ideas that do not affect anything.
- A big war not visible on Russian tracks?
We will definitely not initiate it. If others start, which is extremely unlikely, they will have to participate, but Russia itself has neither an idea, nor a resource, nor a desire. What kind of war are you talking about? Look around: how many volunteers went to Donbass? War is a great way to solve internal problems until it leads to suicide: this is the situation now.
- But why did they take Crimea then? Distracted from protests?
I do not think. The protests weren't dangerous. It's just that Putin asked the question: what will remain of him in history? Olympics? And if he really lifted Russia from its knees, how was this expressed? The idea of appropriating / returning Crimea existed before Maidan, just for more soft version... Let us, as it were, buy it from you. It was possible to agree on this with Yanukovych, but then the power in Ukraine collapsed, and Crimea actually fell into the hands of itself.
- And will it remain Russian?
I guess so. The Ukrainian Constitution will say that he is Ukrainian, but everyone will put up with it.
- But how do you imagine the idea with which post-Putin Russia will live?
Very simple: recovery. Because now the country and society are seriously ill, and we all feel it. The problem is not even corruption, it is a special case. The problem is in the deepest, triumphant, general immoralism. In absolute absurdity, idiocy, which is felt at all levels. In the Middle Ages, where we fall - not by someone's evil will, but simply because if there is no forward movement, then the world rolls backward. We need a return to the norm: normal education, calm business, objective information. This is what everyone wants, and, with a few exceptions, even those around Putin. And everyone will breathe a sigh of great relief when the norm returns. When they cease to whip up hatred, and fear ceases to be the main emotion. And then the money will return to the country pretty quickly - including Russian, withdrawn and hidden. And we will become one of the best start-up sites for business, and economic growth within ten to twenty years may turn out to be record-breaking.
- But how are we all going to live together again - so to speak, Krymnash and Namkrysh?
But how did you live after the Civil War? You have no idea how quickly all this is overgrown. People sort things out when they have nothing to do, and then everyone will have a case, because today in the country there is total meaninglessness and aimlessness. It will end - and everyone will find something to do. Except, of course, those who want to remain irreconcilable. There are five percent of such in any society, and this is their personal choice.
- Finally, explain: how are you tolerated at MGIMO?
You know from your own experience that there are different people at MGIMO. There are retrogrades and liberals, there are right and left. And I'm not the one and not the other. I look at everything from the standpoint of ordinary, unbiased common sense. And to everyone who wants to be a successful interpreter of reality here, I can give the only advice: do not look for insidious plans and malicious intent where banal stupidity, greed and cowardice operate.
"Rumors spread throughout Moscow that the archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters."
Five years have passed since the beginning of the mass protests that erupted in the capital in December 2011, after the announcement of the results of the elections to the State Duma. However, the question "what was that?" still does not have an unambiguous answer. According to the MGIMO professor, political scientist and historian Valery Solovy, we are talking about an "attempt at revolution", which had every chance of success.
Valery Solovey reflects on the origins and meaning of the "Snow Revolution" and the reasons for its defeat in an interview with "MK".
Help "MK": “Recently Valery Solovey published a book, the title of which will scare someone, but perhaps inspire someone:“ Revolution! Foundations of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era ”. This work analyzes, first of all, the experience of the "color" revolutions, to which the scientist includes the Russian events of five years ago. The chapter dedicated to him is called The Revolution Betrayed.
Valery Dmitrievich, judging by the abundance of reassuring forecasts issued on the eve of the 2011 Duma elections, the mass protests that followed came as a complete surprise to many, if not most, politicians and experts. Tell me honestly: were they a surprise to you too?
No, they were not a surprise to me. Back in early autumn 2011, my interview was published under the title: "Soon the fate of the country will be decided on the streets and squares of the capital."
But in fairness, I will say that I was not the only one who turned out to be such a seer. Somewhere in the first half of September, I managed to talk with an employee of one of the Russian special services, who, on duty, is studying mass sentiments. I will not specify what kind of organization it is, but the quality of their sociology is considered very high. And I had a chance to make sure that this reputation is justified.
This man frankly told me then that since the beginning of the 2000s there has not yet been such an alarming situation for the authorities. I ask: "What, even mass disturbances are possible?" Says: "Yes, it is possible." When asked what he and his department were going to do in this situation, my interlocutor replied: "Well, how is that? We report to the authorities. But they do not believe us. They believe that we prove our usefulness with such horror stories. The authorities are sure that the situation is under control. and that nothing will happen. "
In addition, in the spring of 2011, the Center for Strategic Research, then headed by Mikhail Dmitriev, published a report that spoke of the high likelihood of public discontent in connection with the elections - up to mass protests. In a word, what happened was predicted in principle. However, there is an immense gap between the categories "can happen" and "happen". Even if we say that something will happen with a high probability, it is not at all a fact that it will happen. But in December 2011 it happened.
Vladimir Putin calculated the situation psychologically very accurately, choosing Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. No other from Putin's entourage would agree to the "reshuffle" that took place after the expiration of the first presidential term, Valery Solovey is sure.
There is a version according to which the unrest was inspired by Medvedev and his inner circle. Is there a ground for such conspiracy theories?
Absolutely none. It is noteworthy that the core of the first protest action, which began on December 5, 2011 on Chistoprudny Boulevard, was made up of people who were election observers. They saw how it all happened and did not doubt that the announced results were falsified. It was expected that only a few hundred people would take part in this first meeting, but several thousand attended. Moreover, they were very determined: they moved to the center of Moscow, breaking through the cordons of police and internal troops. I have personally witnessed these clashes. It was clearly seen that the behavior of the protesters was an unpleasant surprise for the police. She clearly did not expect such militancy from the previously harmless hipsters.
It was a pure moral protest. Spitting in the face of a person and demanding that he wipe himself off and perceive it as God's dew - and this is how the behavior of the one in power looked like - one should not be surprised at his indignation. The society, insulted at first by the "reshuffle" of Putin and Medvedev, was then warped by the shameless manner in which the ruling party tried to secure its monopoly position in parliament. Millions of people felt cheated.
Another thing is that some people from Medvedev's inner circle had an idea to use the rapidly expanding protest in the interests of their boss. And they made contact with the leaders of the protest. According to some reports, Dmitry Anatolyevich was asked to speak on December 10, 2011 at a rally on Bolotnaya Square. And, so to speak, replay the situation with the "castling". But Medvedev did not dare to do this. These rumors, however, were enough for a version of a conspiracy in which Medvedev participated on the one hand, and the West on the other, was born in the heads of the Chekists.
I repeat, there are no grounds for such suspicions. However, the consequence of this version was that Putin had long doubted Medvedev's loyalty. The fact that he, so to speak, is pure in his thoughts and does not harbor "treacherous" plans. As far as we know, suspicions were finally removed only a year and a half ago. But today, Putin, by contrast, sees Medvedev as someone he can fully trust. What manifested itself, in particular, in the situation with. The attack on the government was planned on a much larger scale. But, as we know, the president publicly confirmed his trust in the government and personally in Medvedev, and thus drew the “red line” for the security officials.
The then calculations of the "conspirators" were pure water projection, or did they rely on Medvedev's position?
I think that they acted on their own, hoping that the situation would "steer" in a favorable direction for their boss and, accordingly, for themselves. I am sure that Medvedev did not and could not give them such a sanction. This is not the psychological type.
Incidentally, there are different points of view on how Medvedev reacted to his "non-reapproval" as president. Someone, for example, believes that he had absolutely no reason for frustration: he brilliantly played in a play written at the time of his nomination for the presidency.
I do not believe in such a long and layered conspiracy theories. I have a feeling - and not only me - that Dmitry Anatolyevich was still going to be re-elected. But he found himself in a situation where he had to abandon this idea. A psychologically stronger partner broke him.
- And he obeyed meekly?
Well, not entirely meek, of course. This was probably a personal tragedy. Sergei Ivanov, of course, would not have behaved like that. And no one else from Putin's entourage. In this sense, Vladimir Vladimirovich psychologically calculated the situation very accurately, the choice was correct.
However, the future looked different in 2007 than in 2011. There were some important and still hidden from the public circumstances that did not allow us to say with confidence that in 2011 there will be castling.
You call the mass protest movement in Russia "an attempt at revolution." But today the prevailing point of view is that the circle of these revolutionaries was terribly narrow and they were terribly far from the people, and therefore did not pose a real threat to the authorities. Like, the rest of Russia remained indifferent to this Moscow intellectual "Decembrist uprising", which therefore was nothing more than a storm in a glass of water.
This is not true. It is enough to look at the results of opinion polls, made at the same time, in hot pursuit. Look: at the time of the start of the protests, almost half of Muscovites, 46 percent, in one way or another approved the opposition's actions. Negatively about them 25 percent. Only a quarter. And even less - 13 percent are categorically against.
Another 22 percent found it difficult to define their attitude or declined to answer. This is the data of the Levada Center. It is also significant that 2.5 percent of the capital's residents announced their participation in the rally on Bolotnaya Square on December 10, 2011.
Judging by these data, the number of participants should have been at least 150 thousand. In fact, there were half of them - about 70 thousand. It follows from this amusing fact that at the end of 2011, participation in protests was considered an honorable thing. A kind of symbolic privilege. And remember how many representatives of the Russian elite were at these winter rallies. And Prokhorov came, and Kudrin, and Ksenia Sobchak pushed on the podium ...
- But outside Moscow, the mood was different.
Until now, all revolutions in Russia have developed according to the so-called central type: you seize power in the capital, and after that the whole country is in your hands. Therefore, what they thought at that moment in the provinces does not matter at all. It matters for elections, but not for revolution. This is the first thing.
Secondly, the mood in the provinces was not so different then from those in the capital. According to the fund's survey " Public opinion"Held throughout the country in mid-December 2011, the demand to cancel the results of the elections to the State Duma and to re-vote was shared by 26 percent of Russians. This is a lot. Less than half, 40 percent, did not support this demand. And only 6 percent believed that the elections were held without cheating.
Obviously, the population of large cities fluctuated. It could well have sided with the Moscow hipster revolutionaries if they had behaved more decisively.
In a word, it cannot be called "a storm in a teacup". In fact, on December 5, 2011, a revolution began in Russia. The protest covered more and more territory of the capital, every day more and more people were involved in it. Society was increasingly expressing sympathy for the protesters. The police fizzled out, the authorities were confused and frightened: even a phantasmagoric scenario for the storming of the Kremlin was not ruled out.
Rumors spread throughout Moscow that an archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters. It is not known how true they were, but the very fact of such rumors says a lot about the then mass mood in the capital. For at least two weeks in December, the situation was extremely favorable for the opposition. All the conditions were created for a successful revolutionary action.
It is noteworthy that the protest developed rapidly, despite the fact that the government-controlled media, especially television, adhered to a policy of a strict information embargo against opposition rallies. The thing is that the opposition has a "secret weapon" - social networks. It was through them that she carried out agitation, notification and mobilization of her supporters. By the way, I can't help but notice that since then the value social networks has grown even more.
As Donald Trump's recent campaign has shown, they can already help win elections. I am now analyzing this experience of using social networks in the classroom with my students and in public master classes.
- Where and when was the move made in this game that predetermined the opposition's loss?
I think if on December 10 the rally, as previously planned, had taken place on Revolution Square, events would have developed in a completely different way.
That is, Eduard Limonov is right, asserting that the protest began to "drain" at the moment when the leaders agreed to change the place of the action?
Absolutely. At least twice as many people would come to Revolution Square than to Bolotnaya. And if you are familiar with the topography of Moscow, you can easily imagine what 150 thousand people are protesting in the very heart of the capital, a stone's throw from the parliament and the Central Election Commission. Mass dynamics are unpredictable. One or two calls from the rostrum of the rally, spontaneous movement among its participants, the awkward actions of the police - and a giant crowd moves to the State Duma, the Central Election Commission, the Kremlin ... The authorities understood this very well, so they did everything to move the rally to Bolotnaya. And the leaders of the opposition came to the aid of the authorities. Moreover, in fact, they saved this power. Agreeing to change the Revolution Square to Bolotnaya Square meant, in essence, a refusal to fight. And in the political, and in the moral-psychological, and symbolic terms.
- What was the name of the yacht, so it sailed?
Quite right. Nevertheless, the opposition still had the opportunity to turn the tide in January and February, right up to the presidential elections. If, instead of the fruitless chanting "We are in power here," "We will come again," some action had been taken, the situation could well have developed.
- What do you mean by action?
All successful revolutions began with the creation of the so-called liberated territory. In the form of, for example, a street, square, quarter.
- A la Maidan?
Maidan is one of the historical modifications of this technology. In all revolutions, it is critically important for revolutionaries to create a foothold, a foothold. If we take, for example, the Chinese revolution, which developed along a peripheral type, then there a bridgehead was created in the remote provinces of the country. And for the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, Smolny was such a territory. Sometimes they hold on to the beachhead for a long time, sometimes events unfold very quickly. But it all starts with this. You can even gather half a million people, but it won't make any difference if people just stood there and dispersed.
It is important that quantitative dynamics are complemented by political, new and offensive forms of struggle. If you say, "No, we are standing here and will stand until our demands are met," then you are taking a significant step forward. Attempts to follow this path were made on March 5, 2012 at Pushkinskaya Square and May 6 at Bolotnaya. But then it was too late - the window of opportunity had closed. The March and post-March situation was fundamentally different from the December one. If society had serious and justified doubts about the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections, then Putin's victory in the presidential elections looked more than convincing. Even the opposition did not dare to challenge it.
But December, I stress, was an extremely convenient moment for the opposition. The massive upsurge of the protest movement was combined with the confusion of the authorities, which were quite ready to make serious concessions. However, by mid-January, the mood of the ruling group had changed dramatically. The Kremlin and the White House came to the conclusion that, despite the great mobilization potential of the protest, its leaders are not dangerous. That they are cowardly, do not want and even fear the authorities and that they are easy to manipulate. And one can only agree with this. It is enough to recall the fact that on New Year almost all the opposition leaders went to rest abroad.
One of those people who then formulated the political strategy of the authorities, after the fact, told me the following: “On December 9-10, we saw that the opposition leaders were stupid. And at the beginning of January we were convinced that they value their own comfort above the authorities. we will not share the power, but we will crush the opposition. " I quote almost literally.
- And how far were the authorities ready to go in their concessions? What could the opposition possibly count on?
Concessions to the authorities would be directly proportional to the pressure on them. True, I do not really believe that the opposition could then have won a complete victory - come to power. But it was quite possible to achieve a political compromise.
It is known, for example, that in the corridors of power the possibility of holding early parliamentary elections - after the presidential elections - was discussed. But after the leaders of the opposition showed a complete lack of strategy and will, this idea was removed from the agenda. However, I'm not going to accuse anyone of anything. If God did not give volitional qualities, then He did not. As the French say, they have such a frivolous saying, even the most beautiful girl cannot give more than what she has.
The art of politics is to discern a historical opportunity, and not to push off from it with your hands and feet. History rarely provides an opportunity to change something, and it is usually merciless towards those politicians who miss their chance. She also did not spare the leaders of the "Snow Revolution", as these events are sometimes called. Navalny was prosecuted, his brother ended up in prison. Vladimir Ryzhkov lost his party, Gennady Gudkov - his deputy mandate. Boris Nemtsov left us altogether ... All these people thought that fate would provide them with one more, better opportunity. But in a revolution the best is the enemy of the good. There may not be another chance.
It seems to me that the psychological pattern of the "Snow Revolution" was largely predetermined by the August 1991 phenomenon. For some it was a miracle of victory, for others it was a terrible trauma of defeat. The Chekists, who saw how the monument to Dzerzhinsky was destroyed, who were sitting at that time in their offices and were afraid that a crowd would burst in, have lived since then with fear: "Never more, this will never be allowed again." And the liberals - with the feeling that one fine day the power itself will fall into their hands. As then, in 1991: they did not hit a finger on a finger, but found themselves on a horse.
Let us imagine that the opposition would be able to achieve the holding of repeated parliamentary elections. How would this affect the development of the situation in the country?
I think that even with the most honest vote count, the liberals would not have been able to gain control over the State Duma. A total of 15 would be satisfied, the largest being 20 percent of the seats. However, political system would become much more open, flexible, competitive. And as a result, a lot of what happened in the following years would not have happened.
We would now live in a completely different country. This is the logic of the system: if it closes down, loses its inner dynamism, competitive struggle, if there is no one who could challenge the authorities, then the authorities can make whatever decisions they want. Including strategically erroneous ones. I can say that in March 2014, most of the elite was horrified by the decisions taken at that time. In genuine fear.
- However, the majority of the country's population perceives the events of March 2014 as a great blessing.
In my opinion, the attitude of the majority of the country's population to this was best and most accurately described by the talented playwright Yevgeny Grishkovets: the annexation of Crimea was illegal, but fair. It is clear that no one will be able to return Crimea to Ukraine. Even the Kasparov government would not have succeeded if it had miraculously come to power. But for society, Crimea is already a played-out theme; it is not present in everyday discourse today.
If in 2014-2015 the problem of Crimea divided the opposition, stood up as an insurmountable wall, now it is simply taken out of the brackets. By the way, I would not be surprised at the restoration of the protest coalition that emerged in 2011 and included both liberals and nationalists. As far as I know, this recovery is already in progress.
How likely is it that in the foreseeable future we will see something similar to what the country experienced in that revolutionary winter?
I think the probability is high enough. Although probability, as I said, does not mean inevitability. After the suppression of the 2011-2012 revolution, the system stabilized. Internal "capitulators", as the Chinese would call them, realized that they had to sniff into a rag and walk in the wake of the leader, the national leader.
At the end of 2013, when a system of repressive measures began to take shape in the country, there was a feeling that the regime had cemented everything, that nothing would break through this concrete. But, as is usually the case in history, everywhere and always the power itself provokes new dynamics that undermine stability. First - Crimea, then - Donbass, then - Syria ...
It was not the Americans who planted it, not the opposition. When initiating geopolitical dynamics of this magnitude, you must be aware that it will inevitably affect the socio-political system. And we see that this system is becoming more and more unstable. This is manifested, in particular, in the growing nervousness within the Russian elite, in mutual attacks, in the war of compromising evidence, in the growth of social tension.
The system becomes more turbulent. By the way, the revolution that took place in our country at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, from the point of view of the criteria of historical sociology, is not over. We are still living in a revolutionary era, and new revolutionary paroxysms are not at all excluded.
There is a bright palette in the assessments of the figure of political scientist Valery Solovyov - he is a spy, a Russian nationalist, and an expert in suggestion. The incredible accuracy of his forecasts of certain events in the life of the country, willingly or unwillingly, brings up the idea that the professor has his own network of informants in the vertical of power. The general public recognized Valery Nightingale after high-profile performances at Manezhnaya Square in December 2010 and on the RBK TV channel.
Childhood and youth
The details of the life of a political scientist available in sources are not rich in facts. Valery Dmitrievich Solovey was born on August 19, 1960 in the Luhansk region of Ukraine, in a city with a promising name - Happiness. There is no information about the childhood of Nightingale.
After high school, Valery became a student of the Faculty of History of the Moscow state university... After graduating from the university in 1983, he worked for ten years at the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences. In 1987 he successfully defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of historical sciences.
Further work biography of Valery Solov'i continued at the international foundation for socio-economic and political research "Gorbachev Foundation". According to some reports, Nightingale worked in the fund until 2008. During this time, he prepared several reports for international organizations, including the UN, was a visiting researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and defended his doctoral dissertation.
By the way, some observers and political analysts reproach Valery with connections with the fund and the London School of Economics, believing that both of these institutions a priori cannot be carriers of the idea of creating a strong Russian state. Simultaneously with his work in these organizations, Valery Solovey held a position in the editorial board and wrote articles in the journal Svobodnaya Mysl.
Since 2009, the political scientist has been a member of the Expert Council of the international analytical journal Geopolitics. The magazine promotes the idea of preserving Russian originality, statehood, spreading the Russian language and culture. Well-known media personalities work in the editorial office - Oleg Poptsov, Anatoly Gromyko, Giulietto Chiesa. In addition, Valery Solovey is the head of the Department of Advertising and Public Relations at MGIMO University.
Science and social activities
In 2012, Professor Nightingale made an attempt to make himself known in the political arena louder by creating and leading the New Force party, as announced in January of the same year on the radio station Echo of Moscow. Nationalism, according to the professor, underlies the worldview of normal people, because only thanks to such an attitude towards life there will be a chance to keep the country.
Despite the fact that the ideas promoted by the party found understanding among people, New Force did not pass registration with the Ministry of Justice. The party's official website has been blocked, Twitter and VKontakte pages have been abandoned. This is not surprising, given Valery Solovy's right-wing liberal position: he does not see nationalism as a threat to society, does not consider it an ideology.
Nevertheless, Valery Solovey continues to be active. Today he is the author and co-author of 7 books and more than 70 scientific articles, and the number of Internet publications and articles in the media is in the thousands. It has long become a tradition in the journalistic environment to interview one of the most famous political scientists in the country on every more or less significant issue.
Frank, without embellishment, Nightingale's notes in his own blog on the Echo of Moscow website, on his personal pages in Facebook and "In contact with" collect a lot of comments. Quotes from speeches, the professor's forecasts (by the way, surprisingly accurate) become the subject of discussion, are taken as a basis in the expression on the pages of the LiveJournal of the personal position of caring citizens.
Personal life
All that is known about the personal life of Valery Nightingale is that the professor is married and has a son, Pavel. The spouse's name is Svetlana Anashenkova, originally from St. Petersburg, graduated from the psychology department of St. Petersburg State University, is engaged in the publication of children's literature, teaching aids.
In 2009, together with his sister Tatyana, also a doctor of historical sciences, Nightingale published the book “The Failed Revolution. Historical meanings of Russian nationalism ", which the authors dedicated to their children - Pavel and Fyodor.
Valery Solovey now
The last book by Valery Nightingale so far is “Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era ”was published in 2016.
In the fall of 2017, it became known that the leader of the Rosta Party, a billionaire and an ombudsman for the protection of the rights of entrepreneurs, will participate in the presidential elections in Russia in 2018. In the campaign headquarters of the party, Valery Solovey was appointed responsible for ideology. The professor believes that from the point of view of propaganda, the campaign has already been won, and the goal of Titov's nomination is to influence the economic strategy.
Among the last "prophecies" of Nightingale is the imminent ripening of the political crisis, the loss of control by society, the aggravation of the crisis in the economy. In addition, on a page on Facebook, Valery Dmitrievich expressed his opinion that supposedly one should expect the appearance of Russian volunteers in military conflicts in Yemen, as happened with Libya and Sudan. In other words, Russia will be drawn into yet another conflict, which will again entail multibillion-dollar costs and rejection of the country in the international arena.
Nightingale predicts an imminent end to Putin's next presidency, in two or three years, and the reason lies not even in the years of Vladimir Vladimirovich (the heads of state are much older), but in the fact that "the people of Russia are tired of Putin." And then a series of major changes will follow.
Speaking about a possible successor, Nightingale does not consider the Minister of Defense as such, whose candidacy is not directly discussed, but is being discussed in narrow circles. The political scientist drew attention to the former deputy Shoigu, lieutenant general, governor of the Tula region.
On the exaggerated Ukrainian issue and topic in presidential elections in the USA, Valery Solovey is also straightforward. According to the political scientist, relations with Ukraine will no longer be the same, and Crimea will remain Russian. And Russia, albeit long before the elections, launched attacks, but the victory was due to a successful political strategy, exploitation of the role of a guy from a neighboring yard and mistakes.
Publications
- 2007 - "The meaning, logic and form of Russian revolutions"
- 2008 - "Blood and soil of Russian history"
- 2009 - “Failed revolution. Historical meanings of Russian nationalism "
- 2015 - “The Ultimate Weapon. The basics of psychological warfare and media manipulation. "
- 2016 - “Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era "
Russian political scientist on Ulyukayev's hope, Kadyrov's suppression and Putin's pause
For some six months, the main memes of the Russian political agenda have become “request for change” and “image of the future”, which were well known only to the readers of the newspaper “Zavtra” before. Well-known historian, political scientist and publicist Valery Solovey told in an interview to Realnoe Vremya about what fills these memes with content, namely about the growing political activity of citizens, the confusion of the elites and the still hidden function of Ramzan Kadyrov.
Appeals from the regions were allowed to take their course: as you want, so react
Valery Dmitrievich, you recently wrote on your Twitter that the situation in the country is shaken not by a conspiracy, but by "stupidity and methodologists." Apparently, you meant the "generous" people and their main public representative Sergei Kiriyenko? What mistakes were made by the presidential administration under him?
Yes, this meant advisers close to Kiriyenko from the group of “methodologists”. According to general opinion (by general I mean the opinion of Moscow political experts and people close to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation), they failed to determine the correct political line of conduct and made a number of mistakes. Associated, for example, with the reaction to the events of March 26 and June 12 and, in general, the reaction to the Navalny phenomenon. Do you remember, say, the video in which Navalny is compared to Hitler, or the song by Alisa Vox, which calls for schoolchildren not to go to rallies, but to "start with themselves." It is clear that the legs in this case grew out of the administration. And all this worked for the benefit of Alexey Anatolyevich. I'm not talking about more serious things, when appeals from the regions with a request to suggest how they should react to the upcoming actions of Navalny were actually allowed to take their course: whatever you want, react. This is despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Russian regions (Tatarstan is an exception in this case) needs an understanding of the Kremlin's position and clear instructions.
This is one part of the problem. The second is that people who are tightly integrated into the presidential administration rate its ability to solve problems that face the country and specifically the Kremlin more and more. Moreover, there is some contradiction, because they personally rate Sergei Kiriyenko quite highly. But at the same time, they note that, at least until this summer, he did not manage to organize the effective work of the administration. Perhaps this was due to internal opposition... Not everything was going well there, he had conflicts with other prominent apparatchiks. Either it took a long time to get used to it, or the point is that when he agreed to move to the administration, there was only one situation in the country, and now, since the early spring of this year, there has been a political revival. That is, a different situation developed, and it was necessary to comprehend it, to understand what was happening, and to suggest how to cope with it.
“It was 'an offer that cannot be refused,' nevertheless, Kiriyenko was probably promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, successfully runs the presidential campaign.” Photo kremlin.ru
- So Kiriyenko was invited to this position? Didn't he really want her?
It was "an offer that cannot be refused," nevertheless, Kiriyenko was probably promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, he successfully runs the presidential campaign. I don’t know what kind of reward, but you can guess that it is about a post in the government. Maybe about the position of the head of the cabinet. Indeed, for the head of Rosatom, the transition to the post of deputy chief of the presidential administration is a loss of status, independence and a significant complication of life.
The elite builds up tension, discontent and fear
The trial began against the former Minister of Economic Development of Russia Alexei Ulyukaev, at which the defendant has already accused the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin of provoking a bribe. What else interesting do you think we can hear during this process?
In fact, we haven't heard anything interesting yet. For political Moscow, what Ulyukayev said is no secret - this scenario was discussed long before the trial. More precisely, not the scenario, but the background of the events.
And I think that nothing more awaits us. Ulyukayev will certainly not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him it is fraught with a worsening of the situation. I think he still hopes that his article will be re-qualified for a less serious one, and he will receive a suspended sentence. Or it will be released under the planned amnesty on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. But the fact that there will be no acquittal is absolutely certain.
- It will be a great irony of fate if it comes out on the occasion of the centenary of October.
Well, in Russia, everything is already permeated not even with irony, but with grotesque. Look at the story of Poklonskaya - it's something Kafkaesque. Or, rather, Gogol, Saltykov-Shchedrinskoe.
“I think that nothing more awaits us. Ulyukayev will certainly not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him it is fraught with a worsening of the situation. " Photo iz.ru
How would you comment on the assumption of Alexei Venediktov that Sergei Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev's statement?
Anyone can stand. In general, Aleksey Alekseevich has a sane idea. Chemezov and Sechin are opponents. And if they are opponents, then Chemezov, as an influential person, can somehow support Ulyukaev so that life does not seem like honey to Igor Ivanovich. But even if Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev's statement, this does not mean that the verdict will be acquitted. The prosecution will get its way, no doubt about that. Ulyukaev will definitely not be able to leave the courtroom with a clean, spotless reputation. It is quite possible to write over the Russian court, as over Dante's hell: "Leave hope, everyone who enters here." This is exactly such a hopeless place.
All the fuss will be around what exactly Ulyukaev will receive - imprisonment, suspended sentence or amnesty.
That is, this court does not tell us about some tectonic shifts, about the “split of the elites”, as Dmitry Gudkov suggested?
There is no split. A split in the elite is when different groups of the elite see differently how to build a strategy for the development of the country and society, and not when they are fighting for resources. A split in the Russian elite will arise in one and only case - when very powerful pressure is exerted on the central government in the form of popular demonstrations from below. Then the elite will have doubts about its political future and different versions of this future will appear.
- Can foreign policy pressure split it?
No, he can not. It can - and is already causing - growing tension. But this does not mean that at least one of them, and even more so some group, will dare to openly oppose Putin if he decides to go to the polls. This is absolutely out of the question.
So far, quantitative rather than qualitative changes are taking place in the Russian elite. There is an accumulation of tension, discontent and fear. The latter is caused by the clause in the US sanctions law, which involves an investigation of the ties of parastatal structures of the oligarchs with the Kremlin. Moreover, not only the oligarchs themselves, but also the members of their families are subject to the law. They are very afraid of this. But these are moods, emotions. There is no action.
“It has two functions. The first is to maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is a personal guarantor of stability in this region. And the second is to act as a pillar of the regime in the event of the outbreak of mass unrest ”. Photo kremlin.ru
"We will face many local protests that will gradually merge into a nationwide one."
- What role does Ramzan Kadyrov play in the Russian elite? there were many, but in Lately even more?
It serves two purposes. First, maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is a personal guarantor of stability in this region. And the second is to act as a pillar of the regime in the event of the outbreak of mass unrest.
- Unrest in Moscow, you mean?
If unrest begins, they are likely to take on a nationwide character. That is, they can cover several cities.
When, say, he talks about his key role in Crimean Spring (as it is stated in social networks) - is this agreed with the Kremlin?
Unlikely. He considers himself a strong independent figure. Kadyrov is by far the most influential regional leader in the Russian Federation, far more influential than everyone else. Accordingly, he allows himself what no one, including major federal figures, can afford.
What is the reason for the statement of the head of VTsIOM, Valery Fedorov, that the demand for stability in Russian society has been replaced by the demand for change? Especially in light of the fact that Fedorov considers this phase dangerous, I quote: "Revolutionary sentiments appear not in a crisis situation, but when the crisis is over."
The very request for change after twenty, if not more, the request for stability is a very serious, almost tectonic shift. But what consequences it will lead to, we will not find out immediately, but within two or three years. Because there are not enough changes in the consciousness of people - it is much more important for their political behavior to change. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the Navalny phenomenon. This is what Gleb Pavlovsky called politicization.
“There are not enough changes in the minds of people - it is much more important for their political behavior to change. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the Navalny phenomenon. " Photo by Oleg Tikhonov
We just need to be aware that mass dynamics are absolutely and fundamentally unpredictable. We do not know how the political activity will develop. I am inclined to believe that it will go on increasing, that is, we will face many local protests, which will gradually begin to merge into a national one. And I do not exclude that this will start in the coming autumn.
And the political crisis itself, if we enter into it, and it seems that we are slowly being drawn into it, will continue for at least two years, more likely even three years. But this is still under a big question mark. Because a change in the mood of citizens does not automatically lead to a change in behavior.
Maybe the very appearance of such a statement from the head of the pro-government sociological structure suggests that the government itself is trying to ride this wave?
No, the authorities are trying to defend themselves against it. She just understands that this is a threat. How to saddle?
- The most to lead the renewal process.
This could have been done if new person with a fundamentally new national agenda. Which would suggest an image of the future. Or if Putin suggested it. That is, if you and I saw the new Putin. This is practically impossible, but theoretically it cannot be ruled out.
That is, do you think that Putin will go to the polls after all, but will arm himself with some kind of vague agenda?
You know, we will know for sure whether he will go or not, not earlier than October. Until now, there are doubts about this, albeit microscopic. Although everything he does is very similar to the election campaign. Nevertheless, until he personally announces that he is going to the polls, doubts will remain.
“You know, we will know for sure whether he will go or not, not earlier than October. Until now, there are doubts about this, albeit microscopic. Although everything he does is very similar to the election campaign. " Photo kremlin.ru
In the meantime, he says: “I think. I have not decided yet". Maybe he decided, but hides. Or maybe he really didn’t decide. I can only say that this pause causes some confusion among the political elite. She would have preferred certainty, and the sooner the better.
- Then why do you think that he will announce this not earlier than October?
This is not what I think, this is how they think, as far as is known, in the inner circle. But again, these are all rumors. After all, he did not announce this during the "direct line". They say that in October it will become clear that Putin has promised to make it. Or maybe he will bring it in in November.
The ending follows
Rustem Shakirov
Valery Solovey: by 2024 there will be 15-20 regions in Russia and state ideology
Valery Solovey, a political scientist and professor at MGIMO, expressed his opinion on rumors about an imminent constitutional reform in Russia.
The other day the chairman of the constitutional court Valery Zorkin spoke about the need to change the country's Constitution.
According to Professor Nightingale, by 2024 in Russia the number of subjects of the federation will be reduced through unification and state ideology will be introduced.
Valery Solovey:
I already had to write and speak on this topic, I will repeat myself with pleasure.
1. Preparation of constitutional reform, or rather cardinal changes in wide range constitutional laws was launched in the fall of 2017.
2. Changes were developed in the following areas:
a) the formation of a new configuration of state power and administration;
b) a radical reduction in the number of subjects of the federation (up to 15-20) by combining them for the purpose of ease of management, leveling the levels of development and neutralizing ethnic separatist tendencies;
c) decisive amendments to the laws on elections and political parties (by no means in the sense of liberalization);
d) the introduction of state ideology.
Well and one more thing.
3. Initially, it was not clear which of the changes and to what extent would be given the green light, and which would not.
But in any case, they were not supposed to be implemented all at the same time due to the predicted strong negative reaction.
4. Sine qua non - the reconfiguration of state power and management, which should provide the institutional and legal framework for the transit of the system.
There are several options here too.
From the well-known model with the establishment of the State Council as an analogue of the Politburo and reducing the role of the president to representative and symbolic functions to, on the contrary, strengthening and expanding presidential powers and establishing the post of vice president. (There are several more options.)
5. The transit of the system should be carried out until 2024, in order to catch the enemies of the external and internal by surprise. It was assumed that the decisive years could be 2020-2021.
6. There is one and only reason why these terms could be shifted downward.
And this reason has nothing to do with politics and declining ratings. The situation is assessed as disturbing, but not critical and under control.
7. And even more so, there was no talk of any early elections and could not go. A radical change in the organization of state power and administration is not being carried out in order to hold elections and subject the system to severe stress.
8. Among the key beneficiaries of the reform, the authorities name three people who are already in the top ten of the elite in terms of their political and bureaucratic weight.