Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin biography. How Marshal Nedelin died. "Kapustin Yar", sat down in a puddle

In military service since 1920. He graduated from the military-political courses of the Turkestan Front (1923), advanced courses for artillery commanders (1929 and 1934) and advanced courses for senior artillery commanders at the Artillery Academy named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1941). He began his service in the army as a private, then became a squad leader and a political fighter. Participated in battles during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 during the liquidation of the Tambov uprising of 1920-1921 and the Basmachi in Central Asia in 1922. Since 1923 he served in artillery units, since 1925 - political instructor of the battery, then - regimental school. In 1929-1937 he was a battery and battalion commander, chief of staff of the regiment's artillery. In 1937-1939 he participated in the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people of 1936-1939. Upon his return - the commander of an artillery regiment, then - the chief of artillery of a rifle division.

In April 1941 he was appointed commander of the 4th artillery anti-tank brigade in KOVO. With this brigade at the beginning of World War II, he entered into hostilities with the enemy on the Southern Front. Subsequently, he held the following positions: Deputy Chief of Artillery of the 18th Army, Deputy Commander of Artillery of the 37th Army, 56th Army, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasian Front Artillery and Commander of the 5th Artillery Corps (1941-1943).

From July 1943 until the end of the war, he commanded the artillery of the South-Western (from October 20, 1943 - the 3rd Ukrainian) Front. He confidently controlled artillery in the Iasi-Kishinev, Budapest and Vienna operations, resolutely concentrated the main artillery forces of the front in breakthrough areas. For the skillful leadership of the artillery of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the courage shown in repulsing large enemy tanks and infantry forces northeast of Lake Balaton, M.I. Nedelin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, M.I. Nedelin was appointed commander of artillery of the Southern Group of Forces (1945-1946), chief of staff of artillery of the Armed Forces (1946-1948), head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Armed Forces (1948-195), commander of artillery of the Soviet Army (1950-1952 and 1953-1955) , from January 1952 to April 1953 - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR for armaments. From March 1955 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for special weapons and rocket technology, from December 1959 - Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

In order to ensure the defense capability and security of the country, M.I. Nedelin was actively involved in the creation and organization of this new type of aircraft. Under his leadership, the first samples of ICBMs and medium-range missiles were developed and tested. He did a lot of work on the formation of the first missile units, the training and deployment of missile personnel and the creation of the foundations for the combat use of missile forces.

Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR IV and V convocations.

Awarded five Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Kutuzov 1st Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, Patriotic War 1st Class, "Badge of Honor" and medals, as well as foreign orders.

He died at the test site when a rocket exploded during its launch.

MiTRofan Ivanovich Nedelin.

Articlecreated co-authoredwith Vladimirom IvanovichIvkin

instead of a preface. This article was written by the authors at the request of the historical popular science magazine "Rodina" in September 2015. The article was planned to coincide with the 55th anniversary of the first "rocket" tragedy at Baikonur, which occurred on October 24, 1960 during the test of the R-16 rocket. The assignment for the article was difficult. It was necessary not only to talk about that terrible tragedy and great sacrifices, but also to somehow comment on the role of Lavrenty Beria in the development of Soviet rocket science. If you look at the same time, "where" the events of 1960, and "where" the same L.P. Beria, it becomes obvious that the task was not just difficult. Archipelago and extraordinary! And, nevertheless, the authors managed to solve it. Perhaps for the first time in Russian history, albeit in an extremely concise form, but quite completely, the contribution of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria to the formation and development of Soviet rocket science was characterized. Objectively, non-opportunistically, on the basis of a detailed study of archival documents and materials that were completely closed until recently. But this article did not go into the planned circulation of October of the past year. Its release was postponed to December, so, in any case, the authors were informed. In December - the same result, or rather, no result. Only in the January issue of Rodina magazine, already this year, under the names of the authors, some material was published. Not an article, because 95% of its content was cut out, but it was the material, or rather, only a small part of it. And without even starting. All historical texture from the article, in fact, has been removed! What invoice? "Inconvenient." About the positive and outstanding role of Beria L.P., about the "non-fictional" Nedelin M.I., about the position of Mitrofan Ivanovich in the "case" of Marshal Yakovlev N.D., that the very "case" of Marshal Yakovlev N.D. it was not fabricated that the origins of the brilliant achievements of Soviet rocket science and cosmonautics date back to the Stalin era. The editors ruthlessly rejected even the fact discovered by the authors that it was Beria L.P. in February 1953, he authorized a qualitatively new large-scale rocket program, the end result of which, and after a very short time, was the exit of Mankind into space! In connection with these circumstances, the authors submit the following. The historical popular science magazine "Rodina" does not need an objective history! It is too easy for a magazine, the name of its editors, to get rid of "inconvenient" facts that go beyond the framework of generally accepted facts. And the fact that all the facts set forth in the article below are objective, the authors vouch. In this subject area, we have been conducting scientific research, research and studies for over 20 years, working with documents and materials from all the leading archives of the country, in the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, GARF, RGASPI, RGANI, RGAE, TsAMO and its branches. Echoing Andrey Karaulov, the author and host of the "Moment of Truth" program, we are responsible for every word we say, for every given fact. And therefore, having not received the “go-ahead” for a full and honest publication in the Rodina magazine, we, the authors of the article “Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin. interested readers. And anticipating a possible reaction. Without a doubt, the editorial staff of Rodina magazine, if it deems it necessary, will necessarily refer in its defense to some expert assessment of the material presented by the authors, the conclusions of which, most likely, will be entirely negative: "does not correspond", "not disclosed", "not is set", etc. She certainly has every right to do so. I want to know one thing: who are the experts? Who has worked on this topic in the archives for more than 20 years? Who has researched and thoroughly studied thousands and thousands of volumes of the post-war funds of the Soviet Government, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Military and Naval Ministries, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, all the leading defense industrial ministries, the Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Affairs, the Standing Commission for Defense under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Bureau for Mechanical Engineering, the First and Third Main Directorates under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the 4th Directorate of the GAU, TsNIIMASH, NII-4, Deputy Minister of Defense for special weapons and jet technology and many others, one way or another related to the problems of rocket science and the combat use of missile and nuclear missile weapons in 1944-1991? Studying the materials of the indicated archival funds, where, according to the existing rules, data on each researcher or expert is entered in each case, we, in the vast majority of cases, have not seen such records, alas. None. Not with the names of researchers or experts, or at least with their notes and signatures. The fact that our concerns about experts are not unfounded is clearly demonstrated by the analysis of the revision made by the journal's specialists of the original text of the article. In the published version, one of these specialists - a proofreader, editor, or maybe the expert himself, you don’t recognize - Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin was demoted! From Commander-in-Chief to Commander. Apparently, the level of competence of Rodina's "specialists" does not make it possible to understand the differences between these positions. Secondly, Nedelina M.I. in the same place, they also awarded a position that did not exist at that time, made them "commander of the Strategic Missile Forces." For their general information: until November 1980, in all official documents and according to the staff list, this position was referred to only as "Commander-in-Chief of the Rocket Forces." Without adding "strategic purpose". That is, exactly as we indicated in the full text of the article. But the "specialists" of the magazine "Rodina" are not up to such "nuances" and subtleties. They rule the historical facts under their own level. They are not even embarrassed by the fact that such (in their eyes, undoubtedly, "competent") editing, they undermine the authority and knowledge of the authors, make them a laughing stock in the eyes of a competent Reader! To be honest, we wondered for a long time and looked for where, in what place could "gain" their "deep knowledge" in this subject area "specialists of the Motherland". And they found the only source where the above position is named in the same way. On Wikipedia! In an article about the Strategic Missile Forces. It is very likely that the results of our work were checked for compliance with the "historical postulates" of this particular information site. There is, admittedly, no other intelligible explanation for the flagrant errors in what has been published here. So, with respect to those for whom historical science and the power of fact are not fiction and arbitrariness,

Candidate of Historical Sciences Alexander Yasakov,

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences,Vladimir Ivkin

The following are : uncut article "Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin. The truth and fiction of the legendary biography", timed to coincide with the anniversary of the tragedy at Baikonur on October 24, 1960; the material of the authors published in the January 2016 issue of Rodina magazine. Actually the article. October 24, 1960 Tyura-Tam. Research test site N 5 of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, in the present - the Baikonur Cosmodrome. At the 41st launch pad, work is in full swing. It's been almost four days now. Preparations are underway for testing the new R-16 intercontinental strategic missile. Around the two-stage hulk installed on the launch pad, the height of an 11-story building - over two hundred people. Numbers of the combat crew, representatives of developers and industry, controlling persons, members of the state commission. There are even many who, according to the regulations, in a given place, at a given time, are not supposed to be. Still would! The first launch of a new rocket is about to happen, so why not take a look at the historic launch with your own eyes? Here even the lazy will not refuse. What’s more, no one really interfered with it. As usual, it was a sin not to take advantage of the opportunity. The first persons of state tests are even more so here. Chairman of the State Commission, Chief Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin and technical director of the test, he is also the chief designer of the R-16 rocket, Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel. Boris Mikhailovich Konoplev, chief designer of the Kharkov OKB-692, is also on the site. With his brainchild, the control system "R-sixteenth", not everything is in order. At the stage of vertical checks, one of its blocks issued improper commands. Having postponed the start scheduled for October 23, the reasons were sorted out for a long time. The results of the analysis did not inspire optimism. It took a long time to fix the problem. And the first one is in a hurry! I really want Nikita Sergeevich to rejoice about the new achievement of the Soviet system. As soon as he seized upon the sole power, so the restless desire for accomplishments and victories literally began to burst. In the situation that had arisen during the tests, a non-standard solution was required. And the technical management seems to have found it. The onboard network - bypassing the electrical circuits of the faulty unit - was powered from autonomous energy sources. This made it possible to avoid lengthy operations for draining and refueling propellant components and bringing the unit into working condition. The final part of the launch preparations was continued with the fueled rocket and with onboard power on. Deviating from previously approved technology. At 18:45 on the 24th, there was very little left, just a little, some 30-40 minutes. Just finish the last checks, and the 140-ton rocket will go on its first flight. It seems that almost everyone thought so then. If not everyone. But... It didn't happen. The disaster struck with lightning speed. The main engine of the second stage started abnormally. In the blink of an eye, its fiery torch burned through the thin walls of the oxidizer and fuel tanks of the lower, first stage, and a powerful explosion, destroying the rocket, scattered everything around, people, service platforms, equipment, and equipment. A monstrous fire completed the picture of the tragedy and made its results horrific. In the flames of hellfire, interspersed with poisonous vapors of asymmetric demethylhydrozine (rocket fuel) and AK-27I oxidizer, 74 people died. 49 people received injuries and burns of varying severity. Four of them later died in hospitals and hospitals. The first on the list of the dead and one of the first to die a terrible death was the Chairman of the State Commission for the Testing of the R-16 Rocket, Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery Nedelin M.I. An outstanding Soviet military leader, a participant in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, he went through the Great Patriotic War from its first days to its last. He entered his name in the history of the Great Victory with personal courage and the results of battles and battles in the positions of division artillery chief, army and front artillery commander. Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of thirteen military orders, a man of unparalleled courage, a brilliant organizer, a most intelligent leader. An outstanding personality in all respects, he devoted himself entirely to the cause of serving his Fatherland, without a trace. Heroic deeds and merits to Nedelin M.I. was not to borrow, with an excess would be enough for more than one person. It is unlikely that his name needed to sound even louder, to become more capacious and meaningful. Moreover, it did not deserve to be turned into a distorted legend, into a dead idol, whose deeds were attributed to the deeds, results and aspirations of other historical characters. That's how they made him. Made later. Successors and part of the senior generals of the Strategic Missile Forces. Persons who are far from historical science, but passionately wanting to tell history. And they told. Without the study and analysis of archival historical sources - for this is a long, monotonous and difficult matter - but in the presentation of other people's memories, their own conjectures and with varying degrees of imagination. The clichés invented by such "historians" have little to do with objective reality, but, nevertheless, they roam confidently from edition to edition, to this day. To debunk some of them, to name their true names, to restore authenticity to the events and, ultimately, to destroy the fabricated and, therefore, unnecessary legend is our main goal. Or in other words, brushing aside fiction, forward, to the defense of the fact! So, nfirst fuck . Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin directly supervised the creation of a research base for domestic rocket science. It would be interesting, of course, to find out more from the authors of this statement when he was in charge? But they don't specify. And it's understandable why. Indeed, in the Soviet Union, the rocket science research base began to be created already at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. Created as the Soviet military-political leadership realized the scope of the Third Reich in this area, and made operational decisions to study its impressive achievements. Actually, the organization of work on the study of German technology and German experience gave rise to the process, as a result of which the research base of domestic rocket science began to take shape. In this process, first by the decisions of the State Defense Committee, then the Council of People's Commissars, headed by Stalin I.V., most of the defense people's commissariats were involved: the aviation industry, weapons, ammunition (agricultural engineering), the electrical industry, the shipbuilding industry, the chemical industry, mortar weapons (engineering and instrumentation). Direct leadership and responsibility fell on the relevant people's commissars, from March 15, 1946 - ministers: Shakhurina A.I. (from January 5, 1946 Khrunicheva M.V.), Ustinova D.F., Vannikova B.L. (from June 26, 1946 Goremykina P.N.), Kabanova I.G., Nosenko I.I. (from March 15, 1946 - Goreglyada A.A.), Pervukhina M.G., Parshina P.I. Already in 1944, in order to study the design of the German V-1 projectile and recreate it by Soviet designers and engineers, Plant No. 51 of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry and its Design Bureau were redesigned for a given line of work. Both the plant and the Design Bureau were then entrusted to the 30-year-old Chelomey V.N. To a young, but purposeful specialist, whose future path in science and technology will go through thorns to the stars. In the literal sense - to two, Hero of Socialist Labor. Even the uninitiated knows about the subsequent enduring role of Vladimir Nikolaevich in Soviet rocket science. An outstanding scientist, designer, engineer, there were no unsolvable tasks for him. And in the arsenal of his achievements is the whole range of rocket and space systems: projectiles, cruise and intercontinental missiles, space launch vehicles, artificial earth satellites, orbital stations and manned ships. In April 1945, for the development of German powder rockets, the State Central Design Bureau N 1 of the Ministry of Munitions was created (first chiefs Krupnov N. I., Sakhanitsky A.V.). Starting with the study and development of several types of German rocket weapons, including the Rheinbote unguided rocket and the Reintochter anti-aircraft guided missile in its gunpowder version, the bureau in subsequent years grew to the most powerful Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, in the development palette of which intercontinental ballistic missiles that do not have analogues in the world, the famous Pioneer, Topol, Topol-M, Yars. More even bigger. With the end of hostilities, the State Defense Committee moved the target work to the territory of Germany, to the Soviet zone of occupation. It was consistently carried out: the Commission established by the decision of the Special Committee under the State Defense Committee (chaired by G. M. Malenkov) to develop measures for the study and development of German jet technology. It was headed by the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin A.I.; formed by Decree of the GOKO of July 8, 1945 N 9475, the Special Technical Interdepartmental Commission for collecting materials and studying the German experience in creating jet technology, chaired by a member of the military council of the Guards mortar units, Major General of Artillery Gaidukov L.M. The result of the work of the latter was the organization of several research and production centers, where, with the involvement of a large number of German specialists, the painstaking process of mastering the advanced achievements of the just defeated enemy by Soviet specialists began. Such centers were: the Nordhausen and Shot groups, the Rabe Institute, the Werk-3 plant, the Leesten test station, the Gröttrup bureau, and a group of anti-aircraft missiles. The main theme of the work is guided long-range missiles V-2 and guided anti-aircraft missiles "Wasserfall", "Schmetterling" and "Reintochter" in a liquid version. In parallel with this, the State Union Design Bureau N 47, headed by N.T. Kulakov, is being reoriented to study the Henschel-293 and Fritz-X jet aircraft torpedoes in the USSR. The study of captured weapons quickly formed an understanding: further work on the development of missile systems and the creation of domestic analogues that are not inferior to them requires a qualitatively new organization. With comprehensive proposals on this subject to Stalin, I.V. speakers: Beria L.P., Malenkov G.M., Bulganin N.A., Vannikov B.L., Ustinov D.F., Yakovlev N.D. At a meeting on April 29, 1946, in the leader's Kremlin office, these proposals were considered, revised, and on May 13 formalized by a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR under the heading "Issues of rocket weapons." According to this Decree, the Special Committee on Jet Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR headed the supervision and control of all work in this area. Malenkov G.M. was appointed its chairman. The surname of his deputy in the text of the Decree Stalin I.V. entered by hand. The involved ministries were divided into parent and related ministries. Their responsibility was clearly delineated by groups of missile systems. As part of each, a rocket control was created. And, finally, by the said Decree, a research base of domestic rocket science was formed: two powerful research centers in Germany, five largest research institutes within the country, three specialized design bureaus and two test sites here. This list now includes world famous: the Nordhausen Institute and NII-88, where the genius of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, Alexei Mikhailovich Isaev and many other outstanding scientists and designers developed; NII-4 with its great discoverer Mikhail Klavdievich Tikhonravov; the oldest missile range in the town of Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan region, which had a unique test base. And all this without taking into account many research institutes and design bureaus, which in the matter of creating rocket technology were identified as related. For example, such as the famous OKB-456, headed by Valentin Petrovich Glushko, who later became a genius in liquid propulsion, or NII-10, where gyroscopic instruments for all types of guided missiles were developed under the leadership of Viktor Ivanovich Kuznetsov. And "such" subcontractors already at the beginning of the journey numbered several dozen. A year later, the name of the Special Committee on Jet Technology and its chairman were changed. Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was headed by another deputy of Stalin, I.V. in the Government and Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR Bulganin N.A. At the same time, in order to increase the responsibility of the ministries for the fulfillment of tasks in the field of missile weapons, all the main ministers whose ministries were entrusted with such tasks were included in the Committee. And the formation and strengthening of the research base of rocket science continued again. Scientific and production cooperation expanded, new research institutes and design bureaus were created for new tasks. Among them: Special Bureau N 1 of the Ministry of Armaments, formed to develop the Kometa aviation complex, designed to destroy large enemy ships; Design Bureau N 3 of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, whose task was to create jet weapons for infantry and aviation; Special Design Bureau N 385 for long-range missiles, which later became the largest center for sea-based missiles, as well as a number of others. A special scope for the new branch of Soviet industry - rocket science - and, consequently, the expansion of its research base, was given with the onset of the 50s of the past century. Then, when the threat of new aggression from the United States and the NATO bloc formed a year earlier, and with the use of nuclear weapons of attack, became distinct and quite real. Not having in their arsenals the means of defeating the main potential enemy on his own territory, the Soviet military-political leadership, headed by Stalin I.V. began searching for options to protect the country and the population from possible nuclear aggression. The result of such a search was a comprehensive solution that combines several parallel steps, such as: the creation along the borders of the country of the most powerful aviation fighter group on jet aircraft as part of the Air Defense Forces of the Border Line; deploying a unified system for radar detection of enemy aircraft, alerting friendly troops of their appearance and directing aircraft at an enemy invading from the air; speeding up work on the Comet system in order to combat US and UK aircraft carriers; emergency deployment of work to create a highly effective air defense system for cities and strategic facilities, built on the integrated use of modern means of detection and destruction, namely radar and anti-aircraft guided missiles. The system was assigned the code "Berkut". The work in the last two areas was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, who initiated them, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the Special Committee under the Government of the country. The closest associate of Stalin I.V., the most gifted and capable of the leader’s entourage, a tough manager, he was illegally arrested, slandered and liquidated in 1953. The Soviet partocracy, having eliminated Beria L.P. from power, not only destroyed him physically, she turned his name into a universal monster, trampling any truth about him for many decades. The reality was different. Beria L.P. He was a man of inexhaustible energy, extraordinary determination, efficiency and many talents, capable of solving and solving problems of any difficulty and scale. It was under his leadership and control that the country, dilapidated by a terrible war, in the shortest possible time was able to create nuclear weapons that were unthinkable in terms of complexity and laboriousness from almost complete scratch. Only by his assertiveness and organization in a matter of months the newest factories and combines began to work, in a couple of years entire industries were launched. It's hard to believe, but the construction of power plants and canals, oil refineries, geological exploration throughout the country, the construction of the famous "Stalinist" skyscrapers, the planning of rail transportation, and the creation of bacteriological weapons were organized, in fact, by one person. The rest did. And the name of this man is Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. It is clearly understandable why the daunting task of speeding up the development of the Kometa and Berkut systems was entrusted to him. And this despite the fact that the "atomic project" of the USSR, headed by L.P. Beria, was still far from being completed. Lavrenty Pavlovich completed the new tasks assigned. "Kometa" went into production in January 1953, construction work on the deployment of the "Berkut" system around Moscow in the same year was already coming to an end. To ensure such a result, he built a powerful production and research cooperation, bringing together many dozens of plants, factories, research institutes and design bureaus of almost all Union ministries! Rapid and undeniable successes in the field of creating projectiles and anti-aircraft guided missiles already at the stage of their development dictated to Stalin I.V. new solution. It assigned to Beria L.P. extended tasks. In August 1951, he was also assigned to oversee work on long-range missiles. Until that very moment, these works were supervised by N.A. Bulganin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Progress in this area has been modest. In five years, the head NII-88 was able to create the R-1 missile with a range of 270 km, an exact copy of the German V-2, and take the "one" into service. Its mass production was not started. Structurally very close to the previous R-2 missile, whose maximum range was 590 km, at that time also completed. But it was only to be adopted, as well as brought "to mind". With R-3, designed to reach a range of 3000 km Nothing has worked for four years now. The same did not work with anti-aircraft guided missiles, with the R-101, an analogue of the German Wasserfall, and with the R-112, a modernized version of the German Schmetterling. The combat use of R-1 missiles, and in the future R-2, was planned to be carried out by specialized formations - special-purpose brigades of the RVGK. There were two of these under the command of the Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army. Both sky-ready. One is due to incomplete formation. The other is due to the transfer of part of its units to the first and the lack of material support. The only arsenal for storing combat missiles was not completed. In this state, the "economy" was accepted by Beria L.P. His further decisions were quick, simple, clear, justified. Work on the R-101 and R-112 missiles was immediately stopped. As part of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, four additional special-purpose brigades were formed, two in 1951, two in 1952. In the future, they planned to form four more. Organized the training of engineering and officer personnel. The construction of four new large arsenals for storing long-range missiles has begun. They finally substantiated the procedure for the combat use of R-1 missiles, approving it from Stalin I.V. We developed and began to implement a plan to bring the brigades to constant combat readiness. By the sole decision of Beria L.P. The development of the R-3 rocket was also discontinued. Instead, Korolev S.P., the leadership of NII-88 and the Ministry of Armaments received a decisive "go-ahead" from Lavrenty Pavlovich for the official and full-scale deployment of work on R-5 missiles with a range of 1200 km and R-11, which will replace R-1 and is tested on high-boiling fuel components. Fortunately, Isaev A.M. had experience in NII-88 in creating similar engines for anti-aircraft missiles of the Berkut system. One of the balanced and timely decisions of L.P. Beria, implemented in this area of ​​​​activity, was the construction of a single production base, plant N 586 of the Ministry of Arms, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. Initially planned as the production of R-1 missiles and equipment for the Berkut and Kometa systems, the plant in the subsequent years of Soviet power became one of the largest scientific and production associations of the USSR, the famous Yuzhmash. The contribution of this association to the achievement of nuclear-missile parity between our Fatherland and the United States of America was colossal. And the last about Beria L.P. On February 12, 1953, on the table in front of the chairman of the Troika for the management of special work, in which capacity I.V. Stalin appointed him. half a month before, two draft Resolutions of the Council of Ministers were laid down. On the plan for development and research work on long-range missiles for 1953-1955. He did not have the right to sign them, because from February 1951 only Stalin I.V. could do this. But the head of state has long ceased to carry out such a procedure, no matter how important and urgent the documents are. Therefore, L.P. Beria imposed his resolutions on the first pages of both draft Resolutions. In blue pencil, as always, in neat beautiful handwriting and the only one from the Troika: " For = L. Beria 12.II"The next day, the Decrees registered in the Administration of the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the force of law. And the signature of L.P. Beria on them determined the vector of development of Soviet heavy rocketry for many years to come. Because it authorized large-scale work on a family of new missiles, it is already completely unlike their German predecessors. Here were the R-5 and R-11, the modernized versions of which later became the first carriers of atomic warheads in the Soviet Union. R-12, also the first, but made on high-boiling fuel components, a strategic medium-range missile. And , most importantly, here, as particularly important state tasks, research was identified to ensure the development of ultra-long ballistic and cruise missiles at a range of 8000 km . Topics T 1 and T 2, of which the first intercontinental and space royal R-7, "The Tempest" by S.A. Lavochkina, will materialize in the near future. and "Buran" Myasishchev V.M. So it turns out, no matter how you twist it, but Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria opened the way into space to Korolev S.P., Gagarin Yu.A., and with them to all mankind, on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Soviet State. And this man Malenkov G.M., Khrushchev N.S., Bulganin N.A., Molotov V.A., Kaganovich L.M., Voroshilov K.E., Mikoyan A.I., their henchmen and blind performers in the summer of the 53rd they declared a traitor to the Motherland! As it is customary to say among English speakers, No comments... Well, where, in fact, is Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin? As you can see, among the above names of statesmen, on whom the formation of the rocket science research base depended in one way or another, he is not. Yes, it couldn't be. Until January 1952, in various senior positions in the artillery of the Soviet Army and in the Main Artillery Directorate, he solved tasks of a different level and mostly in a different area. In the area directly related to the actual artillery and artillery weapons. Of course, rocket technology Nedelin M.I. was well known. As Chief of Staff of the Artillery of the Armed Forces, he took an active part in the formation of the State Central Test Range, and later, heading the Main Artillery Directorate, he was directly involved in testing rocket and missile systems. Being the Commander of the Artillery of the Soviet Army, Nedelin M.I. conducted the only tactical exercise in the summer of 1950 with the only special purpose brigade of the RVGK at that time, even before the adoption of the R-1 rocket into service. However, all this work, no doubt, was very, very far from the level of development, and even more so, the adoption of government decisions in the field of development of missile weapons. Following the military-political leadership of the country, the prerogative here, of course, belonged to the highest military command of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In the period up to 1952-1953. - Marshals of the Soviet Union Bulganin N.A., Vasilevsky A.M., Sokolovsky V.D., General of the Army Shtemenko S.M., Chief Marshal of Artillery Voronov N.N., Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev N.D. Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, for example, using the unquestioned authority of Stalin I.V. immediately after the end of the war, he managed to convince the head of state of the need to create a single center for artillery science, which has its own theoretical and experimental base. The Academy of Artillery Sciences, established in July 1946, became such a center, as part of which five (!) Research institutes began to work, including the fundamental missile research institute NII-4. Another thing is that the leadership of the Academy failed to correctly organize its own powerful potential and establish a coordinated and purposeful work of the institutions. In this connection, in April 1953, it was disbanded. Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev. Until January 1952, it was he who was the main character and the main expert, first in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, then in the USSR Military Ministry on the development of missile weapons. A member of the Special Committee on Jet Technology (Committee No. 2), Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces (Minister of War) for armaments, not a single issue was resolved in this area without his knowledge, not a single fundamental document was formed. Actually, the position of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces for armaments, to which Yakovlev N.D. was appointed in November 1948, was introduced in the military department in order to concentrate all work related to the development, testing, introduction of missile weapons into the troops and their operation, in one hand. Therefore, if we talk about the role of this or that statesman in the creation of a research base for domestic rocket science, as well as the industry as a whole, then in the Military Ministry it was the highest among Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev N.D. Although there is no reason to include him in the category of creators. Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin reached such a level of authority on the development of missile weapons that Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev possessed, and even then not completely, only in January 1952, replacing his predecessor as Deputy Minister of War for armaments. Upon appointment, from the sphere of competence Nedelina M.I. the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of War, dealing with the organization and conduct of nuclear weapons tests, and the Main Automobile and Tractor Directorate were withdrawn. Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev N.D. they were under direct control. Why Beria L.P., who controlled all the personnel changes in the "atomic" structure, did not entrust the leadership of the 6th Directorate to M.I. Nedelin, remains unclear. Taking up the new position of Deputy Minister of War for Armaments and until the removal of Beria L.P. from management and authority, Colonel-General of Artillery Nedelin M.I. did not show any serious initiatives on the development and improvement of missile weapons. He participated in the meetings of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on several occasions. Among the many working with Beria L.P. directly, was the responsible executor of the tasks assigned to him by the chairman of the Special Committee. The performer is conscientious and accurate. It is safe to say that 1952 was a landmark year for him. Since then, in the life and ministry of Nedelina M.I. missile weapons are the top priority. Second story . Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin at a meeting of the highest military command, held by Stalin I.V. in order to decide the fate of the arrested Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev N.D., the only one of the participants boldly spoke in defense of I.V., who fell out of favor with Stalin. accused, and thereby sealed his fate. Yakovleva N.D. not shot, but only sentenced to prison. For all that, his arrest was made according to the fabricated Beria L.P. case, but Vasilevsky A.M. told about all this in his memoirs. and Bulganin N.A. There is only one piece of truth in the above saying. The one in which it is said about the arrest of Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev N.D. and his subsequent imprisonment. It happened at the beginning of 1952. Yakovlev N.D. was arrested together with the head of the GAU, Colonel-General of Artillery Volkotrubenko I.I. and Deputy Minister of Armaments Mirzakhanov I.A. Everything else is pure lies! Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky A.M., and Colonel General Bulganin N.A. no such memories left. Bulganin N.A. He left no memoirs at all, either verbal or written. This is an indisputable and generally accepted fact. Vasilevsky A.M. worked on memoirs at the end of his life. They were published under the title "The Case of a Lifetime". The period of memories - from a young age to the end of World War II. Not a word about the post-war period. So when, with whom, and under what circumstances, Alexander Mikhailovich and Nikolai Alexandrovich shared their experiences, this author preferred not to expand. He just said, okay. It turned out interesting and with a famously twisted plot! Nedelin M.I. could not before Stalin I.V. to defend Marshal Yakovlev N.D. boldly. And timidly, too, could not. For the simple reason that, according to the surviving original archival documents, he, along with other artillerymen, Varentsov S.S., Kazakov V.I., Voronov N.N., publicly condemned his predecessor and his "comrades", on meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on May 21, 1952. And, most likely, it was impossible for him to speak then otherwise. After all, the accused Yakovlev N.A. acts could be fully attributed to Nedelin M.I., who in the period 1948-1950. headed the Main Artillery Directorate and was directly responsible for the quality of industrially produced artillery weapons. Consider the situation when in one case Nedelin M.I. before Stalin M.I. Yakovleva N.D. defends, and after some time, before the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, condemns, it makes no sense because of its impossibility. Because Mitrofan Ivanovich was never a double-dealer and a hypocrite. The case of Marshal Yakovlev N.D. was not fabricated by Beria L.P. On this score, the authors have full conviction, supported by the results of archival research. And all the other cases attributed to him again, he, too, with a high degree of probability, did not fabricate. Conviction in this statement, apparently, is only close to complete. The remaining doubts are explained simply. To get out from under those tons of black mud that has been poured on the name of L.P. Beria for decades, oh, how difficult it is even for an objective and independent researcher. And until every accusation against him, every "crime" attributed to him, is not carefully investigated and refuted, doubts will remain all the same. Needless to say, even saints have sinned. And let's not talk about mortals. In this context, one has been found so far. Post-war "economic" activities of Beria L.P. had nothing to do with criminally punishable acts and with reprehensible actions. On the contrary, now it causes only admiration. And, returning to the case of Marshal Yakovlev N.D. At the beginning of 1952, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the USSR began to follow it, and since February of the same year, investigators from the Ministry of State Security, headed by party leader S.D. Ignatiev, took it into development. It is generally accepted that the case was fabricated from the very beginning. However, there are serious doubts about this general recognition at present. Archival documents, such as acts of periodic tests, unannounced inspections, complaints, undeniably testify that the state of affairs with many types of artillery weapons in the troops at that time was catastrophic. If expressed in a general, somewhat exaggerated mnemonic formula, then a large number of samples adopted for service fired either inaccurately, or with failures, or did not fire at all. Only for 57- mm automatic anti-aircraft gun S-60, the shortcomings of which formed the basis of the accusations against Yakovlev N.D., Volkotrubenko I.I. and Mirzakhanov I.A., after launching it into a series and mass deliveries to the troops, 2453 design changes were made. Only one! And there were many others. For example, the aviation NR-23, the improvements on which were not thousands, but hundreds, and, nevertheless, its reliability remained extremely low, as well as the KS-19, D-44, Ch-26 guns, B-2LM naval gun mounts, 2M-3, 2M-8, BL-120, grenades PG-82, PG-2, HSV-1, VOG-1. Was it the direct fault of those subsequently convicted? Undoubtedly yes. Because, first of all, these officials silently supported the vicious system, in which samples were taken into service even when they met the tactical and technical requirements only "in the main." They simply turned a blind eye to the shaft of subsequent improvements. Deserved Yakovlev N.D., Volkotrubenko I.I. and Mirzakhanov I.A. severe criminal penalties for failure to take action? From the current positions - perhaps administrative. And from then? It is impossible to answer unambiguously. We do not know all the conditions of that situation. Still, let's make our own guess. It appears that Yakovlev N.D., Volkotrubenko I.I. and Mirzakhanov I.A. were punished exponentially. So to speak, for the edification of others and in order to change the existing vicious system of adoption into service "according to the basics." Apparently it didn't work any other way. Comrade N.A. Bulganin, who supervised this direction from the Government, lacked the skill. "Upstairs" the case of Marshal N.D. Yakovlev conducted by Malenkov G.M. It was he who chaired the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers when the matter was just beginning. On the course of the investigation Prosecutor General Safonov G.N. and Minister of State Security Ignatiev S.D. also reported to him. But Beria L.P., as stated earlier, was really nothing to do with it. He was present only at the last meeting and he was primarily interested in the circumstance of the case itself. Even despite the fact that the guilt of the convicts took place, he did not agree with the sentence pronounced by him. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that immediately after the death of Stalin, I.V. Yakovlev N.D. and "company" by the efforts of Beria L.P. were released and rehabilitated. Fiction third . Stalin I.V. every quarter heard the reports of Voronov N.N., Nedelin M.I. , Yakovleva N.D., Koroleva S.P. , Kurchatova I.V. and other experts on the progress of work on the rocket project. Stalin I.V. especially liked the reports of Nedelin M.I., which he set as an example to the rest. Yes, dear readers will not be angry with us, but it is hardly possible to come up with a greater artistic nonsense. The person who wrote the above opus has nothing to do with history as a science. One hundred percent everything he said was sucked out of his finger. Stalin I.V. did not accept Nedelina M.I. never. Neither at the nearest dacha in Kuntsevo, nor in the working Kremlin office. Only the inner circle of the leader and especially trusted statesmen had the right to visit Stalin's dacha. Mitrofan Ivanovich obviously did not belong to those. Lists of people who have ever been at the reception of Stalin I.V. in his Kremlin office, as well as the time of arrival and departure of each such person, are well and thoroughly known. Nedelina M.I. not among them. Written reports to Stalin I.V. signed by Nedelin M.I. also does not exist. Could he have presented them orally anywhere? Almost unbelievable. An analysis of his correspondence shows that Nedelin M.I. any oral presentation or presentation was necessarily supported by a written version. So for a report to Himself, somehow, yes, I would have prepared. Did I.V. Nedelin see Stalin I.V. basically? Rather yes than no, for example, at parades, state celebrations, large receptions. But a personal meeting between them hardly ever took place. The service star of Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin, having begun to flare up brightly in the spring of 1953, lit up in full force two years later. At the very moment when he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for special weapons and jet technology. Not only missile systems of all types and categories from now on became his fiefdom, but also all the country's nuclear weapons. For the creation, development, and introduction of both groups of weapons into all branches of the Armed Forces, he was now responsible to the leadership of the country and its people. And in this post, as in all previous and subsequent last, he gave himself entirely. The authority of Nedelin M.I. until his tragic death was indisputable. Even G.K. Zhukov listened to his always balanced opinion. It is difficult to say unequivocally, but the study of archival documents forms a high degree of confidence that "the post of Commander-in-Chief for Missile Units in the Armed Forces of the USSR" was established on December 17, 1959 precisely "under" Nedelin M. And .... The death of Mitrofan Ivanovich is still interpreted ambiguously. Some accuse him of negligence and carelessness, putting him directly at fault for the tragedy of October 60th. Others persistently defend him, explaining everything by a tragic coincidence. We will simply quote the immortal: "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side." We will never know all the circumstances of the tragedy. And now it doesn’t matter whether Nedelina M.I. personally had any degree of guilt in what happened, or there wasn’t any at all. You can't turn back time, you can't bring back the dead. Something else is important. In a critical situation, the Chief Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin, defying the threat and fate, without betraying anyone, remained with his soldiers, officers and people to the end ... For SUCH one can and should bow from the waist. AND ETERNAL MEMORY TO THEM! And the last. At the time of the publication of this article, there was a strong opinion that during the catastrophe of October 24, 1960, the body of Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin was not preserved, and the search for him was not crowned with success. In the course of them, only those belonging to Nedelin M.I. were found. the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union in a melted state, a marshal's epaulette and a wrist watch. Until recently, no archival documents confirming or refuting this opinion have been found. The authors of this article succeeded in doing this. The documents found are: Act of October 25, 1960, identifying the body of Chief Marshal of Artillery Nedelin Mitrofan Ivanovich; Inventory of items belonging to the Chief Marshal of Artillery Comrade Nedelin M.I. In this article, its authors introduce the above documents into scientific circulation for the first time. The style and spelling of the originals were preserved during publication.

Born on October 27 (November 9), 1902 in the city of Borisoglebsk, Tambov province, now in the Voronezh region (Russia) in the family of an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Russian.
From September 1909 to May 1913 he studied at the parochial school of Borisoglebsk, from October 1913 to February 1917 - at the Lipetsk real school. From August 1917 to February 1920 he worked in the railway workshops in Borisoglebsk, at the same time he studied at the evening school of the second stage.
In the Red Army since March 13, 1920.
Participated in the civil war. In March-May 1920 - a Red Army soldier, political fighter of the 33rd rifle battalion of the 33rd section of the military roads of the 12th army of the Southwestern Front. From March 1920 to May 1921 - in the war with Poland: from May 1920 to March 1921 - squad leader, in March-April 1921 - a Red Army soldier of the 5th railway battalion of the 12th Army. From April 1921 to April 1922 - treasurer of the political department of the 2nd combat sector, head of the economic department of the political department of the 10th rifle division of the Tambov army. From May 1921 to April 1922 he took part in the suppression of the Antonov uprising in the Tambov region. In April-May 1922 - assistant clerk of the 150th rifle regiment of the 17th rifle division of the Moscow military district, in May-October 1922 - assistant to the head of the military-political courses of the 28th separate rifle brigade.
From November 1922 to January 1923 - a cadet of the Military-Political Courses of the Turkestan Front, a participant in the struggle against the Basmachi in Central Asia.
In January-May 1923, he was deputy head of the 3rd district of the mounted police, head of weapons of the 132nd separate special-purpose company, during aftercare after being wounded, he was an accountant-cashier in the institution of the consumer cooperation system in the city of Borisoglebsk.
In May 1923, for health reasons (he fell ill with tropical malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis), he was dismissed from the Red Army.
He began to serve in the Red Army again from April 1924.
He served in the 56th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Military District: a Red Army soldier - political fighter of the 56th Light Artillery Battalion, head of the library of the 56th Artillery Regiment (April-December 1924), assistant political officer of the regimental battery of the same regiment (December 1924 - October 1925 of the year). From November 1925 to November 1928 - in the 43rd artillery regiment of the 43rd rifle division: battery political instructor, political instructor and acting platoon commander of the regimental school.
He graduated from artillery advanced training courses for the command staff of the Leningrad Military District (studied from November 1928 to August 1929).
From August 1929 to October 1931 - battery commander, from October 1931 to November 1933 - commander of an artillery battalion, in April-November 1933 - commander of a battalion of the 2nd artillery regiment of the 2nd rifle division.
He graduated from artillery advanced training courses for the command staff of the Red Army (studied from November 1933 to January 1934).
In January-July 1934 - commander of the training division of the 2nd artillery regiment, from July 1934 to January 1937 - commander of the training division.
On January 13, 1936, he was promoted to the rank of major.
In January-December 1937, he was the chief of staff of the training artillery regiment of the artillery courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Red Army.
Participated in the national revolutionary war in Spain from December 1937 to March 1939 as a military adviser on artillery of the Central Front, adviser on armaments under the Ministry of Defense of the Republican government.
On March 5, 1939, he was promoted to the rank of colonel.
From March (September) 1939 to 1940 he commanded the 13th artillery regiment of the 1st Moscow Proletarian motorized rifle division, then was the head of artillery of the 160th rifle division.
In April-October 1940 - senior inspector for artillery of the Moscow Military District, from October 1940 to April 1941 - head of artillery of the 160th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District.
In 1941, he graduated from the semi-annual Higher Artillery Academic Advanced Courses for commanders at the Artillery Academy named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky.
From April 30, 1941, he served in the Kiev Special Military District as commander of the 4th artillery anti-tank brigade.
Participated in the Great Patriotic War from June 1941. He fought on the Southwestern Front, until September (October) 1941 he commanded the 4th artillery anti-tank brigade, then he was in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command and in the 18th Army of the Southern Front.
From October 1941 to May 1943 - Chief of Artillery of the 18th Army, Commander of Artillery of the 37th Army of the Southern Front, Commander of Artillery of the 56th Army of the North Caucasian Front.
On May 13, 1942, he was awarded the military rank of Major General of Artillery.
In May-June 1943, he was deputy commander of artillery of the North Caucasian Front; Western Front.
On September 25, 1943, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General of Artillery.
From October 20, 1943 - Commander of Artillery - Deputy Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, at the same time a member of the Military Council.
On April 3, 1944, he was promoted to the rank of colonel-general of artillery.
He took part in the battles for the Dnieper, in the Iasi-Kishinev, Budapest, Vienna operations.
After the end of the war, he continued to serve in the Armed Forces.
From July 1945 - commander of the artillery of the Southern Group of Forces and a member of the Military Council, in April-May 1946 - chief of staff of artillery of the Office of the commander of artillery of the Ground Forces, from May 1946 - chief of staff of artillery of the Armed Forces, from November 1948 - chief of the Main Artillery administration of the Armed Forces. From March 1950 - Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army, from January 1952 - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR for Armaments, from April 1953 - Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army.
On August 3, 1953, he was awarded the rank of Marshal of Artillery.
Since March 21, 1955 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for special weapons and rocketry.
On May 8, 1959, he was awarded the military rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery.
Since December 1959 - Commander-in-Chief (1st Commander-in-Chief) of the Strategic Missile Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
He was actively involved in the creation and organization of the Strategic Missile Forces. Under his leadership, the first samples of intercontinental ballistic missiles (October-November 1947) and medium-range missiles were developed and tested, and the first artificial Earth satellite was launched. In September 1954, he was in the leadership of a major military exercise with a real explosion of an atomic bomb. Member of the State Commissions for testing nuclear weapons in the USSR (August 1953) and for testing the world's first intercontinental multi-stage rocket (1957).
He was engaged in scientific activities, wrote articles "Artillery in the battles for the liberation of Yugoslavia", "The defeat of the Nazi troops in the battles for Vienna."
He died on October 24, 1960 in the line of duty at the 41st launch pad of Baikonur - during pre-launch preparations for the launch of the first R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile, an unexpected launch of the second stage propulsion system and a rocket explosion occurred. A total of 74 people died and four more died as a result of severe burns and poisoning with heptyl vapor. The combustion temperature was so high that only a dark mark remained from Marshal Nedelin on the asphalt near the rocket. A melted Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, one of his epaulettes and a wristwatch were found. The marshal could have avoided his death if he had taken advantage of a special shelter, and did not sit on a chair near the rocket while preparing it for launch. This carelessness cost him his life.
The incident was strictly classified, it was officially announced that only Nedelin himself had died as a result of a plane crash. The urn with the ashes of Marshal Nedelin was buried in the Kremlin wall necropolis on Red Square in Moscow (Russia).

For the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the German invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 28, 1945, Colonel-General of Artillery Nedelin Mitrofan Ivanovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Gold Star medal No. 5442) .

He was awarded five Orders of Lenin (09/13/1944, 04/28/1945, 05/06/1945, 04/20/1956, 12/21/1957), four Orders of the Red Banner (02/22/1939, 12/13/1942, 11/03/1944, ** 1950), the Order of Suvorov 1st Class*** (03/19/1944), Order of Kutuzov 1st Class**** (10/26/1943), Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class***** (11/18/1944), Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree (11/03/1944), the Order of the Badge of Honor (08/16/1936), medals "XX years of the Red Army" (01/24/1938), "For the Defense of the Caucasus" (05/01/1944), "For the liberation of Belgrade" ( 06/09/1945), "For the capture of Budapest" 06/09/1945), "For the capture of Vienna" (06/09/1945), "For the victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" (05/09/1945), "30 years of the Soviet Army and Navy" (02/22/1948), "40 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR" (12/18/1957), the Russian Order of Courage (12/20/1999) and foreign awards - the Order of the Partisan Star 1st degree (Yugoslavia), the Order of Military Merit of the 1st degree with swords (Bulgaria), the Order of Hungarian Freedom (Hungary), as well as other orders and medals.

Notes:
* According to some sources, he came from the noble family of the Nedelins, according to other sources, he was born into a working-class family.
** The order had serial number 559/3.
*** The order had serial number 145.
**** The order had serial number 64.
***** The order had serial number 336.

First launches at the Baikonur Cosmodrome

The tragic story that happened at the Soviet Baikonur cosmodrome is shrouded in some kind of mysticism ... On October 24, 1960, the largest accident in the history of space exploration occurred at Baikonur - 78 people died, including the legendary man, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin. This terrible disaster happened a few days after the two previous October accidents at Baikonur. Exactly three years later, to the day, on October 24, 1963, a rocket exploded there again, and again there were victims.

Such a fact: the decree on awarding the Soviet Chief Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin with the Russian Order of Courage was suddenly signed by the then President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin just a few days before his resignation, on December 24, 1999. That is, after he made the final decision about his resignation - from the historical chronicles of the recent past it is known that on December 22, Yeltsin secretly invited Vladimir Putin to his place, and it was on that day that he convinced him to take over the leadership of the country.

What prompted the first president of Russia to dedicate one of his last decrees to rewarding Nedelin and his comrades who died 39 years ago - the secret of secrets, some kind of mysticism ... There are no convincing explanations for this fact in the open press.

After October 24, 1963, exactly three years after the so-called "Nedelinskaya" tragedy, the R-9A intercontinental ballistic missile crashed at Baikonur with human casualties (eight people died), this day is considered a "black" day in cosmonautics and rocket launches that day, it was decided not to produce any more. And on this day, it is customary to remember not only the victims of the "Nedelinsky" disaster, but also all those who died during space exploration.

The names of the scientists and technicians who died in this catastrophe are on the streets of the city of Baikonur. And the streets in the cities of Voronezh, Mirny (Plesetsk Cosmodrome), Moscow, Lipetsk, Donetsk, Odessa, Odintsovo, Schelkovo and many other cities of the former Soviet Union are also named after Marshal Nedelin ...

Alas, it was in October 1960, before the disaster with the R-16 rocket at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, that there were other unsuccessful launches of Soviet missiles - this is some kind of mystically "black" month. So, on October 10, the first attempt was made to launch the 1M-1 automatic interplanetary station towards Mars, the Molniya 8K78 launch vehicle crashed in the launch site and exploded.

But already on October 14, 1960, the next attempt was made to launch an automatic interplanetary station, only with the index "1M-2", towards Mars. As in the first case, the Molniya 8K78 launch vehicle crashed in the launch site and exploded. Incidentally, even then the flight program provided for the station to reach the surface of Mars. But the "Mars" program in the USSR, you understand, was postponed for a long time after these accidents.

By the way, the October days of 1960 were unsuccessful not only for our rocket scientists, but also for the Americans. Two days after the so-called "Nedelinsky" disaster, on October 26, 1960, at the Vandenberg cosmodrome (Western test site, Santa Barbara County, California, USA), the Thor Agena-B launch vehicle crashed, which was supposed to put into low Earth orbit American satellite photo reconnaissance Discoverer-16 ...

So, on October 24, 1960, at Baikonur, 74 people died in the explosion of the R-16 rocket, and four more died as a result of severe burns and poisoning with heptyl vapors (according to other sources, from 92 to 126 people died). The combustion temperature was so high that only a barely noticeable dark mark remained from Marshal Nedelin on the asphalt near the rocket. A terribly melted Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, one of his epaulettes and a wrist watch were found.

When a hot jet escaped from the rocket, Mitrofan Ivanovich was pressed against concrete and burned at a temperature of about three thousand degrees. Everyone who was on the rocket adapter was thrown onto concrete from a height of fifteen meters and reduced to ashes.

The technical aspects of this accident can be found on the net without difficulty, it is not necessary to bring them into this material, except perhaps very briefly. 30 minutes before the scheduled launch, an unauthorized launch of the R-16 second stage engine took place. There was a destruction of the tanks of the first stage and an explosive ignition of the propellant components.

They say that the marshal could have avoided his death if he had taken advantage of a special shelter, and did not sit on a chair near the rocket while preparing it for launch. Such carelessness cost him his life ... In the USSR, only Nedelin himself was officially declared dead - moreover, as a result of a plane crash. Everything was secret, but the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Nedelin was impossible to be hushed up, so a version was invented about his tragic death in a plane crash. The fate of the crew and other passengers of the supposedly passenger plane was not reported.

The funeral took place on Red Square on October 27, 1960. The urn with the ashes of Nedelin (although, if you look, there were no ashes of his body as such!) Was buried in the necropolis of the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow next to the urn of I. V. Kurchatov.

Data on the disaster was classified, and the first mention of it in the Soviet media appeared only in 1989. In publications about the accident, which refer to the post-Soviet period, they write something like the following: the catastrophe, which entailed a large number of victims, was caused by gross violations of safety regulations in preparation for launch and the desire to have time to launch an incompletely prepared rocket for the upcoming holiday - anniversary Great October Socialist Revolution.

In general, the course of preparing the rocket for launch was under the close attention of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the top leadership of the country. N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev repeatedly called to the test site. The deadlines were running out, and it was customary to time great achievements to coincide with the "red" dates of the calendar, for which the anniversary of the Great October Revolution really fit perfectly. The work was carried out in two shifts, day and night.

Not everything was glued, there were comments on the technique. But apart from some objecting specialists who knew about possible problems, everyone spoke in favor of continuing the work. Remarks about the dangers of carrying out modifications on a fueled rocket were discarded. According to the recollections of one of the participants in the events, Marshal Nedelin remarked: "What will I say to Nikita? ... To finalize the rocket at the start, the country is waiting for us!"

The work was continued. Setting an example of fearlessness, before the launch, Marshal Nedelin sat on a chair at the so-called zero mark - about 17 meters from the foot of the rocket. Next to him were many high officials. The explosion killed almost everyone who was near the launch pad.

The chief designer of OKB-586 M.K. Yangel, who was absent for a short time before the start, miraculously survived. He decided to smoke and, in order not to set a bad example for his subordinates, went to the smoking room. Along with him, some other bosses also went to the smoking room. This saved their lives.

The first meeting of the special commission on the disaster took place in the assembly and test building immediately after the arrival of the convoy of cars from the airfield. In the presence of all the surviving R-16 testers, Leonid Brezhnev, who was a member of the commission, declared: "We will not punish anyone." As further investigation showed, the direct culprits of the accident - those responsible for the safety of work and the developer of the control system - died in the explosion. Those who remained alive were considered to be punished as inhumane. There is a legend that, following the results of the commission's work, Brezhnev waved his hand and said: "... you punished yourself."

But the launch of the ill-fated R-16 nevertheless took place there, at Baikonur, but already on the second launcher of the site, rather soon - on February 2, 1961. And it wasn't completely successful either! The head of the rocket instead of Kamchatka fell in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Only from August 1962, the rocket began to fly normally. And on October 20, 1962, by a government decree, the R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile (with the code 8K64) was put into service. By 1965, 186 launchers for R-16 missiles had already been deployed! There was an arms race...

Despite the measures taken, information still leaked to the Western media, albeit with an understandable delay. On December 8, 1960, the Italian news agency Continentale reported that Marshal Nedelin and 100 others were killed in a rocket explosion. On October 16, 1965, the British newspaper The Guardian reported that the exposed spy Oleg Penkovsky had confirmed the disaster. Additional details of the tragedy were reported by dissident Zhores Medvedev in 1976 to the British magazine New Scientist. And the first publication about the catastrophe in the Soviet media was an essay in the Ogonyok magazine, published in 1989 ...

Every year on October 24, rallies were held with the laying of wreaths at the mass grave of the dead on Gagarin Avenue in the city of Baikonur in Kazakhstan, at the monument on the site of the former launch pad R-16 (site 41) and on the territory of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine, which is now omaidan - after all a significant number of developers of Soviet rocketry came from there!

At the Zaporozhye cemetery in Dnepropetrovsk, the surviving rocket men still remembered those who died on October 24, 1960. Whether they will be commemorated this year is unknown ...