What did the Chechens fight for? Who needed a war in Chechnya? The beginning of a full-scale military campaign
Since the end of the 18th century, when Russia began to establish itself in the North Caucasus, this region of the country could not be called calm. The nature of the area, as well as the peculiarities of the local mentality, led to disobedience and war against Russian troops, to banditry. The culmination of the confrontation between the highlanders, who wanted to live according to Sharia, and the Russians, who sought to push the borders of their empire to the south, was the Caucasian War, which lasted 47 years - from 1817 to 1864. This war was won by the Russian army due to its numerical and technical superiority, as well as due to a number of local internal factors (for example, enmity between clans in the Caucasian Imamate).
However, even after the end of the Caucasian War, this region did not become calm. Uprisings broke out here, but as the Russian borders moved south, their number began to decrease. By the beginning of the 20th century, a relative calm was established in the Caucasus, which was interrupted by the October Revolution and the Civil War that followed it. Nevertheless, at that time the North Caucasian region, which became part of the RSFSR, was quickly “put out” without unnecessary losses and clashes. But it is worth noting that rebel morals have always reigned among part of the population.
During the collapse of the USSR, nationalist and separatist sentiments intensified in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Especially their growth intensified after Yeltsin announced a kind of "doctrine" for the subjects of the USSR "Take as much sovereignty as you can!" And as long as there was power behind the back of the Supreme Soviet of the CHIASSR, albeit not so strong, but still, there could be no open speech. Only in October 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, the Provisional Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic decided to divide the republic directly into Chechen and Ingush.
unrecognized state
On October 17, 1991, presidential elections were held in the Chechen Republic, in which Dzhokhar Dudayev, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of Aviation, won. Immediately after these elections, the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho was unilaterally declared. However, the leadership of the RSFSR refused to recognize both the results of the elections and the independence of the rebellious region.
The situation in Chechnya was heating up, and already in the late autumn of 1991, a real threat of conflict arose between the federals and the separatists. The new leadership of the country decided to send troops into the rebellious republic and stop attempts at secession in the bud. However, Russian troops, deployed on November 8 of the same year by air to Khankala, were blocked by Chechen armed formations. Moreover, the threat of their encirclement and destruction has become real, which the new government did not need at all. As a result, after negotiations between the Kremlin and the leadership of the rebellious republic, it was decided to withdraw Russian troops, and transfer the remaining equipment to local armed groups. Thus, the Chechen army received tanks and armored personnel carriers ...
Over the next three years, the situation in the region continued to deteriorate, and the gap between Moscow and Grozny widened. And although since 1991 Chechnya has been essentially an independent republic, in fact it has not been recognized by anyone. However, the unrecognized state had its own flag, coat of arms, anthem, and even a constitution adopted in 1992. By the way, it was this constitution that approved the new name of the country - the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
The formation of "independent Ichkeria" was closely connected with the criminalization of its economy and power, which made it clear that in fact Chechnya would live at the expense of Russia, while absolutely not wanting to be part of it. On the territory of the republic and in the border regions of Russia, robbery, robbery, murder and kidnapping flourished. And the more crimes were committed in the region, the clearer it became that this could not continue.
However, this was understood not only in Russia, but also in Chechnya itself. The years 1993-1994 were marked by the active formation of opposition to the Dudayev regime, especially noticeable in the northern, Nadterechny region of the country. It was here that in December 1993 the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic was formed, relying on Russia and setting the goal of overthrowing Dzhokhar Dudayev.
The situation escalated to the limit in the autumn of 1994, when supporters of the new, pro-Russian administration of Chechnya took possession of the north of the republic and began to move towards Grozny. There were also Russian servicemen in their ranks, mostly from the Guards Kantemirovskaya division. November 26 troops entered the city. Initially, they did not meet resistance, but the operation itself was planned just terribly: the troops did not even have Grozny's plans and moved towards its center, often asking for directions from local residents. However, soon the conflict turned into a "hot" stage, as a result of which the Chechen opposition was completely defeated, the Nadterechny region again came under the control of Dudayev's supporters, and the Russian fighters were partly killed, partly captured.
As a result of this short-term conflict, Russian-Chechen relations have escalated to the limit. In Moscow, it was decided to send troops into the rebellious republic, disarm illegal armed gangs and establish full control over the region. It was assumed that the majority of the population of Chechnya would support the operation, which was planned exclusively as a short-term one.
The beginning of the war
On December 1, 1994, Russian aircraft bombed airfields under the control of Chechen separatists. As a result, a few Chechen aviation, represented mainly by An-2 transport aircraft and obsolete Czechoslovak L-29 and L-39 fighters, was destroyed.
Ten days later, on December 11, President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin signed a decree on measures to restore constitutional order on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The start date for the operation was Wednesday 14 December.
To bring troops into Chechnya, the United Group of Forces (OGV) was created, which included both military units of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The OGV was divided into three groups:
- Western grouping, the purpose of which was to enter the territory of the Chechen Republic from the west, from the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia;
- Northwestern group - its goal was to enter Chechnya from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia;
- Eastern group - entered the territory of Chechnya from Dagestan.
The first (and main) goal of the united group of troops was the city of Grozny, the capital of the rebellious republic. After capturing Grozny, it was planned to clean up the southern, mountainous regions of Chechnya and complete the disarmament of the separatist detachments.
Already on the first day of the operation, on December 11, the forces of the Western and Eastern groupings of Russian troops were blocked near the borders of Chechnya by local residents, who hoped in this way to prevent a conflict. Against the background of these groupings, the North-Western Group operated most successfully, whose troops, by the end of December 12, came close to the settlement of Dolinsky, located just ten kilometers from Grozny.
Only by December 12-13, having come under fire and using force, did the Western group, as well as the Eastern one, nevertheless break through into Chechnya. At this time, the troops of the North-Western (or Modzdok) grouping were fired upon by Grad rocket launchers in the Dolinsky area and were drawn into fierce battles for this settlement. It was possible to capture Dolinsky only by December 20.
The movement of all three groups of Russian troops towards Grozny took place gradually, albeit in the absence of constant fire contact with the separatists. As a result of this advance, by the end of the 20th of December, the Russian army almost came close to the city of Grozny from three sides: north, west and east. However, here the Russian command made a serious mistake - although it was initially assumed that the city should be completely blocked before the decisive assault, in reality this was not done. In this regard, the Chechens could easily send reinforcements to the city from the southern regions of the country controlled by them, as well as evacuate the wounded there.
Assault on Grozny
It is still unclear what actually prompted the Russian leadership to begin the assault on Grozny on December 31, when there were almost no conditions for this. Some researchers attribute the reason to the desire of the country's military-political elite to take Grozny "on the move" for their own benefit, not taking into account and even ignoring the bandit formations of the rebels as a military force. Other researchers point out that in this way the commanders of the troops in the Caucasus wanted to make a "gift" for the birthday of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev. The words of the latter are widespread, that, "Grozny can be taken in two hours by one airborne regiment." However, it must be remembered that in this statement the minister said that the capture of the city is possible only if the army is fully supported and ensured (artillery support and complete encirclement of the city). In reality, there were no favorable conditions, alas.
On December 31, Russian troops advanced to storm Grozny. It was here that the commanders made the second glaring mistake - tanks were brought into the narrow streets of the city without proper reconnaissance and infantry support. The result of such an “offensive” was very predictable and sad: a large number of armored vehicles were burned or captured, some units (for example, the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade) were surrounded and suffered significant losses. At the same time, a similar situation unfolded in all directions.
The only exception is the actions of the 8th Guards Army Corps under the command of General L. Ya. Rokhlin. When the corps troops were drawn into the capital of Chechnya, posts were set up at key points in close proximity to each other. Thus, the danger of cutting off the grouping of the hull was somewhat reduced. However, soon the troops of the corps were also surrounded in Grozny.
Already on January 1, 1995, it became clear that the attempt of Russian troops to take Grozny by storm had failed. The troops of the Western and Northwestern groups were forced to retreat from the city, preparing for new battles. The time has come for protracted battles for every building, for every quarter. At the same time, the Russian command made quite the right conclusions, and the troops changed tactics: now the actions were carried out by small (no more than a platoon), but very mobile air assault groups.
To implement the blockade of Grozny from the south, the Southern Group was formed in early February, which soon managed to cut the Rostov-Baku highway and interrupt the supply and reinforcements to the militants in Grozny from the southern mountainous regions of Chechnya. In the capital itself, Chechen bandit formations gradually retreated under the blows of Russian troops, suffering noticeable losses. Grozny finally came under the control of Russian troops on March 6, 1995, when the remnants of the separatist troops retreated from his last region - Chernorechye.
Fighting in 1995
After the capture of Grozny, the Joint Group of Forces was faced with the task of occupying the flat regions of Chechnya and depriving the militants of the bases located here. At the same time, Russian troops sought to have good relations with the civilian population, persuading them not to provide assistance to the militants. Such tactics very soon brought results: by March 23, the city of Argun was taken, and by the end of the month - Shali and Gudermes. The most fierce and bloody were the battles for the settlement of Bamut, which was never taken until the end of the year. However, the results of the March battles were very successful: almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was cleared of the enemy, and the morale of the troops was high.
After taking control of the flat territories of Chechnya, the command of the United Forces declared a temporary moratorium on the conduct of hostilities. This was due to the need to regroup the troops, put them in order, as well as the possible start of peace negotiations. However, it was not possible to reach any agreement, therefore, already on May 11, 1995, new battles began. Now Russian troops rushed to the Argun and Vedeno gorges. However, here they encountered the stubborn defense of the enemy, as a result of which they were forced to begin maneuvering. Initially, the direction of the main attack was the settlement of Shatoy; soon the direction was changed to Vedeno. As a result, Russian troops managed to defeat the separatist forces and take control of the main part of the territory of the Chechen Republic.
However, it became clear that with the transfer of the main settlements of Chechnya under Russian control, the war would not end. This was especially clear on June 14, 1995, when a group of Chechen fighters under the command of Shamil Basayev managed to seize a city hospital in the city of Budyonnovsk in the Stavropol Territory (which is located about 150 kilometers from Chechnya) in a daring raid, taking about one and a half thousand people hostage. It is noteworthy that this terrorist act was carried out exactly when the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin announced that the war in Chechnya was practically over. Initially, the terrorists put forward conditions such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, but then, over time, they demanded money and a bus to Chechnya.
The effect of the seizure of the hospital in Budyonnovsk was like a bombshell: the public was shocked by such a daring and, most importantly, successful terrorist attack. It was a serious blow to the prestige of Russia and the Russian army. In the following days, the hospital complex was stormed, resulting in heavy losses among both the hostages and the security forces. Ultimately, the Russian leadership decided to comply with the terrorists' demands and allowed them to take buses to Chechnya.
After the hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk, negotiations began between the Russian leadership and the Chechen separatists, at which on June 22 they managed to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. However, this moratorium was systematically violated by both sides.
So, it was assumed that local self-defense units would take control over the situation in Chechen settlements. However, under the guise of such detachments, militants with weapons often returned to the villages. As a result of such violations, local battles went on throughout the territory of the republic.
The peace process continued, but it ended on October 6, 1995. On this day, an attempt was made on the life of the commander of the United Group of Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov. Immediately after that, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on some Chechen settlements, and there was also some intensification of hostilities on the territory of the republic.
A new round of escalation of the Chechen conflict took place in December 1995. On the 10th, Chechen detachments under the command of Salman Raduev suddenly occupied the city of Gudermes, which was held by Russian troops. Nevertheless, the Russian command assessed the situation in a timely manner, and already during the battles on December 17-20, they again returned the city to their hands.
In mid-December 1995, presidential elections were held in Chechnya, in which the main pro-Russian candidate, Doku Zavgaev, won with a huge advantage (gaining about 90 percent). The separatists did not recognize the results of the elections.
Fighting in 1996
On January 9, 1996, a group of Chechen fighters raided the city of Kizlyar and a helicopter base. They managed to destroy two Mi-8 helicopters, as well as take a hospital and 3,000 civilians as hostages. The requirements were similar to those in Budyonnovsk: the provision of transport and a corridor for the unimpeded escape of terrorists to Chechnya. The Russian leadership, taught by the bitter experience of Budyonnovsk, decided to fulfill the conditions of the militants. However, already on the way, it was decided to prevent the terrorists, as a result of which they changed the plan and made a raid on the village of Pervomayskoye, which was captured by them. This time it was decided to take the village by storm and destroy the separatist forces, but the assault ended in complete failure and losses among the Russian troops. The stalemate around Pervomaisky was observed for several more days, but on the night of January 18, 1996, the militants broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya.
The next high-profile episode of the war was the March raid of militants on Grozny, which came as a complete surprise to the Russian command. As a result, the Chechen separatists managed to temporarily take over the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, as well as seize considerable stocks of food, medicines and weapons. After that, the fighting on the territory of Chechnya flared up with renewed vigor.
On April 16, 1996, near the village of Yaryshmardy, a Russian military convoy was ambushed by militants. As a result of the battle, the Russian side suffered huge losses, and the column lost almost all of its armored vehicles.
As a result of the fighting in early 1996, it became clear that the Russian army, which managed to inflict significant defeats on the Chechens in open battles, turned out to be fatally unprepared for a guerrilla war, similar to the one that took place some 8-10 years ago in Afghanistan. Alas, the experience of the Afghan war, invaluable and obtained with blood, was quickly forgotten.
On April 21, near the village of Gekhi-Chu, an air-to-ground missile fired by a Su-25 attack aircraft killed Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. As a result, it was expected that the decapitated Chechen side would become more accommodating, and the war would soon be stopped. The reality, as usual, was more complicated.
By the beginning of May, a situation had matured in Chechnya when it was possible to start negotiations on a peaceful settlement. There were several reasons for this. The first and main reason was the general weariness from the war. The Russian army, although it had a fairly high morale and enough experience to conduct hostilities, still could not ensure full control over the entire territory of the Chechen Republic. The militants also suffered losses, and after the elimination of Dudayev, they were determined to start peace negotiations. The local population suffered the most from the war and, naturally, did not want to continue the bloodshed on their land. Another important reason was the upcoming presidential elections in Russia, in order to win in which B. Yeltsin simply needed to stop the conflict.
As a result of peaceful negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire from June 1, 1996. Ten days later, an agreement was also reached on the withdrawal of Russian units from Chechnya, except for two brigades, whose task was to maintain order in the region. However, after Yeltsin's election victory in July 1996, hostilities resumed.
The situation in Chechnya continued to worsen. On August 6, the militants launched Operation Jihad, the purpose of which was to show not only Russia, but the whole world that the war in the region is far from over. This operation began with a massive separatist attack on the city of Grozny, which again came as a complete surprise to the Russian command. Within a few days, most of the city fell under the control of the militants, and the Russian troops, having a serious numerical advantage, did not manage to hold a number of points in Grozny. Part of the Russian garrison was blocked, part was driven out of the city.
Simultaneously with the events in Grozny, the militants managed to capture the city of Gudermes practically without a fight. In Argun, Chechen separatists entered the city, occupied it almost completely, but ran into stubborn and desperate resistance from Russian military personnel in the area of the commandant's office. Nevertheless, the situation was truly threatening - Chechnya could easily "blaze".
Results of the First Chechen War
On August 31, 1996, an agreement was signed between representatives of the Russian and Chechen sides on a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the actual end of the war. However, the final decision on the legal status of Chechnya was postponed until December 31, 2001.
The opinions of various historians regarding the correctness of such a step as signing a peace treaty in August 1996 are sometimes diametrically opposed. There is an opinion that the war was over at the very moment when the militants could be completely defeated. The situation in Grozny, where the separatist troops were surrounded and methodically destroyed by the Russian army, indirectly proves this. However, on the other hand, the Russian army is morally tired of the war, which just confirms the rapid capture by militants of such large cities as Gudermes and Argun. As a result, the peace treaty signed in Khasavyurt on August 31 (better known as the Khasavyurt agreements) was the lesser of two evils for Russia, because the army needed a respite and reorganization, the state of affairs in the republic was close to critical and threatened with major losses for the army. However, this is the subjective opinion of the author.
The result of the First Chechen War can be called a classic draw, when none of the warring parties can be firmly called a winner or a loser. Russia continued to put forward its rights to the Chechen Republic, and as a result, Chechnya managed to defend its “independence”, albeit with numerous nuances. In general, the situation has not changed dramatically, except that in the next few years the region has undergone even more significant criminalization.
As a result of this war, Russian troops lost approximately 4,100 people killed, 1,200 missing, and about 20 thousand wounded. The exact number of militants killed, as well as the number of dead civilians, is not possible to establish. It is only known that the command of the Russian troops calls the figure of 17,400 killed separatists; the chief of staff of the militants A. Maskhadov announced the loss of 2,700 people.
After the First Chechen War, presidential elections were held in the rebellious republic, in which Aslan Maskhadov quite naturally won. However, the elections and the end of the war did not bring peace to the Chechen land.
If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.
All my school years, television showed reports about the war in Chechnya - at that time, television was still quite objectively covering such things, showing this war through the eyes of both sides of the conflict. From the outside, everything looked like the Chechens were fighting for the right to live according to their customs and pursue a policy independent of Moscow, and Moscow wanted to deprive them of this right and force them to live by their own rules.
And so the First Chechen War died down, and then the second. "Wikipedia" in the column "results of the Second Chechen War" writes: "The result is the victory of Russia, the restoration by Russia of full control over the territory of Chechnya." One can agree with the "restoration of full control" (albeit with reservations), but I would argue about the "victory of Russia".
Let's look at the facts:
- De jure, Chechnya has federal legislation, but de facto there are many legislative nuances, this is noted by many Russian journalists and political scientists, for example, here is a quote from Yaroslav Trofimov: "Theoretically, Chechnya - although it is predominantly Muslim - is an integral part of the secular Russian Federation, and in "The same laws apply here as in Moscow. However, in practice, this North Caucasian republic of 1.4 million people, destroyed and tormented by two wars in a row, lives by completely different rules."
These rules apply, for example, to weddings and other aspects of civic life - at the internal level, even those laws that may be contrary to federal law are in force.
- The leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is pursuing an independent policy in many respects, this is noted by many researchers of the issue. Here is what Mikhail Khodorkovsky stated in one of his interviews published in The New York Times: "In many respects, Chechnya is practically an independent Islamic republic where Sharia is widely practiced. Some neighboring republics have only the appearance of belonging to a federal structure."
That is, in fact, the Chechens retained the right to live the way they want and solve problems in their own way.
- From the 2000s to the present, the Chechen Republic has been one of the most subsidized regions of Russia, huge funds are sent there. I have come across different figures, but in general, all charts put Chechnya in the top 5 among the subsidized regions of Russia, only Dagestan, Kamchatka and Crimea are higher than Chechnya (data for 2016). In my opinion, this state of affairs suits both the central Russian authorities and the Chechens themselves, here is what the deputy of the Chechen parliament, Magomet Khambiev (former assistant to Dudayev), says: “If Dudayev were alive now, then everything he would see, he would like . He would say: “Ramzan managed to do what I failed to do.”
In this regard, I have a question - so why were two Chechen wars needed and what is their real outcome?
Because now everything looks as if Chechnya did not lose in that confrontation for independence, but won - the Chechens live the way they want, and even receive colossal funds from Moscow.
Historians have an unspoken rule that before giving a reliable assessment, one or another event should take at least 15-20 years. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different, and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these most bloody and tragic pages in the newest Russian. But society has every right to know the names of the people who unleashed this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually laid the foundation for a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen one.
The events leading up to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 1990 to 1991, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime without bloodshed, and the second stage from the beginning of 1992, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.
Stage one. How it all began.
The first impetus for the beginning of events can be considered Gorbachev's promise to give all autonomous republics the status of Union and Yeltsin's subsequent phrase - "Take as much independence as you can carry." Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to get support from the inhabitants of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.
A few months after Yeltsin's statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Although, in fact, it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and authority, nevertheless, the first bell had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appears in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who had never been a Muslim and who had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too quickly. In the same Chechnya, many are still convinced that serious people sitting in Moscow offices stood behind Dudayev.
Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev overthrow the Supreme Soviet with its chairman, Doku Zavgaev, on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such in Chechnya no longer existed. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic was looted, in which there was a rifleman for a whole regiment, all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the holding of presidential elections on October 26 of the same year, in which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and on November 1 to adopt a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.
The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoi, it was he who tried to declare a state of emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. Yeltsin these days was in his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not accept the document on the state of emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoy himself, who, during the discussion of the document, literally stated the following - "these black-assed people must be crushed." This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.
True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny) several planes with fighters of the internal troops, with a total number of about 300 people, nevertheless landed. Naturally, 300 people had no chance to complete the task and overthrow Dudayev and, on the contrary, became hostages themselves. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and, as a result, they were taken out of Chechnya by buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president and his authority and power in the republic became unlimited.
Stage two. War becomes inevitable.
After Dudayev officially took office as president of Chechnya, the situation in the republic heated up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all the weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. In the 173rd Grozny training center alone, there were weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.
In January 1992, not a single soldier remained in the training center, and all this mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50 to 50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains incomprehensible, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to the extremely nationalist policy pursued by Dudayev, a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic took place in Chechnya. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border of Kulikov every day.
But the anarchy that was going on in the republic influenced not only the Russian inhabitants in the republic itself, but also the inhabitants of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Avisos and, most importantly, they made money on this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from this and in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 1992-1993 well-known Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month. According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of "distinguished guests", Dudayev personally gave instructions on the acquisition of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.
Turning a blind eye to this was no longer possible, and Yeltsin instructed the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) Savostyanov to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev by the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov made a bet on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and they began to send money and weapons to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters were left to Dudayev's palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the Savostyanov assault.
The next attempt to storm the opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. It is after this assault that Minister of Defense Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tankmen who were taken prisoner and declare that the Russian Army would take Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.
Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council, completely dedicated to the Chechen problem, had already taken place in Moscow. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Yegorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar presentations. Yegorov stated that the situation for the introduction of troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the population of the republic will undoubtedly support this decision, and only 30 percent will be neutral or resist. Grachev, on the contrary, in his report emphasized that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed to postpone the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan of the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and said that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin's demand to prepare a plan of operation for the introduction of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.
On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, Andrey Kozyrev, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short time, this will not cause a particular negative reaction from the US administration.
One way or another, the introduction of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals at once, whom Grachev offered to lead the operation, refused to do so, and only in mid-December Anatoly Kvashnin agreed to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny ...
Exactly 20 years ago, the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government, which justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), which consisted of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, which directly borders Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.
The well-known St. Petersburg political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy discusses the causes and consequences of the First Chechen War in an interview with the Russian People's Line Sergey Lebedev :
Why did the First Chechen War start? I discussed this topic in my book Russian Ideas and Russian Business. You can't blame everything on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some suggest that they fought because of "black gold", but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are produced in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, in those days there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was brought to Grozny even during the war.
What are the real causes of the war?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. The year was 1994, parliament was shot down last fall, the country is dominated by an American dictatorship - dozens of omniscient and omniscient Washington advisers sat in each ministry. What was their problem? It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia still has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although even now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should the American advisers do, because it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that would destroy the Russian army, but present it as a necessary and urgent solution. What is needed for this?! Little dirty shamefully lost war! As a result of this action, to demand reforms, since supposedly everything is bad and wrong in the army. In addition, a defeat in Chechnya would herald a "parade of sovereignties" and then the collapse of Russia. Chechnya would be followed by the remaining republics of the country. It was precisely such deep-reaching plans that American advisers hatched.
Until then, Dudayev's Ichkeria had been fed for three years already, starting in the autumn of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former leader of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. All three years Chechnya did not recognize itself as a part of Russia, although money was regularly flowing into the republic for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a penny from Chechnya, oil was driven to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic became in those days a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political formation. The puppeteers understood that the Chechens are courageous and excellent warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot police calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, such a scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, stuffing them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. Military operations began in winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise they were called "federals", came to naught in the mountains. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers counted on the shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was conceived as a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the most inopportune time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was operated on, but also the generals were absent from the post of Commander-in-Chief. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, it turns out not at all what was intended.
From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were failures at the beginning of the assault on Grozny, but, albeit with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off their bulletproof vests, etc. If there were private military failures, then all of them were explained by betrayal in the headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A special forces officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens put up a banner with congratulations on the birthday of the commander of the unit, his last name, first name, patronymic, the name of the military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only secret information, but also the personal data of the commanders.
The most important headquarters was the first traitor in that war, which was started with the aim of shamefully losing the federal forces. But it didn't. As General Lebed said, it was a custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes declared a truce in order not to defeat the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy bandit formations with the help of air bombardments. Human rights activists were let loose on the military like dogs. The entire Russian “fourth power” fought for Dudaev, and the soldiers were called “federals”. This word has an ironic connotation, while the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Puppeteers also created legends about bandits, they were sung about as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!
This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to move away from the intoxication that had been going on since the times of "glasnost" and perestroika. An attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began to speak at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things - if you are against the war, then resign, if you are for it, then do not interfere. The calculation was for the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would have thrown a tantrum, which would have led to the collapse of the army. But the eighteen-year-old conscripts took it and broke the spines of the Chechen wolves. What about military generals? Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities, fighting against the Chechens.
After the start of finishing off the bandit formation, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens captured Grozny while our troops went on maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers write at lightning speed about the imminent capture of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blockaded the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed flew in and signed the capitulation in Khasavyurt. There was only one defeat in the First Chechen War - political. Militarily, despite a series of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The capitulation in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the gang. The shameful role in this case was played by the media and traitors at the top.
From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again stewing in its own juice. By this time, after a decade of frantic glorification of liberalism, “Russification” had taken place in Russia. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Has this war ended, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars have been going on in the Caucasus for tens and hundreds of years.
To some extent, the opinion that the Kremlin feeds the Caucasus is partly true. Masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue comes from the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.
Now an interesting situation has developed in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were well beaten, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got hit in the neck. Appeasing sooner or later will lead to what they say - not enough, let's have more money! In order to avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that was initially effective and brought good results - it relied on local figures, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. As long as it's effective. He managed to quite calmly integrate many militants into the normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the governor-general headed by a Russian general. Why precisely Russian?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, the rest of the clans may feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is producing good results, but it cannot be continued for long. Care must be taken to avoid a war that could flare up with renewed vigor!
The security forces drew conclusions from the two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999-2000 with considerable support, first of all, from law enforcement agencies. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined to prevent formations like Ichkeria from appearing on Russian territory. It is impossible not to admit that a number of military leaders who made their careers in both Chechen wars entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they are. Recall that Shamanov was not very effective, but still the governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. These are the promoters of two Chechen wars.
The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and about public organizations, such as "Soldiers' Mothers". The conclusions drawn are correct - it is impossible to completely ban and close such organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights activists of the 90s. She created the “Gruz-200” society, gives interviews and tries to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva's fantasies have dried up, so she lists all sorts of football teams, where all the dead, or simply takes the numbers from the lantern. Such personalities must be deftly neutralized, directing them to a marginal sphere.
If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, it is heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin's rating is known, which is recognized with gnashing teeth by Western figures who speak from the position of Chechen terrorists, "white ribbons", liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these pussies, writers, who have declared their desire to emigrate?! For example, Akunin wants to be expelled from the country in disgrace, as Solzhenitsyn did in his time. Akunin was told to go! Who needs him over the hill?! It is very awkward to leak the opposition, showing what it is, without forbidding it.
In Soviet times, everything was forbidden, many people spoke in enthusiastic tones about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov writes. Some daredevils who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn's novels are perplexed, what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on the minds?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had that influence if they had not been silenced, but had been allowed to speak, as they say, aside.
The Kremlin learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was with the reliance on the security forces that the regime changed with the advent of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should be conducted not so primitively, in the spirit of "take it and close it." Speaking in pathetic language, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real disintegration of the country, to preserve the armed forces, which received a certain hardening and experience. As often happens, Russia was eager to destroy, but everything turned out the other way around, the country grew stronger in spite of its enemies.
Section: War |
During the armed conflict in the North Caucasus during the week of November 17-23, 2014, at least eight people were injured, six of them were killed and two were injured. Also this week it became known about the death of another person that happened earlier. Among the dead are six suspected of participating in the activities of the armed underground - two in Dagestan and four in Chechnya. It also became known about the death of a civilian in Chechnya a week earlier.
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Watch our video report.
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Section: Opinions and assessments |We are publishing Anzor Maskhadov's appeal in connection with his new project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people in the 20th-21st centuries.
Work is underway on a project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people. The purpose of the project is to collect, analyze and disseminate information about crimes against our people in the XX-XXI centuries. Unfortunately, the world knows nothing or almost nothing about the tragedy of our people. Our duty is to convey this information to the world for the sake of restoring historical justice, in the name of the memory of the dead and in the name of future generations. Only the widest possible publicity can guarantee that this will not happen again.
Here you can leave your signature under an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to hand over the body of Aslan Maskhadov to his relatives.
Chechen separatist leader, former President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov was killed on March 8, 2005 in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt.
The release of his body to relatives for burial was denied. He was secretly buried in an unknown location.