German Air Force. Aviation of Germany. Light armored vehicles of the German army. Sections of this page
The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945
Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.
Their fighters dominated the battlefield.
Their bombers razed entire cities off the face of the earth.
And the legendary "pieces" terrified the enemy troops.
The air force of the Third Reich - the renowned Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. Loud victories of the Wehrmacht would, in principle, be impossible without air support and air cover.
Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was prohibited from having military aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build modern and effective air forces in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. ...
This book, published by the British Air Ministry in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the just-ended war, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. It is a detailed and eminently competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of the air force of the Third Reich.
Sections of this page:
Organizational structure of German aviation
Reorganization of the command system in 1939
By February 1939, due to the growth of the Luftwaffe and the expansion of their territory, a large-scale reorganization was required in order to bring the command system in line with this expansion. Therefore, at the beginning of the month, radical changes were made both in the high command and in the organization of command on the ground. First, the functions of the State Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation and the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe were merged by the post of Inspector General and remained under the authority of Milch. Kesselring replaced Wefer, the first chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, after his death in a disaster in 1936. However, Kesselring was too strong-willed and could pose a threat to Goering, so in 1937 he was replaced by Stumpff. Now the latter has been replaced by Jesonnek, a strong-willed young officer who had previously commanded a training air squadron in Greifswald and who had thoroughly studied the capabilities of Luftwaffe aviation technology. He was an ardent supporter of the use of high-speed medium bombers.
The combat flight units were now subordinate to three newly created operational formations, called "air fleets" ( Luftflotten), commanded respectively by Generals Kesselring, Felmi and Sperrle. The 1st Air Fleet, headquartered in Berlin, was responsible for North and East Germany, the 2nd Air Fleet, headquartered in Braunschweig, covered northwest Germany, and the 3rd Air Fleet (which, together with the 2nd Fleet, formed the basis of the German forces, participating in the Battle of Britain) with headquarters in Munich was responsible for the south-west of Germany. In addition, a separate air command was created in East Prussia. A month later, in March 1939, the 4th Air Fleet was created with headquarters in Vienna, in whose area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility were South-East Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria. Command of this fleet was given to General Leroux, who, as already mentioned, had been transferred from the Austrian Air Force following the annexation of Austria. It should be noted that, in contrast to the British Air Force, these air fleets, operational formations and strike forces of German aviation were organized according to territorial rather than functional lines. Each air fleet consisted of independent and balanced strike forces, including bomber, fighter, assault, reconnaissance and other units.
Ministry of Aviation
At the beginning of the war, the German Air Ministry had about 15 main directorates or departments. First of all, it is necessary to name the Operational Headquarters ( Fuehrungsstab), in which there were subdivisions: navigational affairs, meteorological, technical, propaganda, public relations, politics, security, etc. The headquarters was responsible for making operational decisions and issued operational orders for the Ministry of Aviation. Separately from the Operational Headquarters, there was a General Staff, divided into five or six departments, in charge of the formation of new squadrons and ground units. One of the main directorates dealt exclusively with tactical issues. Another department was in charge of supply, transport and transportation. There was also a headquarters for intelligence. There was a department in charge of the distribution of aircraft, vehicles and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as involved in the investigation of flight accidents and the distribution of personnel. In addition, there were departments for communications, aviation technology, mobilization, personnel training, etc. The Central Directorate dealt with the affairs of the institutions of the Ministry of Aviation, its subdivisions - relations with the press, legal issues and other issues, such as the publication of printed materials and the military service. air attachés. The Administrative Office was in charge of salary issues, claims and financial matters, buildings and living quarters, as well as food and clothing supplies. There was also a headquarters for air communications, which included a flight control service, a meteorological service, and an air force security service. Finally, there were about 15 inspections in the structure of the ministry, each of which dealt with one specific issue: combat training, organization of medical service, education, navigational affairs, parachute and airborne troops, interaction with the naval forces, vehicles, communications, etc. In addition, separate inspections dealt with interaction with ground forces, bomber aircraft, dive bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. An inspection was also provided for fighter aircraft. The functions of these inspections were to exercise control on behalf of the Ministry of Aviation over Luftwaffe units on the ground. They were supposed to serve as a link between the theater of operations and the ministry. In addition, a significant part of their activities concerned personnel training issues, therefore they were subordinated to the personnel training department.
From the above, it can be seen that the organization of the Ministry of Aviation before the war was quite common. During wartime, the number of inspections was increased, and the activities of the Ministry of Aviation itself were highly dispersed, but it nevertheless continued to largely control the German aviation formations on the ground.
The map shows the deployment areas of the air fleets at the beginning of the war, in September 1939.
The initial zones of deployment of the Luftwaffe forces were the areas of responsibility of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd air fleets with headquarters in Berlin, Braunschweig and Munich, respectively. The 4th Fleet, headquartered in Vienna, was formed in March 1939 after the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Silesia, which was previously part of the responsibility of the 1st Air Fleet, was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 4th Fleet.
The map also shows the location of the Fliegerdivisions (later the Fliegerkorps) of the 1st and 4th Air Fleets at the start of the Polish campaign in September 1939. One air division, based northeast of Berlin, supported the 4th Army, which was advancing Another air division (based in East Prussia) supported the advancing South 3rd Army.The 4th Air Fleet supported the 8th, 10th, and 14th armies advancing east and northeast. a powerful enveloping strike against the encirclement of Polish troops in the Poznan area.It was also provided for secondary coverage (for example, in Southwestern Poland), the implementation of which was greatly facilitated by the use of the territories of Czechoslovakia and Silesia as initial lines. .)
Air fleet composition
Air Corps, Divisions and Districts
In each of the air fleets, administrative functions were assigned to aviation districts - luftgau (Luftgau). Although the Luftgau were responsible for all administrative matters, for operational purposes, parallel services also existed in the air divisions ( Fliegerdivisions), later renamed to the air corps ( Fliegerkorps). Before the war in Germany there were about 10 Luftgau headquarters and 7 air divisions, of which one was a parachute division. Each of the air fleets usually consisted of 2-3 Luftgau commands and 1-2 air divisions as strike forces. On paper, the organization of the air division and the Luftgau was very similar to the organization of the air fleet. Each structure had an operations department, an adjutant department, a legal department, an administrative department, a communications department, and a quartermaster department, each of which had many sub-departments. However, there was a clear division of responsibilities, which consisted in the fact that the air fleets issued orders and carried out leadership, the Luftgau organized supply and transportation, and the air divisions played the role of strike forces and carried out operations. The separation of the actual flight and administrative and economic aspects of the Luftwaffe's activities is most noticeable in the command system of airfield nodes.
Aerodrome Commands
When the flight unit occupied a military airfield, the commander of this unit became the senior officer at the airfield for the entire duration of its stay. At the same time, there was a permanent command at the airfield, whose personnel were provided by the administrative services of the Luftwaffe through the local Luftgau. When the unit left the airfield, the head of the airfield again became its senior officer. Each Luftgau had several airfield hub commands ( Flughafenbereich Kommandanturen), the number of which varied from two to twelve, depending on the size and importance of the area. These command stations, also known as control stations ( Leithorste), were located at the most important airfields. The control stations were supposed to regularly report to the Luftgau on the technical condition of the airfields and request supplies for all airfields in the hub, as well as control the correct distribution of supplies and other cargo. The command usually consisted of about five main airfields and up to twelve alternate airfields ( Einsatzhafen).
At the beginning of the war, Germany had approximately 250 main and 150 alternate airfields. At the main airfields, which at that time occupied an area of \u200b\u200babout 1000 m2, flight units, schools and experimental units were based. Field aerodromes were approximately the same size, but it should be noted that they were not tied to the main airfields, but were located throughout the country and were used during maneuvers or in accordance with operational needs. At that time, alternate airfields were practically not equipped. There were no hangars, no living quarters, except for a few barracks, which housed a small number of personnel serving the landing strip. None of the German main airfields had a paved runway at the start of the war, although in 1939 construction began on a paved runway at several major airfields in northwestern Germany.
To prepare field aerodromes for the rapid deployment of flight units on them, it was necessary to ensure the possibility of the prompt transfer of airfield service parts to them. To do this, each Luftgau was required to be in constant readiness to allocate a sufficient number of personnel from permanent airfields to complete the airfield service units for reserve airfields within the Luftgau. Accelerated transfer by transport aircraft or mechanized columns was practiced during pre-war maneuvers, when alternate airfields were temporarily occupied by flight units. Thus, the Luftwaffe could begin the transfer of combat units from one part of Germany to another within a few hours after receiving the order, knowing that the airfields would be manned and prepared to receive aircraft. During the war, the German airfield network was extended to the occupied territories.
Flight parts
The main combat unit of the Luftwaffe was the air group ( Gruppe), which consisted of about 30 aircraft. Flight units of German aviation have always been organized on the basis of air groups. There was a squadron unit ( Staffel), usually consisting of 9-10 aircraft. Thus, each group consisted of three squadrons. Squadrons could be based at different airfields (or seaplane bases, if it was about naval reconnaissance or patrol aircraft), however, for bombers (including dive-bombers) and fighters it was considered the norm to base an entire group of about 30 aircraft at one airfield. Bomber and fighter units were brought together in air squadrons ( Geschwader), which usually included three groups, i.e., had a strength of about 90 aircraft. According to pre-war concepts, three groups of bombers or fighters were supposed to be based on neighboring airfields, however, during the war, groups were often separated from their squadrons, and often, if local conditions required it, smaller units operated from separate airfields.
The squadron was commanded by "staffelkapitan" ( Staffelkapitaen). Individual officers of the squadron (as a rule, pilots) in their free time were also supposed to be in charge of the technical department, communications and navigational affairs. Maintenance and repair of the squadron's aircraft were carried out in the group's workshops, but sometimes the squadron had its own mobile workshop for minor repairs. The size of the squadron's flight personnel varied depending on the number of crew members on its aircraft. The squadron's airfield personnel consisted of 150 people for single-engine fighters and 80 people for twin-engine fighters. In twin-engine fighter squadrons, the non-flying composition had a smaller number due to the fact that a significant part of the service and administrative functions was performed by permanent airfield service units.
In total, the group usually consisted of about 500 non-flying personnel for single-engine fighters or about 300 people for twin-engine fighters. The group consisted of a commander, an adjutant, an operational officer who could also be responsible for communications and navigational affairs, a technical service officer and a medical officer. Unlike the British Air Force, the structure did not provide for a separate reconnaissance officer at the squadron or group level. Although groups or squadrons of fighter or bomber air squadrons could operate separately, the headquarters of the air squadron remained and consisted of the squadron commander, adjutant, operational officer, organizational officer, intelligence officer, squadron navigator, squadron technician, squadron communications chief, squadron photographer and officer meteorological services. The air squadron headquarters also had several combat aircraft, which were used according to the circumstances (usually for reconnaissance).
The size of the air fleet
Although the size of squadrons, groups and squadrons was relatively constant at the beginning of the war, the size of the air fleets and air divisions varied significantly. With 4,000 aircraft on the first line, the size of the air fleet of the 1939-1940 model was supposed to be 1,000 aircraft. In preparation for the invasion of Poland, the combat units of the western air fleets (2nd and 3rd) were actually transferred to the eastern fleets (1st and 4th), which were supposed to support the offensive on Poland. In different periods of the war, the size of the air fleet varied from a minimum level of 200-300 aircraft to a maximum of about 1250 aircraft.
The air division in the air fleet, which included warheads of all types (bomber (including dive), fighter and reconnaissance), could have from 200-300 to 700-750 aircraft. The number of air divisions (later renamed the air corps) and air fleets depended on the general strategy of German aviation, taking into account the situation in this direction.
Communication
The well-organized communications service, which became an integral part of the Luftwaffe, played a significant role in the success of German aviation in the campaigns of the early stage of the war. The communications service performed the following tasks: transmission of all orders and reports (if possible, by land lines (telephone, teletype), and wireless radio and telephone communications), installation and maintenance of all navigation equipment (radio stations, radio direction-finding installations, radio and visual beacons), air defense (through an observer service), interception of enemy communications, flight control of German aviation, flight safety, as well as individual rescue operations.
The commander-in-chief of the German aviation had a command system at his disposal that allowed him to communicate with all officials of the air force. Each task force, including the air fleets, air corps and air divisions, and each institution of the Luftwaffe had its own communications units. These units were divided into regiments and further subdivided into companies, each of which dealt with its own range of issues. The companies were accordingly divided into platoons and further into squads. As a rule, the regiment consisted of nine companies, of which the first consisted of telephone and teletype communication operators, the second was engaged in radio communications, and the third provided interaction with ground forces. The rest of the regiment's companies were engaged in laying telephone lines, detecting aircraft, ensuring flight safety or radio interception. Some regiments were attached to communications aircraft (as a rule, Ju-52), which, during the campaigns, landed at forward airfields and served as advanced radio stations or radio guidance stations. Like the rest of the ground forces of the Luftwaffe, the signal troops were organized according to the needs of mobile warfare. The units attached to the operational formations were required to organize a communication system, as well as the construction and maintenance of radio and visual beacons, etc. immediately after the occupation of the new territory. In addition, each large group of airfields had its own communications company, which organized a communications system in the area. Its own communications company was also attached to each large formation of 100 fighters or bombers, and for every 30 combat aircraft, its own communications platoon was provided.
The command system was linked to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces and the commander of the fleet, and each task force was provided with communication with anti-aircraft artillery, supply bases, large airfields and, of course, flight units. For air defense, there was a separate system associated with civil defense and medical assistance systems. To a large extent, these systems relied on the existing networks of the German postal service.
In general, the communication system of the Luftwaffe on the eve of the war in Europe was quite capable of solving most of the problems of modern air warfare. Apparently, there were only two weaknesses in this system. This is, firstly, the impossibility of using radar for both offensive and defensive purposes, and, secondly, a very primitive fighter guidance system from the ground.
FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW No. 3/2001, pp. 31-38
AIR FORCE
Colonel V. FEDOSEEV
The Federal Republic of Germany has the most powerful air force, which is the German Air Force ("Luftwaffe") - an independent type of armed
forces (BC). In peacetime, forces and assets are allocated from their composition, which are on alert in the united NATO air defense system in Europe. They are also called upon to monitor and prevent the violation of national airspace, and, if necessary, take measures to suppress the invasion of aircraft and other air objects from the air.
In wartime or in times of crisis, the Air Force acts according to national plans or participates in an air offensive (defensive) operation in an air offensive (defensive) operation, interacting with formations of other types of armed forces in a theater of operations (it is possible that nuclear weapons can be used along with conventional ). They are designed to solve the following tasks: gaining and maintaining air superiority, isolating the combat area and the battlefield, providing close air support to the ground forces and the Navy, conducting aerial reconnaissance in the interests of all types of armed forces, and carrying out air transport of troops and military cargo.
The basis of the Air Force is combat aviation, which, in cooperation with other types of armed forces, is capable of playing a decisive role in defeating the opposing enemy. They also include all air defense forces and assets, including fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-aircraft artillery and radio equipment. To support the combat operations of all types of armed forces, the Air Force has auxiliary aviation.
Governing bodies.The leadership of the Air Force is entrusted to the Air Force Inspector (Commander), who reports to the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. He directs the construction and combat activities of all formations, units and institutions of the air force through the main headquarters.
Organizationally, the air force of the FRG consists of the main headquarters, the air force operational command, the air force support command and the air force central command (Fig. 1).
The main headquarters of the Air Force is the operational control body. It develops plans for the construction, combat training and operational use of the Air Force, determines the deployment of formations, units and subunits of the Air Force. The headquarters includes the operational command, the air force support command and the central air force command.
The Air Force Operational Command (Cologne Wan), formed in 1994 on the basis of the Tactical Aviation Command, is the highest operational formation of the Air Force. It is designed to control the forces and assets of the Air Force both in peacetime and in wartime. It includes two regional Air Force commands - "North" and "South", the transport aviation command and the command of the air force control services.
Air Force Commands "North" (Kalkar) and "South" (Messtätten) include all formations and units of combat aviation, air defense forces and assets. The Transport Aviation Command (Münster) concentrates all auxiliary aviation intended for the transfer of troops and cargo by air. The Air Force Command (Cologne-Wan) is responsible for the operation and development of communication and control systems of the Air Force, and is also involved in the investigation of accidents, accidents and analysis of the causes of flight accidents, the development of requirements, recommendations and plans to reduce accidents not only in Air Force, but also in the aviation of the Bundeswehr as a whole.
The Air Force Support Command is responsible for the purchase of new technology and equipment, their current repair, as well as for the supply of air force units and subdivisions with fuels and lubricants (POL), ammunition and spare parts, and plans the needs of aviation units in material and technical means. It consists of six logistic support regiments, each of which has a certain area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility and is the main rear part. At the disposal of these regiments are about 20 warehouses for logistics, ammunition, fuels and lubricants, 15 repair shops and 10 motor transport units. For the main types of logistic support in the Air Force, reserves have been created that allow them to conduct combat operations with maximum tension for 30 days or more.
The Central Air Force Directorate is responsible for organizing the recruitment and training of personnel for the Air Force in military educational institutions, as well as for medical and geophysical support, planning and monitoring the course of combat training of Air Force units.
Number, combat strength and weapons.The number of Air Force personnel is 73.3 thousand people. The air force has 20 squadrons (559 combat aircraft), of which 457 are in combat (of which 108 nuclear weapons carriers, including 165 fighter-bombers, 36 IDS Tornadoes, 35 ECR Tornadoes, 144 fighter air defense, 125 F-4F, 94 combat trainers "Alpha Jet", as well as 102 in reserve.
15 anti-aircraft missile groups include 534 anti-aircraft missile launchers, of which 240 are "Patriot", 204 are "Advanced Hawk" and 90 "Roland", as well as 264 anti-aircraft artillery guns.
In nine squadrons of auxiliary aviation, there are more than 160 aircraft, of which 157 are transport, 7 are electronic warfare. In five squadrons of auxiliary aviation helicopters there are about 100 machines.
Attack aviation, all air defense forces and assets were consolidated into four aviation divisions (1, 2, 3 and 4), which are distributed between the regional air command South and North (two in each).
The command of the Air Force "North" includes the 3rd and 4th air divisions, in the combat composition of which there are 117 tactical fighters "Tornado" (Fig. 2), 89 air defense fighters F-4F (Fig. 3) and 23 MiG-29, 108 PU SAM "Patriot" (Fig. 4), 96 - "Improved Hawk" and 30 - "Roland". These forces and assets are combined into two (31 and 38) fighter-bomber aviation squadrons, three (71, 72 and 73) fighter squadrons, one (51) reconnaissance squadron, three (1, 2 and 3) - SAM and regiment (1st) of radar control of airspace.
The Air Force Command South includes the 1st and 2nd Aviation Divisions, which include 119 Tornado tactical fighters, 36 F-4F air defense fighters, 132 Patriot missile launchers, 108 Advanced Hawk and 60 "Roland".
These forces and assets are combined into three (32, 33 and 34) fighter-bomber squadrons.
The Transport Aviation Command has 84 S. 160 Transall tactical transport aircraft (Fig. 5), the CL-601 family (see color insert), two Boeing 707s, the A-310 family and 99 UH-1D transport and landing helicopters (Fig. . 6).
Air divisionis the highest operational-tactical formation of the Air Force. It includes two or three aviation and one or two anti-aircraft missile squadrons.
Aviation squadron -the main tactical part. In peacetime, it has two or three squadrons (20 aircraft) and up to 2,000 military personnel. With a mobilization deployment, the size of the squadron increases to 4,000 - 4,500 people due to the replenishment of reservists. The transport aviation squadron includes one or two aviation and up to three helicopter squadrons.
SAM squadronis a tactical part and solves the tasks of object air defense. Organizationally, in three squadrons (1, 2 and 5), it is envisaged to have two anti-aircraft missile groups (one group of air defense missile systems "Patriot" and "Advanced Hawk"). The other three (3rd, 4th and 6th) SAM squadrons additionally include one Roland SAM group.
Air Force units and subunits are fully equipped with materiel. Every day, at least 80 percent is maintained in constant technical readiness. planes of the regular composition of combat aviation squadrons. The manning of the flight personnel is from 1.2 to 1.5 crews for each regular aircraft, and the technical personnel is at least 90 percent. peacetime staffing table.
In accordance with the transition to a new, three-component structure (response forces, main defensive forces and reinforcement forces) of the combined and national armed forces, the Bundeswehr command plans to allocate 19 combat squadrons (four aviation and 15 anti-aircraft missile squadrons) to the aviation component of the NATO response forces.
One squadron of air defense fighters (18 F-4Fs), one squadron of electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft (18 ECR Tornadoes) and six anti-aircraft missile (three Patriot, two Advanced Hawk "And one" Roland ", total 41 PU SAM). They are kept in 72-hour readiness for redeployment to operational airfields and in fact represent the forward echelon aviation of the NATO Response Force. The time required to prepare the SNR aviation for the start of hostilities after the completion of relocation should be no more than 72 hours.
The NATO Rapid Deployment Force (RBD) of the bloc has two fighter-bomber aircraft (36 Tornado aircraft), one reconnaissance (18 Tornado RECCE), one air defense fighter jets (18 F-4F) and five anti-aircraft missile (three - "Patriot" and two - "Improved Hawk", a total of 36 launchers of missiles) squadrons. They are supposed to be put into operation if the scale of the crisis exceeds the capabilities of the SNR aviation, as well as if it is necessary to increase the efforts of these forces in areas of sharp aggravation of European theater of operations or outside the unit's zone of responsibility The terms of readiness of the SBR aviation have been determined: 7 days for redeployment and up to 7 days for completion of the creation of an operational group.
In addition, units of aircraft and helicopters of military transport aviation can be transferred to the response forces.
A feature of the functioning of the aviation component of the NATO response forces is that in everyday conditions the air force and air defense units allocated to them are under national subordination and are engaged in routine combat training in places of permanent deployment. Their reassignment to the coalition command is carried out only after a decision has been made by the leadership of the alliance on the use of reaction forces or for the period of exercises. However, these forces can also be used in the national interests and according to the plans of the WEU.
Under normal conditions, coordination of interaction between units of the air component of the NATO Allied Air Force Response Force is carried out through a special headquarters deployed at the Central Military District in Kalkar. The chief of staff is the commander of the Sever Regional Aviation Command.
The main defensive forces will include the forces and assets of the Air Force, which are not part of the SNR and the RBU. They are planned to be used if there is a threat of a large-scale military conflict.
With a mobilization deployment, the number of Air Force personnel is planned to be increased from 78 thousand to 225 thousand people, and the number of combat aviation squadrons from 20 to 23 (500 aircraft).
Aerodrome network. INGermany has a highly developed airfield infrastructure, which includes more than 600 airfields of various classes, helipads, as well as airfield road sections. Over 130 airfields are considered well prepared and suitable for the basing of all types of combat and military transport aviation. The airfield network on the territory of the country is unevenly located (Fig. 8), however, according to foreign experts, it will allow the NATO command to concentrate here a powerful grouping of tactical aviation, as well as transport and transport and refueling aviation.
Operational and combat trainingheadquarters and combat training of Air Force units and subunits are planned and carried out taking into account the possible nature of military operations in Europe and the requirements of modern concepts of the combat employment of aviation. As foreign experts note, the leadership takes into account the shortcomings of the combat use of the national air force during Operation Resolute Force. The main attention is paid to improving plans for the mobilization and operational deployment of formations and units, methods and methods of fighting an air enemy, actions as part of multinational strike groups, organizing interaction with other types of the Armed Forces, and increasing the effectiveness of the control system.
The participation of headquarters, formations, units and subunits of the Air Force is planned annually in at least 50 exercises, exercises-competitions, trainings and checks of combat readiness (Fig. 7). Most of the operational and combat training activities are carried out at the NATO Allied Air Force scale. Of those exercises in which the FRG Air Force participates, the largest are Central Enterprise, Cold Phase, Joint Maritime Kos and Tektikal Ermit, during which the following plans are being worked out: operational deployment and conduct of the first air offensive and defensive operations of the initial period of the war in Europe using conventional means of destruction, repelling enemy aggression from coastal areas, organizing interaction between NATO command and control bodies
Figure: 8. Aerodrome network of the German Air Force
Combat training plans provide for the development of various tasks in various weather conditions day and night, followed by verification of the results achieved during exercises. On the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, combat training is carried out taking into account the prohibition by the federal authorities of flights at low and extremely low altitudes and supersonic speeds, as well as restrictions on the use of air ranges. In this regard, these types of flights and the practical use of aircraft weapons are being practiced at the training grounds of the USA, Canada, Italy, Greece and other NATO countries during exercises and routine combat training. The annual average flight time per flight crew is about 150 hours for combat and 240 hours for auxiliary aviation. At the same time, foreign experts note that in recent years there has been a tendency for the shortage of personnel in combat and auxiliary aviation. This is due to two main factors: the transition of experienced pilots to civil aviation for material reasons, as well as a decrease in the medical condition of applicants for admission to the school. In 2000, out of more than 2,000 applicants, only 143 were able to pass the medical commission and professional selection for further training in flying professions.
Air Force development prospects.Simultaneously with the improvement of plans for the operational use of the Air Force, the Bundeswehr command has developed and is consistently implementing a program for the development of this type of armed forces "Structure-4". Its main goals are: optimization of the organizational structure and control system of the national air force; strengthening the combat power of this type of armed forces by upgrading the existing equipment; and the transition to modern types of aviation equipment, equipping with high-precision weapons with a long range of destruction, the creation of smaller in numbers and combat strength, but with greater combat capabilities, aviation formations capable of independently or in cooperation with units and formations of the ground forces and the Navy to solve a wide range of tasks on any theater of operations or an area of \u200b\u200barmed conflict. The number of the Air Force personnel by 2000 is planned to be reduced to 77 thousand people.
Figure: 9. Tactical fighter EF-2000 "Typhoon"
The modernization of F-4F air defense fighters is carried out in order to increase the range of interception lines for air targets. The aircraft are equipped with AN / APG-65 multifunctional radar stations with a phased antenna array, capable of detecting air targets at a distance of up to 150 km. As a means of destruction, it is planned to use an AIM-120 air-to-air missile with an active homing head and a firing range of up to 75 km. An increase in the combat range of these aircraft is planned to be achieved by installing an air refueling system on them. Four Boeing 707 transport aircraft are supposed to be used as refuellers, on which the corresponding conversion work is being carried out.
The Tornado tactical fighter modernization program provides for the improvement of the central on-board computer, as well as the possibility of equipping them with GBU-24 guided bombs, HARM anti-radar missiles, AMRAAM and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles, suspended containers with reconnaissance equipment, Apash missiles air-to-ground class (with a replaceable warhead and a firing range of up to 150 km), which allows the crew to engage ground targets outside the line of opening fire of enemy ground defense systems. It is planned to increase the accuracy of the aircraft's exit to the target area and the use of airborne weapons by correcting the inertial navigation system according to the NAVSTAR radar and equipping the Tornado aircraft with a suspended sighting and navigation system, which includes a laser rangefinder-target designator.
According to the plans, after 2002, a new tactical fighter EF-2000 Typhoon will begin to enter service with the Air Force (Fig. 9), which is to replace, first of all, the outdated F-4F air defense fighters. In total, it is planned to purchase 140 aircraft as an air defense fighter and 40 as a tactical fighter.
In order to renew the fleet of the main military transport aircraft C. 160, it is possible to purchase 74 new FLA transport aircraft developed by the European consortium "Euroflag". The start of their serial production is scheduled for 2003.
Before the entry into the troops (after 2003) of 114 modern multipurpose NH-90 helicopters, jointly developed by companies from Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, it is planned to modernize the UH-1D transport and landing helicopters in service. In particular, it is planned to replace electrical equipment, strengthen the elements of the fuselage structure, and install new flight and navigation equipment. It was decided to extend the service life of UH-1D helicopters until 2010.
In accordance with the requirements of the new NATO coalition military strategy and the Temporary Concept of the Joint Air Defense of the Central European Theater of Operations adopted on its basis, the Bundeswehr command continues to carry out measures to reorganize the air defense system of the country's territory.
The purpose of the reorganization is the transition to a unified centralized control of the forces and assets of the air defense and air force in the course of air offensive and defensive operations. It is envisaged, for example, to expand the national control and warning system through the deployment of new air defense systems in the eastern lands of the Federal Republic of Germany, to optimize the structure of the control and alert bodies of the Air Force and Air Defense, to achieve interoperability of communication systems and automation equipment for further integration into the automated control system of the Air Force and Air Defense NATO ACCS (Air Command and Control System).
In the structure of the deployed unified automated command and control system for the NATO Air Force and Air Defense in Europe, two air operations control centers - the Combined Air Operation Center - have been created on the territory of the FRG. They are headed by the regional commanders of the national air forces of the FRG "North" (2 TSUVO - Kalkar) and "Yug" (4 TSUVO - Messtätten) and are directly subordinate to the commander of the OVVS in the CE theater. Organizationally, the TSUVO consists of three groups: offensive operations management, defensive operations management, and support and support coordination. This control body is an association of headquarters structures engaged in the development and formulation of offensive and defensive missions (the former TSUTA and OTsS Air Defense or their equivalents of control bodies 2 and 4 of the OTAK). TSUVO will exercise control over the units and subdivisions of the aviation component of the operational group of forces, as well as the forces and means additionally allocated to the commander of the OVVS in the theater of operations for the performance of certain tasks.
Information about the air situation is received by the Central Command and Control Center from AWACS-NATO aircraft and from the command and control centers (CMC), which have their own means of detection and use data from command and control posts (CWO) and radar posts (RLP).
In the interests of increasing the capabilities of the air defense system, special attention is paid to the deployment of modern three-coordinate radar stations (radar stations) at five radar posts (RLP n. Debern, Altenburg, Putgart-ten, Elmenhorst and Kelpin), which control the airspace over the eastern lands of the FRG with a phased array antenna AN / FPS-117. These stations are distinguished by high tactical and technical characteristics in terms of detection range and the number of simultaneously tracked targets, require minimal maintenance and are capable of operating in an autonomous mode. In addition, at the disposal of the Bundeswehr, the US Air Force command in Europe has transferred the one located in the settlement of Tempelhof near Berlin) radar AN / FPS-117, which is actively used to control the airspace over the eastern lands of Germany.
Measures are continuing to optimize the structure of the command and control bodies of the Air Force and Air Defense on the territory of the western lands of the FRG. At the same time, management functions are removed from a number of central control centers, and the command of air defense forces and means is assigned to the central control center. In particular, four central control centers (in the cities of Fisselhevede, Marienbaum, Auenhausen and Erbeskopf) are being converted into air defense radars and equipped with AN / FPS-117 radar.
In total, in the national control and warning system, the Bundeswehr command proposes to have eight central control centers (in the villages of Brockcetel, Breckendorf, Messtätten, Lauda, \u200b\u200bFreising, Pragsdorf, Schönewalde and Erndtebruck) and 12 remotely controlled radar stations (n.p. Arber, Debern, Debraberg, Marienbaum, Putgarten, Tempelhof, Kelpin, Fisselhevede, Elmenhorst and Erbeskopf). In the opinion of Western experts, the new structure of the command and control bodies of the Air Force and Air Defense, in the context of a decrease in financial allocations and a reduction in personnel, will increase the efficiency and reliability of the air defense system by automating the process of detecting and tracking targets, centralizing control and closer interaction of all air defense means.
In addition to the above measures, work continues on the integration of the Gage ACS of the FRG Air Defense and the Eiffel Air Force ACS into the unified command and control system of the NATO Air Force and Air Defense ACCS. Thus, the governing bodies of the national control and warning system are equipped with modern automation and communication facilities, databases and software. On the whole, all this will make it possible to ensure more reliable and effective air defense of the German territory, coordination and interaction in the management of national and coalition forces and tactical aviation assets, which, ultimately, will significantly increase the capabilities of the united NATO air force in Europe.
Within the framework of this plan, it is envisaged to equip control bodies of each level (from the commander of the FRG Air Force to the squadron commander, inclusive) with modern automation and communications equipment, databases and flexible software. This, in the opinion of the Air Force Command, will reduce the cycle time of aviation and air defense control by 3 - 4 times, provide comprehensive automated communication in a crisis situation and in wartime by bringing the organizational and staff structure of the FRG Air Force in line with NATO requirements. significantly increase the flexibility and mobility, as well as the ability of the Air Force to build up forces and assets at the right time in the required directions, will strengthen the centralization of control.
For more details see: Foreign military review. - 2000. - No. 10. - P. 27 - 33.
In the context of the changed political situation in the world, the military-political leadership (VPR) of Germany is rethinking the role and tasks of its armed forces. At the same time, the air force is of particular importance as the most effective and high-tech component of the armed forces.
The large-scale military reform in Germany, carried out from the early 2000s to 2012, did not fundamentally change the structure of the national air force. The number of aviation divisions was reduced from four to three, the transport aviation command was disbanded, and the number of combat and auxiliary squadrons slightly decreased. In addition, the process of real transition to new models of military equipment began, which is actively continuing to this day. The FRG Air Force quickly got rid of the Soviet tactical MiG-29 fighters, transferring them to Poland for a symbolic 1 euro, and at the same time firing most of the not-so-bad pilots from the GDR military aviation.
Until 2012, the structure of the Air Force continued to be typical for any branch of the German armed forces. They were headed by an inspector (commander), whose working body was the main headquarters of the Air Force, which was part of the central apparatus of the German Ministry of Defense.
The organizational and staff structure of the Air Force included two main blocks - the Air Force Operational Command (OK) and the Air Force Central Directorate (CU) (both located in Cologne-Wan). At the same time, the OK included all aviation divisions and the command of operational control. The central administration included training and support formations.
The turning point in the process of German military reform was the adoption in 2011 of a new military doctrine, called the "Main Directions of Germany's Defense Policy." The document re-interprets the tasks of the armed forces and each separate service of the armed forces.
So, the main goal of the planned German Air Force transformations, an increase in the combat capabilities of aviation and air defense forces is declared, while the number of formations and units included in their composition is reduced. At the same time, the main attention will be paid to improving the combat control system, reorganizing reconnaissance aviation, as well as equipping formations and units with modern models of aircraft.
On the basis of the Basic Provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Policy, the spectrum of key tasks of the German Air Force is expected to shift from gaining air supremacy and fighting enemy aircraft to direct air support of troops, surveillance and aerial reconnaissance. At the same time, it is planned to maintain the necessary potential for conducting strategic air operations envisaged by national or coalition plans.
According to the reform plans, the Supreme Command (GC) of the Air Force, headed by an inspector (commander-in-chief), becomes the supreme body of the German air force. The garrison Berlin-Gatow (10 km south of Berlin) was chosen as the location of the GC. It will be engaged in the development of general and long-term plans for the construction, combat training and operational use of the Air Force, as well as determine the deployment (basing) of their formations and units.
The fundamental point is the fact that the main command of the Air Force, like the Civil Code of other types of the Armed Forces, is removed from the structure of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. It is no coincidence that the location of the main command of the Air Force - Berlin-Gatov - was chosen. Thus, the Civil Code plans to restore the military traditions of the garrison, which now houses the largest air fleet museum in Germany.
The prospective structure of the German Air Force command and control bodies is divided into three main areas of activity - operational leadership, combat control and support. At the same time, the divisional level is completely excluded from the air force control system, and divisional headquarters are to be reduced.
The task of the operational leadership is planned to be entrusted to the command of the operational forces (KOS) of the Air Force (Cologne-Wan). It should be directly responsible for organizing combat training, developing plans for the combat employment of units and formations, technical equipment and logistic support. The KOS will be directly subordinated to two components - air and ground.
The air component will combine combat and transport aviation. The combat aviation will include three (in the future, possibly four) tactical fighter squadrons (AvB Wittmund, Nervenikh, Neuburg and Laage), as well as fighter-bomber (AvB Büchel) and reconnaissance (AvB Yagel) aviation squadrons.
Transport aviation will be represented by transport aviation (Avb Wunsdorf) and transport helicopter (Avb Holzdorf) squadrons and a special transport air group (Berlin / Cologne-Wan).
The basis of the ground component will be: an air defense squadron (Husum), two command and communications regiments (Schönewalde and Erndtenbrück), an Air Force facility guard regiment (Shortens) and an information and technical support regiment. The component will also include training centers of the German Air Force in the United States and Italy (AvB Holloman and Dechimomannu), as well as an electronic warfare center (Kleinantingen).
In the promising structure of the German Air Force, a special place is given to the 51st Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron (AvB Yagel). It is supposed to include the 511th reconnaissance squadron (RAE) and the 512th squadron of reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. At the same time, RAE 511 will be equipped with RECCE Tornado reconnaissance aircraft and ECR Tornado electronic warfare aircraft.
The Air Force command associates the expansion of the reconnaissance capabilities of aviation with the adoption of strategic and operational reconnaissance UAVs. In this regard, until 2014, it is expected that the Eurohock reconnaissance UAV will be included in the 512th squadron. In the period up to 2015, it is possible to put into service four more similar devices, and until 2017 - the same number of Global Hawk UAVs designed to deploy the AGS aerial reconnaissance system for ground targets.
Currently, the German VPR is at the stage of making a decision to start implementing a program for equipping the national air force with medium-altitude strike UAVs for operational-tactical purposes. In accordance with the plans until 2020, the German Air Force in the 512th reconnaissance squadron should have 16 such UAVs.
The medium-altitude UAV procurement program is planned to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, it is possible to acquire a batch of five units, which the Bundeswehr will use as a "transitional model" for the period from 2015 to 2020. At the same time, samples of Israeli (Israel Aerospace Industries) and American (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems) firms are being studied.
At the second stage, it is planned to create a "European" strike unmanned aerial vehicle. Work in this direction is actively carried out by the EADS concern.
The tasks of the combat command of the German Air Force will be assigned to the Main Operations Center (GOC) of the Air Force (Kalkar). The center should ensure German participation in the work of the operational planning and command and control bodies of the multinational air force grouping during the preparation and conduct of operations under the overall leadership of NATO and the EU.
The GOC is planned to subordinate the following structures: the German headquarters component in the NATO Allied Forces (AvB Ramstein); the German component at the headquarters of the European Transport Aviation Command (Eindhoven, Netherlands); the German component of AWACS command and aviation control "Avax-NATO" (Geilenkirchen); the German component "AGS" (AvB Sigonel-la, Italy); German components in NATO and EU structures; Air Force Operations Center (Kalkar); National Center for Airspace Protection (Yudem); Outer Space Control Center (Yudem); Information Technology Support Group (Kalkar).
The command of the support forces (CSR) of the Air Force (Cologne-Van) will be responsible for organizing the recruitment and training of personnel for the German Air Force, as well as for the material, technical and medical support of their activities. It will include: the German component of the NATO program center, the technical training center (Fasberg), the officer (Roth) and non-commissioned officer (Appen) schools of the Air Force, the training battalion of candidates for officers and non-commissioned officers (Germersheim), the information technology group support, as well as the air traffic control department of the Bundeswehr (Frankfurt am Main), the Air Force Medical Service (Cologne-Wan) and two Air Force weapons centers (Schönewalde and Manching).
The reform plans approved by the Bundeswehr command envisage the withdrawal of the CH-53 medium transport helicopters from the ground forces and their transfer to the Air Force helicopter transport squadron (AvB Laupheim and Holzdorf). All light transport helicopters NH-90 and fire support helicopters "Tiger", on the contrary, will be concentrated in the rapid reaction division of the German Army.
Within the framework of the Bundeswehr rearmament program, the Air Force plans to completely replace obsolete weapons and military equipment with new and modernized models within five years. Thus, the Luftwaffe is supposed to have up to 225 combat aircraft (of which the Typhoon - 140, the Tornado - 85), about 100 transport aircraft (Transall - 60, А.400M - 40), 64 CH- 53, nine strategic and 16 operational-tactical UAVs, 112 PU SAM "Patriot".
Evaluating the tactical and technical characteristics of the new aircraft of the German Air Force, it should be noted that the Typhoon tactical fighter is a competitive aircraft on the world market and corresponds to the 4+ generation. At the same time, it is difficult to attribute it to a "breakthrough" in the world of aviation. The situation is even more complicated with the adoption of the А.400M transport aircraft. The manufacturer, represented by the Airbus Military consortium, is constantly postponing delivery dates. At the same time, the performance characteristics of the aircraft have undergone significant changes in the direction of deterioration, which causes extreme discontent on the part of the Air Force command.
When analyzing the development prospects of the FRG Air Force, attention is drawn to the moral and psychological aspect of the reform. Thus, this type of armed forces, more than any other, preserves the combat traditions of German aviation. For example, the names of the squadrons (71 iaesk - "Richthofen", 51 raesk - "Immelman", 31 abaesk - "Belke") were given to them in honor of the pilots during the First World War. A large number of biographies and descriptions of the military exploits of the German aces during the Second World War are constantly published in special editions. It is not surprising that the characteristic silhouette of the Me 109 appears in the air - in Germany there are a large number of clubs and societies where combat vehicles are carefully preserved and restored, thereby supporting the interest of young people in aviation.
Another sign of the German Air Force is the extreme "Americanization" of military pilots. This is explained by the fact that the development of pilots takes place in the United States using American techniques and aviation technology. At the same time, units of the national air force are participating in a large number of large-scale combat training events in the United States together with their American counterparts.
Thus, the military reform being carried out by the FRG leadership is designed to ensure the further priority development of the air force. At the same time, the air force control system is being improved and, despite the economic difficulties, active steps are being taken to technically re-equip this type of armed forces.
(Colonel A. Lopukhov, "Foreign Military Review")
Victor Markovsky
Igor Prikhodchenko
Color: Victor Milyachenko
At the end of World War II, the territory of Germany was divided between the victorious powers into two parts __ the eastern one, which was under the control of the Soviet Military Administration (SVAG), and the western one, controlled by the allied countries. Initially, it was envisaged that the joint administration of Germany would be carried out by a common supreme body - the Control Council for the administration of Germany. However, it quickly became clear that the difference in political and social views makes the cooperation of the victor countries in the arrangement of Germany's future doubtful, and the outbreak of the Cold War put an end to the recent partnership.
On October 7, 1949, the creation of the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed in the eastern zone, the founders of which declared the goal of building a socialist society. Three days later, the SVAG command, on behalf of the USSR government, transferred “ to the state organizations of the GDR, the management functions performed until now by the Soviet Military Administration". With the establishment of the Warsaw Pact Organization in May 1955, along with other countries of Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic also joined it. The status of the GDR in the newly formed military bloc, however, was somewhat peculiar - unlike other states, including Albania, the GDR at that time did not have its own army. All military formations were abolished under the terms of the post-war occupation of Germany, on whose territory the Germans were allowed to have only police forces.
On January 18, 1956, the GDR government decided to establish a new German People's Army. The construction of the NNA was carried out with the full assistance of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (before, the Soviet troops were officially called "occupation" here, but in 1955 this status was abolished and the name GSOVG was changed to a more appropriate GSVG for new times). The NNA units were equipped with Soviet weapons and equipment, and personnel were trained on the basis of Soviet military units. Already in August 1957, the first joint exercises of the GSVG and the NNA took place.
Air forces were created among other components of the NPA. In this regard, it is worth drawing a parallel with a similar situation at the end of the First World War, when the Germans were completely prohibited from having military aircraft. In modern times, the strong-willed prescriptions of past years looked like an outright anachronism - modern armed forces without the Air Force looked simply unviable. Already on September 1, 1956, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the GDR, Major General Heinz Kessler, became Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Air Force and Air Defense. During the formation of the NPA Air Force, it was necessary to overcome significant difficulties with personnel: the former personnel with experience of service in the wartime Luftwaffe, for obvious reasons, were not suitable, and it was required to prepare young people from the post-war generation. In general, it was not easy for the authorities of the GDR to gain understanding from the population entrusted to their concerns - in the summer of 1953, just a couple of years before the formation of the armed forces, unrest and revolts took place throughout the country with expressions of dissatisfaction with the policy and the new structure of the country. The riots reached the highest level in East Berlin, where crowds smashed government offices and shops. The Soviet commandant in the capital had to declare martial law, tanks and motorized rifle units of the Soviet troops were brought into a number of cities in the GDR. In such a situation, personnel issues in the formation of the army looked like an extremely problematic matter, highlighting the focus on educating young people in the spirit of "builders of socialism and new Germany." The motto announced by NS Khrushchev became popular: "The Germans will unite again, but under the red banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin!"
The first aircraft of the new German Air Force were the training Yak-11 and Yak-18, then the An-2 and Il-14 transports began to arrive. Already in October 1956, German pilots began training on the MiG-15 jet fighters. For the first time, the new jet technology of the German Air Force was shown at the May Day parade in 1957 over Dresden.
In the next two decades, the NVA combat aviation was replenished exclusively with fighters. Since 1957, MiG-17s were received, two years later, the rearmament of supersonic MiG-19 fighters began, and in the fall of 1962, the NNA Air Force began mastering the MiG-21F, later going through many of their modifications up to the MiG-21bis. Il-28s were also received, but by no means to create their own bomber aviation - these aircraft were used as target towing vehicles for fighter training, as well as in the role of reconnaissance aircraft.
The reasons for this one-sidedness in the construction of military aviation were, as they say, heard: the leadership of the GDR, in every possible way distancing itself from the country's Nazi past, declared purely defensive tasks of the armed forces, in which offensive weapons seemed inappropriate. This approach was especially carefully followed in relation to the Air Force, avoiding any associations with the former Luftwaffe that reigned over Europe. Accordingly, the concept of a purely defensive orientation of the new German armed forces, the Air Force had the goal of protecting the country's airspace and was equipped primarily with fighters, there was no talk of getting bombers and attack aircraft. The fight against Nazi ideology and denazification in the post-war GDR, proclaimed a "peaceful German state", were elevated to a principle where aggressive aspirations and their attributes in the form of strike aircraft had no place. Even the insignia of the NPA Air Force looked deliberately "demilitarized", with the creative symbols of the country's coat of arms present on them - ears of wheat, a hammer and a compass as an alliance of the working peasantry, the working class and the intelligentsia. True, the uniforms of the GDR NPA servicemen, for some reason, looked excellent and largely retained the traditions and attributes of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, from cut to shoulder straps, very similar to previous models, in contrast to the form of the West German Bundeswehr, tailored according to completely new models.
This picture persisted until the early 70s, when either the ideological mood cooled down, or more constructive views on the construction of the Air Force prevailed. The modern Air Force looked deprived without the presence of a shock component in their composition, the capabilities of aviation with such a composition turned out to be limited and the role on the battlefield was secondary. The reliance solely on protective functions in the use of aviation seemed one-sided. When discussing the prospects for building the Air Force, an example was given of their weak effectiveness in the event of enemy aggression: it was generally recognized that aviation is capable of helping to suppress the enemy's intentions, hindering the enemy's actions in a variety of scenarios, be it a defense or a counteroffensive, but in counterstrikes, the HNA fighters available , even if capable of carrying weapons for work on ground targets, will be of little satisfaction for these tasks. In addition to purely defensive missions to cover its territory and troops, it was necessary to provide the Air Force with the possibility of full-fledged air support with the infliction of fire damage to the enemy. There was an example of neighboring Germany, whose military aviation looked envious of being equipped with different types of equipment, including attack aircraft, in the role of which were both fighter-bombers of the first jet generation, and the latest supersonic Starfighters and Phantoms.
The first "relaxation" of reality was the formation in 1971 of a strike aviation unit within the NVA Air Force - the JBG 31 "Clement Gottwald" (Jagdbomberfliegergeshwader) fighter-bomber regiment. Sometimes the name "geshwader" is translated even in military dictionaries as "squadron" or, going to the other extreme, "squadron", although they radically differ in composition and role in the structure of the Air Force. "Squadrons" in relation to aviation structures existed in the German wartime air force, but they were larger formations comparable to our divisions. In addition, in the Russian historical and military vocabulary, the concept of "squadron" has its own, well-established meaning in relation to the fleet. The NNA Air Force units had a manning similar to that adopted in other Warsaw Pact countries, where the "geshwader" corresponded to the formation of the regimental level, with the corresponding numerical strength and organization. For this reason, it seems appropriate to define such a formation in the Air Force as a regiment (although in the German army the regiment was also traditionally called the Regiment).
The NVA Air Force regiment included several squadrons ("staffs"), from two to four, and numbered from two dozen to fifty (and in some cases more) aircraft. Also, traditionally, German aviation units (not all) were assigned their own names, but in the socialist GDR they were called not in honor of prominent military leaders and mythological characters of German history, but after the names of prominent figures of the socialist community, leaders of the international communist and anti-fascist movement. Formed on October 1, 1971, JBG 31 was based at the Drewitz airfield in the southeast of the country, near the border with Poland, next to the JG 7 Wilhelm Peak fighter regiment based here, flying the MiG-21PFM.
JBG 31 flew on MiG-17F aircraft, which had lost their value as fighters by the early 70s, but came in handy in a new capacity. Adapting the aircraft to the role of fighter-bombers, in 1973 the Germans refined them on their own at an aircraft repair plant in Dresden. The aircraft received a pair of additional underwing pylons for suspension of bombs and blocks UB-16-57, as well as low-altitude radio altimeters RV-UM. In 1976, the regiment was armed with 43 MiG-17F and 14 "twin" MiG-15UTI. In terms of the number of aircraft, thus, the then German fighter-bomber regiment was one and a half times superior to the Soviet IBA regiment of the regular staff.
Allowing the appearance of a single unit of fighter-bomber aviation, the GDR authorities tried to maintain secrecy regarding the very existence of the regiment, over the next fifteen years avoiding any advertising of the presence of a strike formation in the Air Force. The presence of a fighter-bomber regiment was practically not reflected either in the press or in other media (in contrast to other units, whose successes in combat and political training in guarding German socialism were the object of attention of army propaganda). Apparently, the commitment of the Germans to discipline and once and for all the established order ("it is impossible - therefore it is impossible") affected. It is worth noting the fact that in the practice of the NVA Air Force service among the pilots brought up in the habit of ordering, there were absolutely no cases of attempts to fly to the western zone, which took place in other countries of the eastern bloc (including ours ...). Pilots of the allied armies, fed up with the values \u200b\u200bof socialism, time from time to time they flew to the adjacent side, but among the pilots of the GDR, many of whom had relatives in West Germany, there was not a single such episode. The possibility of implementing such plans was initially taken into account: just in case, units of the NPA Air Force were deployed in the eastern part of the country, away from the border with the FRG, in Soviet fighter units on the territory of the GDR in case of such attempts, there were plans to intercept, but there was no reason to use them.
It is appropriate to give a description of the flight technical personnel of the GDR Air Force, compiled for our instructors, taking into account the characteristics of the trained contingent: The policy of the USSR is approved and supported. Soviet reality is understood correctly. The attitude towards Soviet people is friendly and benevolent. They willingly talk about their homeland, culture, life, politics, but avoid topics about the period of the Second World War. Critically, from a class position, they treat the United States and NATO countries. They are friends with each other, they are aware of their higher level of training in comparison with cadets from other countries, but they treat them evenly and friendly, avoid conflicts. Discipline and organization are high. Executive, strictly observe the chain of command. They spend money sparingly, are rational in all their actions. They love the military uniform, they treat military rituals with respect, they show diligence in the service. The penalties received are worried, they try not to repeat the offenses.
Professionally knowledgeable about aviation. They take business seriously, they are attentive and focused in the classroom. Abilities are high, memory, attention and thinking are well developed. They are hardworking, active, purposeful, conscientious, honest by nature. A good, cheerful, even mood prevails. In difficult situations, they make competent, rational decisions».
Taking into account the high professional orientation and training of the Germans, our instructors were instructed to work with this group “ show high competence, punctually fulfill the requirements of instructions and instructions, carefully observe the military etiquette appreciated by the trainees».
At the end of the 70s, ideas about the prospects for building the NVA Air Force changed somewhat. With all the declarations about the need for detente in Europe, the confrontation between the military blocs has reached its peak. The continued strengthening of the armed forces of the FRG looked like a challenge (even with the well-known discontent of other members of the alliance, who were somewhat wary of building up the power of the Bundeswehr). The West German army received operational-tactical Pershing missiles, and the Air Force became one of the most powerful in NATO. Formed in September 1956, almost simultaneously with the GDR Air Force, the West German Bundesluftwaffe quickly gained strength. The power of the military aviation of the FRG was much superior to the air force of the NPA, while a significant part of it was initially represented by the shock component. Already four years after the formation of the Bundesluftwaffe, they had 225 F-86 Saber fighters, 375 F-84F Thunderstreak fighter-bombers and 108 RF-84F Thunderflesh reconnaissance aircraft. This was only the beginning: already in 1961, deliveries of the latest novelty of the then military aviation - the F-104G Starfighter supersonic fighter-bombers - began. The machine, in the designation of which the index G meant just the destination for Germany, was distinguished primarily by its adaptability to strikes against ground targets, could carry nuclear bombs and guided missiles for strikes against ground targets. The Bundesluftwaffe received 916 Starfighters __ much more than there were all the planes combined in the NNA Air Force.
Unlike the NPA Air Force, which literally started from scratch and relied on the youth of the post-war generation, the Bundesluftwaffe experienced much less problems with recruiting trained and qualified personnel for military aviation. The most famous example was wartime ace Erich Hartmann, who commanded a fighter regiment and flew in the Starfighter, rising to the rank of colonel in the Bundesluftwaffe
In 1973, the West German Air Force began to equip the F-4F Phantom II fighter-bombers. The Bundesluftwaffe received 175 such vehicles. The aircraft with an impressive combat load and a wide range of weapons entered service with four fighter and bomber aircraft. Replenishment was also being prepared with the latest Tornado fighter-bombers, which the West German Air Force began to receive in 1979, the first from the alliance countries.
The accusatory rhetoric directed at the "revanchists from Bonn" should have been supplemented with more constructive measures to strengthen its air force. One of the decisions of the authorities of the GDR and the leadership of the NPA was the re-equipment of aviation with more modern technology. Together with the MiG-23MF fighters (later the MiG-23ML), the NNA Air Force was replenished with MiG-23BN fighter-bombers. Since 1979, they began to re-equip the fighter-bomber regiment in Drevitz with new machines, writing off the outdated MiG-17F. At the same time, the name of the part was changed to JBG 37. Equipping the part with new equipment, however, was delayed and was completed only by 1981. In total, the JBG 37 received 22 MiG-23BN fighter-bombers and six MiG-23UB "twin" aircraft. By this time, the conjuncture had changed, and the equipment became more expensive, so the GDR authorities considered it possible to allocate money only for a limited number of new cars. The regiment became a two-squadron, accounting for only two-thirds of the equipment from the staff of a similar Soviet unit of the IBA. In 1982, the regiment was subordinated to the newly formed Directorate of Frontline and Army Aviation.
Nevertheless, after only a few years, the supersonic MiG-23BN no longer fully met the requirements. The German command was not satisfied with the combat capabilities of the fighter-bomber, especially in terms of its sighting and navigation equipment and weapons. For some reason, the aircraft supplied to the Germans (unlike other comrades in the socialist camp) were not equipped with equipment for the use of guided weapons and could only carry conventional bombs and NAR, which in modern times was considered unsatisfactory. There were complaints about the aerobatic equipment and on-board navigation, which limited the possibilities of the aircraft's combat use (especially taking into account the frequent adverse weather conditions in Central Europe with accompanying rains and fogs).
In terms of most characteristics, from the combat load and the range of weapons to the level of sighting and navigation equipment, the MiG-23BN was inferior to the emerging Su-22M4, which was proposed to equip strike aircraft of the Warsaw Pact countries. The NVA Air Force command had a good idea of \u200b\u200bthe capabilities of the new fighter-bombers, which was by no means a figure of speech: aircraft of a similar design, the Su-17M4, served in the GSVG Air Force since 1982 and were repeatedly demonstrated to colleagues in joint exercises. In the spring of 1984, on the basis of the Soviet 730th regiment, a demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft's combat use to future buyers was arranged. There were representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries, in front of which, at the Wittstock test site, the Su-17M4 piloted by Soviet pilots for several days in a row carried out bombing and firing with all possible types of aircraft destruction, including guided missiles of various types. The "bride" was a success ": at the show, the Germans were remembered for the thoroughness of their approach, asked many questions, were interested in the details of the armament and equipment of the aircraft.
A decision was made to form two new Su-22M4 fighter-bomber regiments in the NVA Air Force. To equip them, pilots and technical personnel were selected from the units that operated the MiG-21 and MiG-23BN. The first group of eight German pilots went to the USSR for retraining ahead of time, even before the new technology was received. In a curious way, the destination of their business trip among the Russian expanses was defined as “ krasnodar city, south of Moscow". They passed a typical three-month course of study at the Krasnodar School from May 18 to July 21, 1984. The next group of the same size was retrained in the period from September 3 to November 30. Subsequently, as the aircraft received, arriving in several batches, from autumn 1985 to September 1987, another 28 people were trained in the USSR. In the future, as experience gained in working on new equipment and in the presence of qualified specialists in the units, we switched to training newcomers directly at our base.
The new JBG 77 fighter-bomber regiment was formed according to an order dated July 15, 1984 on the basis of a group of specialists and command personnel of JBG 37. During November-December 1984, ground handling equipment, special and automobile equipment were transferred from Drevitz by rail. According to the state, the two-squadron regiment was supposed to have 28 aircraft, including 24 combat and four "twin". The first commander of the 77th regiment was Colonel Manfred Enichen, who was appointed to the post on November 1, 1984. On November 1, 1987, he was replaced by Colonel Jürgen Roske. Officially, the formation of the regiment went on from December 1, 1984 and ended on November 30, 1985. At the end of organizational measures, JBG 77 was included in the Air Force on December 1, 1985.
On February 27, 1987, the 77th Geshwader was given the honorary name "Gebhardt Leberecht von Blucher". Unlike the previous practice, the units did not appropriated the name of the leader of the communist international, naming Prince of Walstadt after the Prussian field marshal of the era of the Napoleonic wars. Von Blucher was a renowned military leader who distinguished himself in a number of battles and commanded the Prussian forces at Waterloo, with his cavalry inflicting a decisive blow on the French at the climax of the battle. A significant moment was the fact that the field marshal acted as an ally of Russia and even at one time commanded the Prussian-Russian troops. True, we had to close our eyes to the fact that the image of the prominent commander was also turned to in Hitler's Germany, where the heavy cruiser Kriegsmarine bore his name, and the Reich propagandists even shot a historical film about the "winner of Napoleon."
The base of the new strike units was supposed to be an air base in Lag near Rostock in the north of the country. Since the airfield had not yet been completed by the time the new aircraft were received, the first cars were delivered to the Rothenburg airfield nearby, where the German specialists from JBG 77 were sent to receive them. The equipment arrived from the plant by air on board An-22 transport aircraft. Then Il-76s were also involved in delivery, but their capacity allowed only one vehicle to be delivered. The assembly of the planes was carried out by a factory team of 15 people sent from Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The overflights of the machines were carried out by two factory testers. The first aircraft delivered was the Su-22UM3K twin, delivered on November 2, 1984. It was followed by three more Su-22UM3K, after which it was the turn of combat aircraft. The first six Su-22M4s arrived in December 1984, followed by a three-month break. It was a winter storm, because of which the delivery was postponed and the next 16 cars were brought in February-March 1985. The transfer of this batch of vehicles was completed in April with the delivery of ten more Su-22M4s. By June 1985, the JBG 77 regiment had practically reached its full strength, numbering 24 Su-22M4 combat aircraft and three "twin" aircraft. Combat aircraft belonged to the 25th and 26th production series, "sparks" __ to different series, from 66th to 71st. Both German and Soviet pilots were involved in ferrying cars in Lag.
By May 1985, 36 Su-22M4 and Su-22UM3K were already in the Lag. Not all of them were intended for the 77th regiment, since in parallel, at the same base in Lage, another unit was being created - the MFG 28 naval aviation regiment (Marinefliegergeschwader 28). Organizational measures for its formation were started on August 12, 1985, but the order was delayed. The reason was delays in the receipt of equipment - the Komsomolsk plant at that time had to provide supplies at once for a dozen countries, from partners in the Warsaw Pact to customers from the Third World countries, and even working at full capacity, could not ship products in all directions immediately. The aircraft for the MFG 28 arrived directly at Laga, where they were assembled by the factory workers and flew over. Nevertheless, according to the report to the command, as of December 1, 1985, MFG 28 had only eight Su-22M4 and two Su-22UM3K. The main batch of Su-22M4 for the "sailors" was received with a considerable delay, during the autumn months of 1986, but the delivery of several missing ones had to wait another six months, until April 1987, when the last two machines arrived __ Su-22M4 and "spark" ... Due to the lengthy supply, the MFG 28 combat vehicles belonged to different factory series, from the 26th in the first batch to the 30th and 31st in the rest. The last Su-22M4s received were distinguished by the installation of eight cassettes with infrared traps ASO-2V (instead of four on the previous machines) and the installation of an IT-23M TV monitor in the cockpit for using X-29T missiles with television guidance.
In total, the NNA Air Force received 56 fighter-bombers, combat and "twin". What importance was attached to strike aircraft and how significant the replenishment of the aircraft fleet became, can be judged by the fact that only 24 MiG-29 aircraft were ordered to update fighter aircraft. Taking into account the MiG-23BN that remained in service, the number of fighter-bombers in the military aviation of the GDR was not inferior to the number of modern MiG-29 and MiG-23 fighters (there were 55 of them).
The first commander of MFG 28 was Colonel Roske, who then left for a similar position in neighboring JBG 77 and was replaced in November 1987 by Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Malwitz. The formation of MFG 28 was finally completed only two years later, on November 27, 1987. The very existence of this formation was kept secret and for cover the unit was called "Blucherovskaya" by analogy with the neighboring air regiment. Only on October 7, 1989, the "naval unit" received its own name "Paul Vechorek" after a revolutionary sailor who took part in the uprising in the navy in the fall of 1918. Since 1986, both regiments have been under the command of the Office of Frontline and Military Transport Aviation in Strausberg (army aviation was withdrawn from the Air Force, acquiring an independent status). To establish another structure for servicing the only combat unit of naval aviation was considered an invoice, and taking into account the simplification of the organization of supply and training issues, the "sailors" were subordinate to the Air Force. Nevertheless, in case of wartime, taking into account the assigned tasks, it was envisaged that the MFG 28 was quickly subordinated to the leadership of the fleet (Volksmarine). For a long time, the personnel of MFG 28 wore general ranks and uniforms, but on July 20, 1990, naval ranks were introduced in the unit. The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Malvits, became a frigate captain, and naval ranks also extended to the rank and file, who became sailors and foremen (maat and obermaat). A naval uniform was also issued, but outside the unit they were not worn for the same reasons of secrecy, without revealing the affiliation of the unit, and officers could show off their white caps and jackets only in the garrison.
The resulting aircraft were assigned three-digit side numbers, traditionally red for combat aircraft and black for twin. As part of the measures to conceal the number of aircraft, the numbers were not in a row, but scattered: for combat aircraft in JBG 77 they began with No. 360 and ended with No. 723, in MFG 28 - from No. 378 to No. 798, giving the inexperienced observer the impression that that in the regiments there are at least a hundred aircraft. The general rule when assigning numbers was the sum of digits, by no means equal to 13 (while one of the "twin" cars carried the number 113 and no one was worried about the presence of the "damn dozen" on board the car - the sum was different from the agreed unlucky number and the prescription was fulfilled, which seemed more significant for disciplined Germans). Even when, over time, the publication of pictures of aircraft in the press began to be allowed, the side numbers when photographing were changed by strict German censorship, adding extra numbers or, conversely, covering them up or painting them over. The very name of the Su-22 was used only in everyday life in the service, in the documentation and correspondence, the executive Germans followed the instructions and allowed only an "open name" __ "item 54" for combat aircraft and "product S-52UM3K" for "twin".
The utmost importance was attached to the observance of secrecy. By their nature, the reserved Germans elevated secrecy to a cult: only an “open” honorary title was allowed in the press instead of the regular numbered name of military units, in no case giving the place of deployment, not to mention the numerical strength. The proposal to call the received fighter-bombers a non-existent name, as it had done a little earlier with the MiG-23BN, which at first was called the MiG-24 (!), Looked anecdotal. The Su-22 was ferried to the place of deployment in Lag along several routes, "confusing tracks" in case of possible observation. Hiding the destination of the flight from West German radars, the routes were laid at low altitude, a winding path with several turning points.
The base itself was surrounded by a high fence without a single crack. The perimeter of the base was patrolled by the military police. However, at Christmas 1984, a scandalous incident happened: cars of the American military mission appeared right on the taxiway of the carefully guarded base. It turned out that they got lost and in the wrong place turned off the Autobahn onto the adjacent road, which led them straight to the airfield parking in Lage. The nearby section of the highway was considered as an alternate runway, a concrete taxiway led to it, but neither the checkpoint nor the gate from the rear entrance to the base had yet been installed.
The base at Lage itself was the largest of all the airfields in the GDR. The construction of it as a northern base for aviation began in 1978 and was finally completed only in 1987. The base was given great importance in view of the operational and strategic tasks assigned to the NPA in the area: in the event of an aggravation of the situation, the presence of an air strike group here made it possible to block the Baltic straits. This was facilitated by the location of Lage, which lay 95 km from the western border and only fifty kilometers from the Baltic coast. The punctual Germans had all airfields and aviation facilities with their own numbers, Lage received the designation "47th air base" (FTAS 47). The base was distinguished by the most modern equipment and facilities, everything was done conscientiously, thoughtfully and rationally. The concrete runway, 2,500 m long, had a width of 60 m, allowing takeoffs to be carried out immediately as a link. The strip was located almost strictly in the meridional direction, from south to north, in accordance with the local wind rose, for the most part blowing from the sea. The Berlin-Rostock highway could be used as an alternate runway, to which taxiways led from the parking areas of each regiment.
The units deployed in Lage were dispersed: JBG 77 was located on the northern side of the strip, the "sailors" from MFG 28 - in the southern part of the airfield. Each regiment had its own zone with parking lots, shelters and areas for training equipment. Nearby there was a zone of dispersal of aircraft (in German, the zone was called exhaustively, with one word mentioning all the functional features - Staffeldezentralisierungsraum). The aircraft were housed in reinforced concrete arched shelters and ground protective horseshoe-shaped embankments. Each shelter was equipped with everything needed to prepare the aircraft, including electricity, fuel and compressed air. In addition to shelters for aircraft, where there were also underground shelters for flight and technical personnel, the zones were equipped with five protected reinforced concrete rooms for vehicles, six command posts and two power supply points with auxiliary electrical units that ensure the autonomous operation of all services.
At the runway, there were parking lots with half-kilometer-long platforms, sufficient to accommodate not only their own aircraft during flights, but also arriving vehicles of other parts. Each such parking lot had 12 refueling dispensers for two aircraft each, making it possible to simultaneously refuel all 24 aircraft of the regiment. There was also a supply of compressed air and electricity for pre-flight check of aircraft equipment.
To the airfield, they ran their own railway line to supply them with everything necessary, first of all - fuel and ammunition. The special equipment of the airfield included the SP-2 landing system, which ensured landings with a visibility of 800 m at 60 m in height.
The lage was distinguished by rather comfortable conditions of service and life: in addition to residential buildings, hostels for young officers and soldiers' barracks, the garrison had five canteens for soldiers, flight and technical personnel, which simultaneously received 1100 people. There was a 35-bed hospital with the latest medical equipment and diagnostics. In the military town, shops were not forgotten, a club and a gym worked, there was a 25-meter swimming pool and even a sauna.
Preparing for the entry of the regiments into service, the Germans approached the matter with all punctuality and thoroughness. Since the weather in the first winter in the new place was extremely bad, with fogs and precipitation, they were in no hurry with flights, preparing and mastering equipment. The pilots trained on the simulator and in the cockpits of the machines, the technicians had time to study the materiel "to the screw". When mastering the technique, the Germans turned to the Soviet side for advice, fortunately, the 730th apib was stationed nearby in Neuruppin, whose pilots had decent experience of working on a similar Su-17M4. At the request of the Germans, they prepared the appropriate manuals on the specifics of combat use (of course, there were regular manuals, but practical advice had its own value). On this score, our instructors noted: “ They have good independent work skills. Self-study is done diligently and purposefully. In difficult questions for themselves, they try to achieve complete clarity. In an effort to master the technique, they attend additional classes. In flight, they behave calmly, with dignity, emotions are able to control».
The meticulous Germans paid attention to such a detail that, according to the piloting instructions, the "twin" had a higher maximum speed than combat aircraft. An explanation was required that the speed limit of the Su-22M4 was due to the presence of a fixed air intake cone, while the Su-22UM3K retained an adjustable inlet device, which ensured the achievement of higher supersonic speeds. Because of this, the speed of M \u003d 2.1 was really allowed for the "pair", while for the Su-22M4 the maximum speed was M \u003d 1.7.
The plane made an impression already upon first acquaintance: after the familiar MiG-21 and MiG-23BN, the car looked unusually large and impressive. As for the possibilities of combat use, the Su-22M4 had the largest assortment of weapons among all the combat aircraft available in the NNA Air Force. The supplied Su-22M4s were equipped with all the envisaged weapons of destruction, including bombs and multi-lock holders, NAR of all types (from blocks with C-5 and C-8 rockets to large-caliber C-24 and C-25) and guided missiles of the C-25L types, Kh-25, Kh-29L and Kh-58 in all available variants. Su-22M4 of the last delivered series could also carry Kh-29T missiles with television guidance. On German vehicles (like other Su-22M4 export versions), there were even Kh-25MR radio command guidance missiles, which were no longer on the domestic version of the Su-17M4. Such an arsenal was provided to export aircraft for the first time (in the usual way, export combat aircraft, even for the closest allies, were distinguished by a truncated composition of weapons, keeping the latest innovations for themselves).
JBG 77 began flying in March 1985. The Germans flew a lot and intensively, even by domestic standards. Soviet pilots who visited their colleagues noticed that they managed to complete the basic exercises of the combat training course in eight or nine months, for which we allotted two years. Already a couple of months after the start of the development of technology, the Germans engaged in combat use, bombing and shooting at the range. During the year on the Su-22M4 they worked out missile launches against sea and ground targets, managed to launch R-60 missiles at air targets over the sea, performed complex aerobatics singly and in pairs, landed in pairs, including at dusk, in a word, how Ilyich instructed, "they studied military affairs in a real way."
Communicating later with colleagues from Lage, where our pilots visited from time to time during the maneuver of forces, Pilots from the neighboring 730th regiment spoke about the Germans as follows: “ Their attitude to flying is the most serious and professional, they are prepared conscientiously. With visible restraint, they are purposeful and will certainly achieve their goal. They do not like to retreat. Diligence and responsibility result in perseverance in completing the task. Somehow there were joint exercises with other "democrats" in an atmosphere with strong air defense, so the Germans were the only ones who made their way to the targets. They recalled the experience of the Luftwaffe and showed what they cost».
With the introduction of the regiments into combat strength, combat alert was established in both units. For him, a link of four aircraft was assigned, which were in readiness with weapons, and there were crews with the machines.
Shooting was carried out for the most part over the sea, since it was to act mainly in the maritime theater of operations, and even with land ranges in the densely populated GDR it was cramped. One of the training grounds was on the Peenemünde island, which since the war years served as a shooting range and a testing ground for testing weapons (the same one where the Reich's rocket scientists created new weapons). They fired from the SPPU-22 suspended installations both forward and backward in flight. There were difficulties with the jamming of the guns, which is why the German armed men turned to their Soviet colleagues for advice. With a high rate of fire, the SPPU cannons were picky about feeding the cartridge tape, which had to be laid especially carefully, avoiding distortions in the feed path.
With all the pedantry of the personnel and the thoroughness of the preparation of the vehicles, there were more than once losses of tanks, NAR units, and even missile launchers. In MFG 28, they somehow lost the UB-32 block along with the missiles, and no one undertook to determine how this could happen with the lock closed and the stops tightened. Another time, the R-60 rocket did not go off during launch, although the engine worked and burned out on the suspension, delivering sharp impressions to the pilot. Fortunately, the fuse ruled out the possibility of cocking in such a situation, because a rocket on a suspension near the cockpit would explode, the pilot would not have been well.
German pilots were also preparing for the use of anti-radar missiles, since the Su-22M4 received retained the full range of such weapons, including both the "small" Kh-25MP and the "large" Kh-58E. Appropriate methodological instructions were received, however, practical shooting was hampered by the lack of a suitable range - the largest Wittstock range on the territory of the GDR had a length of only six kilometers, because of which safety could not be guaranteed when firing missiles capable of flying over a hundred kilometers. In addition, missile launches required special radio-emitting targets that simulate the operation of the main air defense systems of a potential enemy. It was planned to conduct such launches at test ranges in the USSR, but due to political changes in the late 80s, these plans were not implemented.
Several crews were trained under a special program for the use of nuclear weapons. The decision to use nuclear weapons in wartime was made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of Internal Affairs. German pilots were involved in delivering nuclear strikes, acting according to a single ATS plan. If necessary, nuclear bombs were delivered from storage facilities in Soviet garrisons and the planes were prepared by the Soviet armament specialists who arrived with them.
German Su-22M4 could carry reconnaissance equipment - an integrated reconnaissance container KKR-1TE / 2-54K ( such a long designation goes back to the fact that the container was a product intended for the Su-17M4R, __ as indicated by the index of "product 54" in the name, __ also differing in details of export performance according to the index "K" - commercial). In both regiments, one of the squadrons specialized in reconnaissance, whose pilots periodically trained using the KKR reconnaissance equipment. The flights were carried out along the Jena-Erfurt-Karl-Marks-Stadt route at an altitude of 6000-7000 m, which ensured the effective implementation of electronic reconnaissance by the SRS-13 Tangazh stations. In the usual way, the aircraft also carried the SPS-141MVG-E jamming station.
There were plans to re-equip the Su-22M4 with several more units, including the TAS 47 and TAS 87 reconnaissance squadrons, which had flown on the MiG-21M by this time. However, the beginning political changes did not allow the implementation of these plans.
JBG 77 pilots took part in several joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact countries, which were then held almost annually. Among them were the maneuvers "Elba", "Granit", "Druzhba" and others. The pilots of both regiments often paid visits to the neighboring countries of the Warsaw Pact, including the air units that served on the "dry". The demonstration of "brotherhood in arms" served not only for propaganda purposes, but also testified to equal opportunities with colleagues flying the same technique, giving an opportunity to compare combat training and aerobatic skills. In turn, Soviet pilots flew in during the joint exercises in Lag. The JBG 77 personnel underwent a comprehensive fitness test at the Luninets training ground in Belarus in September 1989.
The positive experience of the Su-22M4 service and their quality resulted in the further development of the plans of the German command: having got a taste, they began to show dissatisfaction with the limited capabilities of the MiG-23BN still in service, offering the Soviet side to discuss the option of exchanging them for Su-25 attack aircraft. Moreover, considering the Su-22M4 not quite suitable for operations over the sea due to its insufficient suitability for all-weather use, the Germans expressed interest in obtaining the Su-24. The bomber attracted them with the presence of a radar and rich weapons, which were the best suited to combat naval targets. With such machines, the NNA Air Force literally got the opportunity to control the Baltic and the North Sea. These plans canceled out the well-known perestroika changes and the political situation of the late 80s, when the strengthening of the armed forces of the GDR began to look out of place. Demonstrating its adherence to the policy of detente, the Soviet side in 1989 even hurried to withdraw its Su-24s from the territory of the GDR.
During the operation, two Su-22M4s were lost. The losses were equally distributed __ each of the regiments lost one car. On September 4, 1987, when a squadron of JBG 77 planes departed for bombing at the Kleitz training ground near Stendhal, the Su-22M4 of First Lieutenant Frank Nesse crashed. His plane was the last in a group of 12 cars. According to the official conclusion, the plane got into a wake from the car in front and lost control. Low altitude did not make it possible to correct the situation and the pilot had to eject only a hundred meters from the ground. The pilot himself mentioned somewhat different circumstances of the incident: in his opinion, the failure to drop bombs led to the loss of control - 250-kg bombs came off only from one side, which led to a strong roll. The emergency release of the suspensions also did not work, and the ACS could not parry the roll. The situation was aggravated by poor visibility in dense fog and a low flight altitude of only 150 m. At first, no one noticed the fall of the plane at the range, and the loss was discovered only when the pilot came to the command post, carrying a parachute on his shoulder. The pilot managed to escape only thanks to the excellent qualities of the K-36DM ejection seat. However, later luck changed him and some time later the pilot died in a car accident.
In part of MFG 28, the aircraft was lost in an accident on December 12, 1989. On that day, Major General Zimmmerman, commander of the Frontline and Military Transport Aviation Administration, flew to the regiment. He did not have an admission to independent flights on the Su-22M4, and all the experience of piloting the aircraft was limited to carrying flights in a "twin" with an instructor, in the role of which was the squadron commander Schneider. Nevertheless, the general insisted on performing a flight on the Su-22M4, intending to test the aerobatic capabilities of the machine. No one objected to the boss. The flight took place at exactly noon in clear weather and good visibility. Immediately after takeoff, the general climbed in an ascending spiral, but after some minutes he tore the plane into a flat tailspin and ejected from a height of 2000 m right above the airfield.The plane crashed into one of the service buildings a hundred meters from the main gate at the entrance to the airfield, the lantern fell 20 meters from the checkpoint. There was a fuel depot near the crash site, but the plane, by a lucky coincidence, passed fuel tanks with hundreds of tons of kerosene. And without that, everything around was filled with fuel from the tanks of the crashed plane - it was filled to capacity and carried more than three tons of kerosene.
The pilot landed next to the road. When help arrived, he was sitting on an inflatable boat from the NAZ kit, which opened properly during the descent, and smoked. To the honor of the pilot general, he immediately stated that there were no complaints about the aircraft and all the aircraft systems were working normally, having apologized to the aircraft's technique for what had happened (he was a contract woman who was in the army, and was already worried, remaining "horseless") ... To reassure the public, the news reported that the crashed plane was not carrying any weapons. In fact, on board the vehicle there was a full ammunition load for the guns of 160 rounds, which had to be collected and registered. The cartridges were scattered on impact, and the soldiers took two days of searching, raking them out of the kerosene-soaked mud mixed with snow at the crash site. Due to his official position, Zimmerman had to head an emergency commission to investigate his own misconduct. Conclusions about the cause of the accident indicated gross mistakes of the pilot, who took off unprepared in the air on a new aircraft for him.
The plane crashed by General Zimmermann had an unhappy reputation in general. In early 1989, he had already been in an accident when the pilot Karsten Ruski forgot to lower the landing gear during landing. The aircraft successfully carried the PTB-800 tanks on the ventral suspension, which it touched the strip. Even with a mistake, the pilot landed the car so carefully that the matter was limited to the hewn tanks. Leaving a trail of several hundred meters on the concrete, the pilot turned on the afterburner under the screech of tearing metal and took the plane to climb. After completing a circle, he released the landing gear and sat down normally. The Su-22M4 was examined for damage and deformation, but nothing was found. The only loss was the chipped ventral ridge (and, of course, the tanks themselves, the remains of which hung in rags under the plane). They did not even order the comb at the manufacturing plant; they did it on their own __ it was made at the aircraft repair plant in Dresden, installed on the plane and it flew again. In addition to the pilot, the flight director was admitted to blame: he violated the rules of radio exchange without waiting for the pilot's responses, so his commands fell on pauses when the radio station switched from reception to transmission. The only consequence for the culprits was a six months delay in the assignment of the next officer ranks with the motivation that in that case they did not confirm their class of specialists.
Not without minor breakdowns and accidents. A number of them were associated with the peculiarities of the local climate: the usual rains and drizzle here made the runway cover wet and slippery, which significantly affected the takeoff and, especially, landing. The brakes did not hold the plane well, which could skid when the afterburner was turned on; for the same reason, all landings required the release of a brake parachute.
At the end of 1987, a lieutenant colonel who arrived at MFG 28 with a check ...
In World War II, the Germans had the following aircraft, here is a list with photographs:
1. Arado Ar 95 - German double seaplane torpedo bomber
2. Arado Ar 196 - German military reconnaissance seaplane
3. Arado Ar 231 - German light single-engine military seaplane
4. Arado Ar 232 - German military transport aircraft
5. Arado Ar 234 Blitz - German jet bomber
6. Blomm Foss Bv.141 - prototype of a German reconnaissance aircraft
7. Gotha Go 244 - German medium military transport aircraft
8. Dornier Do.17 - German twin-engine medium bomber
9. Dornier Do.217 - German multipurpose bomber
10. Messerschmitt Bf. 108 Typhoon - German all-metal single-engine monoplane
11. Messerschmitt Bf.109 - German single-engine piston low-wing fighter
12. Messerschmitt Bf.110 - German twin-engine heavy fighter
13. Messerschmitt Me.163 - German fighter-interceptor
14. Messerschmitt Me.210 - German heavy fighter
15. Messerschmitt Me.262 - German turbojet fighter, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft
16. Messerschmitt Me.323 Giant - German heavy military transport aircraft with a payload of up to 23 tons, the heaviest land aircraft
17. Messerschmitt Me.410 - German heavy fighter-bomber
18. Focke-Wulf Fw.189 - twin-engined two-boom triple tactical reconnaissance aircraft
19. Focke-Wulf Fw.190 - German single-seat single-engine piston monoplane fighter
20. Focke-Wulf Ta 152 - German high-altitude interceptor
21. Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor - German 4-engine long-range multipurpose aircraft
22. Heinkel He-111 - German medium bomber
23. Heinkel He-162 - German single-engine jet fighter
24. Heinkel He-177 - German heavy bomber, twin-engined all-metal monoplane
25. Heinkel He-219 Uhu - twin-engine piston night fighter equipped with ejection seats
26. Henschel Hs. 129 - German single-seat twin-engine specialized attack aircraft
27. Fieseler Fi-156 Storch - small German aircraft
28. Junkers Ju-52 - German passenger and military transport aircraft
29. Junkers Ju-87 - German two-seater dive bomber and attack aircraft
30. Junkers Ju-88 - German multipurpose aircraft
31. Junkers Ju-290 - German long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft (nicknamed "Flying Cabinet")
