Does Russia need democracy? Does democracy even exist? What does democracy need?

Professor Zoran Avramović belongs to the circle of very famous Serbian intellectuals, and for decades he has been successfully engaged in political philosophy and modern theoretical thought. The author argues that the acute problem is modern democracy itself, its dual nature, manifested, among other things, in duplicity and “double standards.” For the most part, we are talking about the problems that Western democracies create in other states, and not in their own internal affairs. The imposition of “dual standards” inevitably leads to the use of force against governments democratically elected by the people. The book examines the current contradictions of modern democracy based on the views of major theorists and thinkers: Tocqueville, Spengler, Popper, Kean, Bobia. The book represents a significant contribution to the understanding of modern Western democracy. She points to differences between its domestic and foreign policy decisions and the actions of stakeholders, as well as practical experience in using weapons against those states that some Western countries consider to be “undesirable.”

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The given introductory fragment of the book Democracy and bombing. Does democracy have a future? (Zoran Avramovic, 2017) provided by our book partner - the company liters.

Democratic colonization of the world and the problem of freedom

In the 19th century, culture and politics were determined by civilization, progress, capitalism, and socialism. Tocqueville was already a political philosopher when, in 1848, in the preface to the twelfth edition of his Democracy in America, he wrote that democracy was advancing inexorably and en masse throughout the world. But already on the next page, speaking about the Republic in France, he distinguishes between the “democracy of freedom” and the “democracy of tyranny.” In this conceptual difference one can detect not only delight, but also glimmers of doubt about the democratic influence of Providence.

We live in our time under the sign of democracy. The loudest voices are those of those intellectuals and politicians who address the world with a single slogan - the world will be democratic, or it will not be. In the search for clues to the mysteries of history, the (communist) dream of a new society and the beginning of a new history is hastily discarded, and the program of democratic organization of the world order is spreading even faster. Democracy has become a magic word, and there are more and more wizards pronouncing this word.

Has humanity really found its foothold in democracy?

The general fascination with democracy should not lull critical thought. It must bring into the agenda of democratic debate a discussion of the complex of a global offensive of democracy, as well as the organizational and political methods by which this strategy is implemented.

The spiritual shift of attention to the organizational framework of democracy - intra- and interstate - raises the assumption that the space of ideas, values ​​and knowledge about democracy is oversaturated, and the time has come to begin its practical universalization. The UN is the highest authority in this matter. This organization most decisively transfers the classical connection of democracy with the form of a state constitution into the field of international rules of democratization. This general position was once expressed by the first person in the UN system. In 1993, in an article for Le Monde diplomatique, Boutros Ghali outlined exactly how diplomacy sees democracy and human rights - their goals and tools. The UN sees the justification for this new role in the need to prevent the rising tide of nationalism of small nations and the growth of intolerant relations between citizens within some countries.

When analyzing the strategy of democratic diplomacy and human rights, special attention should be paid to the proposed tools, not the goals, since it is the means that reveal the nature of the policy. Boutros Ghali forces the use of four instruments: 1) the mandate of the “blue helmets” defines their mission in reconciling conflicting nations and consolidating democracy in a particular state; 2) The UN offers legal assistance in organizing elections, as well as assistance in changing mentality through the adaptation of institutions, teaching democracy and training government personnel - army, police, courts; 3) the UN organizes goodwill missions to assist in resolving crises; 4) The UN uses force to defend democracy and human rights.

The message is clear: democracy and human rights are the goal to which all peoples of the world should strive. Such a strategy of global diplomacy should be the subject of critical examination not only from a conceptual point of view, but also from the perspective of current political experience.

First, is the question of defining democracy relevant to an organization that includes such diverse countries? Who organizes verbal games around democracy at the UN? In the history of the UN, democracies have always been in the minority: stable democracies are found in Western Europe and North America. This difference in the history of democracies demonstrates the virtual dominance of the Euro-American model. The political picture of the world demonstrates the export of democracy to the world, interfering not only in the internal structure of states, but also in the process of the emergence of new countries (former Yugoslavia). The globalization of democracy can be countered by one ethical argument: changing mentality to introduce democracy is actually an attack on the achievements of the cultural history of a community. This is also aggravated by the claim to universalization of the language chosen to define democracy.

The most serious condemnation of democracy and human rights diplomacy concerns the instrument of force. First, democracy, as a peaceful struggle for power, denies the use of force. If an international organization endorses violence to promote democracy, it delegitimizes state sovereignty and frames its political violence as defending human rights and democracy. The violent implementation of global democratization was most clearly demonstrated by the process of destruction of the SFRY by multinational forces. The flirtation with force continues: during the armed rebellion of the Kosovo Albanians, Madeleine Albright demanded that the US administration prohibit Belgrade from using the army and police in the event of bloody incidents in Kosovo! In other words, Serbia was denied the right to self-defense.

Democracy and human rights diplomacy avoids facing consequences that should not be delved too deeply into. Globalization of democracy is the path to the creation of new nation states. The world of the third millennium will consist of several thousand countries.

Forms of democratic expansionism

A new diplomacy of democracy and human rights is being built into regional political documents. Europe was the first to take this step. In the OSCE Charter, adopted at the Paris summit in 1990, the section on democracy is formulated without alternative, in the form of obligations that must be fulfilled. (For its content, see the previous text).

Such declarations, in addition to protecting the sublime values ​​of the democratic order, successfully remain silent about individuality of democratic institutions, but this is precisely the main problem of the process of globalization of democracy. We can agree with the statement that, as stated in the OSCE Charter, democracy is the only system of governance in European countries. The problem, however, is whether the legal and political consequences of such a statement are the same for all countries? In other words, to what extent can the legitimate formation of democratic institutions withstand the influence of national political culture and traditions?

Any normalization of political life, and especially global (supranational), requires sacrifices, large and small. In this process, independence, national freedom, autonomy, and the dignity of a separate state can become outdated categories. The democratic colonization of the world redefines the concepts of national freedom and independence in a frantic and radical way, thereby erasing the historical gilding from these concepts that has existed throughout human culture. Another negative consequence of raising democracy to a political absolute is the cover-up of international interests democratic form.

Two examples best illustrate how normative democracy suppresses state independence and freedom.

Democracy is inseparable from human rights and freedom. In the current political life of individual countries, all individual rights are ensured by collective national concepts and autonomously established interests of the people and citizens. What is considered an individual right in one democratic country is not recognized in another. Does this entail mandatory judicial imposition of values ​​on one country or another? No. But this does not mean that one of these countries will not accuse the other of disrespecting democracy, or even lacking it.

In the Garden of Eden of European democracy, tomorrow the issue of sexual freedom may become a stumbling block. The spread of sexual freedoms and rights in some states is recognized in the form of marital relations between same-sex couples. In other countries, homosexual marriage is prohibited by law. The globalization of democracy creates an environment in which countries that recognize homosexual marriage (for example, the United States) accuse states that do not consider such a relationship to be legal of depriving citizens of sexual freedom.

A structurally similar problem is to be expected in the case of different understandings of birth control in individual countries. Countries facing huge rates of natural increase are forced to control birth rates, while countries with negative natural increase must stimulate population policies.

We face similar problems when the issue of women's rights arises in countries with Sharia law. Is the fight for their rights a matter of international democratic norms, or is it an autonomous political right of Islamic states with Sharia law?

Similar political phenomena can be subject to radically different interpretations and different values. Expressing protest against the ruling regime in one country must strictly follow legal procedure, while in another country the guardians of democracy may provoke illegal protests and demonstrations. The difference in this approach is caused by political interests, which are declaratively proclaimed by democracy.

Examples of specifically historical decisions about human nature and freedoms are a real test for testing the suitability of democratic declarations. General acceptance of democratic norms and values ​​does not mean the unification of democratic practices. The problem is that these practical democratic differences can be used to enhance the influence and interests of certain states, and in the event of conflicts they are assessed as a dispute between democratic and non-democratic countries. Democratic philosophers could never have foreseen that democracy is not only an opportunity for the manifestation of political reason, but it also serves the violent manifestation of political passions. Both specialists and amateurs act according to this formula. And with its use, the price of national interests, freedoms and independence becomes low, but very expensive.

Democracy as an international instrument was confirmed by the political crisis in Serbia after the union and local elections on November 17, 1996. Those events clearly revealed the play of foreign policy interests, disguised as democratic demands. In the open speeches of the governments and media of democratic states, the idea of ​​violence as the midwife of democracy was once again heard.

Meanwhile, political events in Serbia speak more about the apparent contradictions of global democracy than about the essence of its internal political crisis. Below we consider three paradigms of political demands.

The highest government authorities of the United States demanded that the President of the Republic of Serbia “start a dialogue with the opposition, take into account the election results and respect freedom of the press,” otherwise “new sanctions against Serbia will be introduced” (“Possible return of sanctions,” Blic, 12/10/1996).

The NATO military organization condemned in Brussels Serbian government(emphasis mine - BEHIND.) for “ignoring the results of local elections and demanded that President Milosevic change his decision” (“Cancel the decision based on the election results,” Blic, 12/11/1996).

At the EU summit in Dublin in 1996, Carl Bildt said: “We will not allow Yugoslavia to become the bearer of an idea that in European history has long been thrown into the dustbin” (Blic, 12/16/1996).

The above quotes clearly express political intentions; their form is such that the question of the future of the democratic universe becomes unclear.

The problem of local election results is deliberately distributed by to other questions, and this circumstance allows us to conclude that there are some other interests in the structural motives of the requirements. One group of states (or one country) assigns the right to an international organization of the UN threaten to impose sanctions. Military alliance of another group of states appoints The Serbian government is responsible, not the court that decided to cancel the election results. The EU figure acts as a censor who allows or prohibits ideas.

Before considering the legitimacy of democratic threats (in these events Serbia became the subject of an experiment that ended with NATO bombing in 1999), it is worth recalling the facts.

In every democracy, elections are governed by laws that may or may not be good. In Serbia, the post-1996 election crisis erupted over the power of the court to arbitrate grievances from election parties. One can agree with the unsatisfactory assessment of the laws, but this implies the possibility of their positive revision. The situation is the same with the dialogue between the authorities and the opposition. In the Republic of Serbia there is a government and an opposition, and what their relationship will be is a matter of their autonomous will and forms of political behavior. The comment about press freedom comes at a time when Serbia has more opposition daily and weekly newspapers than government-controlled newspapers. And when it comes to ideas in Serbia, which of them can be allowed and which are prohibited under the threat of international sanctions?

Among other things, the democratic order in Serbia is threatened by political figures and organizations to which Serbia is not a member. Serbia was neither a member of the EU nor a member of the NATO pact.

Let us ask ourselves what feature of democracy in Serbia was endangered to such an extent that it required international (European) intervention and threats against Serbian political institutions and the population, which was carried out later. Facts confirm that the basic institutions of democracy existed in Serbia. The criticisms and threats analyzed were democratic only in propaganda terms, in fact there was a desire to achieve personal changes in political life, and thereby change the country's policies so that they correspond to the desires of these defenders of democracy who are today experimenting with other countries.

Democracy as a tool for coordinating international interests increasingly suppresses the traditional understanding of democracy as a means of realizing the freedom and independence of individuals and people. In its new meaning, democracy faces a huge temptation to use the latest idea of ​​tolerance in relations between people and nations to impose the pragmatic interests of developed countries, as a result of which it can turn into a squeezed lemon.

The spread of democracy under the threat of military alliances and international sanctions directly affects the historically constructed meanings and institutions of national political culture. The forced globalization of democracy applies the strategy of abolishing world political relativism, and this is nothing more than propaganda of the superiority of higher political cultures over lower ones. Democratic colonialism volens-nolens neglects the inherent goals of political relativism. Instead of studying political cultures, understanding different political experiences and significance and perception political knowledge, the construction of a political system, which is rooted in the long history of Western European civilization, is being rapidly imposed.

The universalization of a political model, even a model of a democratic political culture, will certainly face the question of the political identity of each people. Over the past centuries, each national community has built its own understanding of power, authority, interests, its own attitude towards foreigners, and, first of all, an understanding of dignity, morality, freedom, justice. If we accept Max Weber's judgment on the concept of democracy in America, then personal perception becomes the key criterion. The young American “respects only what the individual can achieve by personal labor” (Weber, 1969:179). This understanding of democracy is not applicable in cultures with strong collectivist practices, or in which material values ​​are not paramount.

The strategy of expansion of democracy neglects the conflict with the political identities of individual peoples, paying attention to political figures in individual countries, which is caused by pragmatic interests. The second dubious factor is related to the problem of the economic, military and political interests of developed countries and the actual attitude towards democratic values. Has democracy become just a valuable tool?

The globalization of democracy cannot avoid serious consequences. By exporting democracy, the most developed states also export its shortcomings, threaten the political identity of the peoples and countries of the “third world,” and the desire to unify their own model causes victims. Uncertainty is a structural difference in the history of society and man. Today's answer to this common destiny is democracy. The spirit of modernity misunderstands its role by directing the world's potential in only one direction. Democracy can survive only by respecting its own traditions and coming into contact with the cultural characteristics of the society to which it belongs.

Internal calls for democracy

So far we have looked at models external international or unilateral pressure to democratize the domestic political system. The time has come to examine the circumstances and reasons for the calls by individuals and parties of one state for the international community to undertake democratic intervention. The point is that the country's political opposition is calling on foreign countries to use various means of pressure on the domestic legal authorities.

The method of gaining power with the help of someone else’s will was long ago considered by Machiavelli in one of the chapters of “The Prince”: “On new states acquired by someone else’s weapons or by the grace of fate.” Machiavelli had in mind the consequences of such a power grab - power is gained without much effort, but maintained with great difficulty - and he did not delve into the problems of the legitimacy of such power.

In modern society, calls for external democratic intervention should be distinguished depending on the nature of the particular system from which calls for democratic assistance come. When it comes to one-party systems, personal dictatorships, requests for help in democratizing internal political circumstances can be understood with political points of view. Especially if authorities in non-democratic systems practice terror against citizens and eliminate political opponents. But in such circumstances, calls for other people's help will always find moral justification: but shouldn’t the citizens of such a country, first of all, independently change the face of power, regardless of the conditions in which the opposition operates?

The situation is different with calls for democratic assistance in multiparty states. The fact that the political opposition turns to foreign governments (Western European) for help in order to apply various punitive measures to their own state and its citizens forces us to analyze two reasons: political and ethical. The political events in Serbia at the end of 1996 very clearly illustrate the subject of our consideration. The leaders of the then opposition asked American officials to impose sanctions against Serbia (after clarification, the scope of sanctions and target groups became the subject of controversy). The head of the Civil Union of Serbia party, Vesna Pepgač, directly demanded that the international community stop the political activities of Slobodan Milosevic, as they subsequently did with Radovan Karadzic (“not to allow him to take part in all upcoming elections,” daily newspaper Demokratija, January 14, 1997, p. .2).

The fact of sending political dispatches to foreign governments demanding democratic intervention against their own country, the constitutional order of which rests on parliamentary principles, draws our attention to the political role of the legal opposition, appealing to foreigners for help. What kind of legal opposition is this that appeals to foreign states, calling on them to intervene in the internal affairs of their own country? Obviously, such political opposition is very weak.

The second assumption may indicate the inferiority of the democratic government (the media work poorly), and therefore a foreigner is required. But the opposition exists to fight for the creation of better conditions for political struggle. Why the Serbian opposition did not succeed during the eight years (1990–1998) of the existence of a multi-party system is a problem that it must consider itself.

The most heinous thing from a political and ethical point of view was their calls to ban specific individuals from political activity in a democratic society. Such a call, firstly, is absolutely contrary to human rights, and secondly, it is politically insignificant. If you are unable to defeat your political opponent, then you appeal to foreign countries for help. And there is no honor or dignity in this call.

How can democracy (and human rights) be reconciled with a ban on political activity? Such discrimination is not inherent in democracy. From an ethical point of view, there is no difference between prohibiting individuals from participating in politics and prohibiting a party or national minority from being politically active.

The right to call on a foreign government to help democratize power calls into question the fundamental values ​​of civilization. Is there a place here for the concepts of freedom and independence of the national community? If you put your freedom into the wrong hands, it confirms the old ethical thesis that you cannot expect responsibility. This is the most vulnerable point of orientation towards the import of democracy. If you are unable to independently fight for democratic values ​​and institutions, then you cannot be free, and even more so you cannot become independent in political thinking and behavior - they are given to you by strangers.

The problem of internal calls to foreign countries with a request to help democratize the state can be considered as a party incident, or an action undertaken by a tiny minority. From the point of view of conceptualizing the relationship between internal and external democracy in one state, such actions have no theoretical force.

The (mis)use of freedom in democracy

Freedom is the main property and condition of a democratic order. This classic definition of freedom and democracy is not without theoretical and artificial shortcomings. If the relationship of these concepts is more or less clear in the historical periods preceding the institutionalization of democracy, the question is posed differently when exercising freedoms in democratic systems. What happens to freedoms when the time comes for their democratic exercise? Does freedom protect democracy, or does it lead to something new? The answers can be sorted by the degree of democratic development and the way freedoms are applied.

The concept of freedom in a democracy is threatened by the possibility of its replacement by anarchy. Aristotle warned that democracy is threatened by excessive freedom and equality, and this danger lies precisely in the anarchist use of freedom. This interpretation of freedom also plays into the hands of the eternal discussion about the concept of freedom: what is freedom and what are its boundaries?

In this case we are not interested in the infinite meanings of the very concept of freedom, but only in what political freedom means in a democratic order of power. The concept of political freedom contains legal (limitation of political power), conscious (knowledge of facts and indication of ways to develop freedom) and free (activity) elements (Nojman, E, 1974).

The conditions under which a person is free are the power of choice, the reality of possibilities, the feasibility of choice. Democracy naturally provides the best political framework for the practical application of freedom. However, the problem of choice still remains unresolved. There is no doubt that without choice there is no freedom, and without freedom moral behavior is impossible. A person is not responsible if he is not free in his actions. In the extreme, freedom of choice is open to all human values, and from this point of view, discrimination against values ​​is impossible. Question: does a person always prefer humanistic values? Can we really “never choose evil”? (Sartr, Z.P., 1964:12). The freedom contained in choice, including political choice, is deeply paradoxical. She, on the one hand, is “the nourishing source of all the best that a person has achieved,” and on the other, “an abyss into which he can fall and destroy himself” (Vargas M., Llosa, 1992:386–400)

Submission to heteronomous values ​​is not necessarily just a consequence of fear of freedom; It is often forgotten that a person's self-determination is not always a product of the independent use of reason, but also of comparing oneself with another person or a person in power. The power of choice in a democratic system also implies the freedom to be independent, but also dependent.

The second element of the political concept of freedom is real opportunity. Freedom of choice must be associated with real, not imaginary, opportunities. However, the very concept of reality is ambiguous, while possibility is one of the most complex philosophical categories. For an individual, reality is what fits into his psychological personality structure. The real possibilities of a poet, athlete or politician cannot be on the same plane.

The reliable, strong connection between social conditions and fields of possibility is hidden. Every situation in society contains many possibilities, some of which are open, while others remain unknown. Good and evil are intertwined in the aspect of real possibilities to the same extent as in reality itself. What brings less evil and more good to individuals and political groups under a democratic system when real opportunities are determined?

The chosen real possibility should be implement. This is the third element of the concept of political freedom, in which individuals, as well as social groups, are constantly faced with the problem of the boundaries established freedom of others. The awareness of freedom must become the awareness of the freedom of another person; it has practical meaning only in the unity of the relationship between my freedom and the freedom of others. “Of course, freedom as the essence of a person does not depend on another, but as soon as an action arises, I am obliged to simultaneously wish freedom for myself and for others; my freedom can become a goal only if I make the freedom of others the goal” (Sartr, Z. P. , 1964:38).

Freedom, as the realization of a chosen possibility, must undergo certain restrictions and overcome obstacles if it wishes to avoid a state in which, to use the expression of the author of the novel “Demons,” unlimited freedom turns into unlimited violence. The assertion that absolute freedom belongs to the realm of thought became controversial after the Germans' experience between the two wars, when violence and totalitarianism were preached and defeated. The language of violence excludes interaction.

Awareness of the freedom of another person implies establishing the boundaries of individual freedom. Here lies the root of the need for a democratic organization of society and the state. The social structure consists of various groups in society, institutions and their interactions with conflicting interests and ideas. Without respect for these differences, freedom, like goodness and the highest human values ​​in general, is impossible to realize.

Pluralism of differences in society is the foundation on which power is based. Democratic institutions of government cannot eliminate the element of coercion in the decision-making system. Is this fact responsible for the unequal distribution of freedoms in a democracy? This is an old problem: to what extent does a democratic state interfere with the freedom of individuals and groups?

The right of the state to interfere with the freedom of the individual is justified by all the philosophers of political liberalism (Mill, Constant, Tocqueville). Here are two arguments.

1. “While recognizing the abstract right of society to interfere in the lives of its members in order to provide for all biological needs (food, drink, health, clothing, accommodation, family), I cannot recognize its right to interfere with what a person possesses and what is not taken away them from another. I mean knowledge, thinking, art.” Freedom, according to Russell, is “the right to live and think as we choose, so long as our choice does not prevent others from doing the same” (Rasel, V., 1977).

2. “I believe that freedom means that there should be no restrictions on the conditions that, in modern nivilism, are the key to individual happiness. There is no freedom without freedom of speech. There is no freedom if special powers restrict the suffrage of part of society. There is no freedom if the prevailing way of thinking controls the social customs of others, and those others are not sure that there are good reasons for such control” (Laski, H, 1985).

Both of these arguments clearly demonstrate the desire of liberal philosophers to limit the rights of the state to interfere with individual rights and freedoms. The tradition of political liberalism is built on opposition to absolute monarchies and various later forms of totalitarian power. In new historical circumstances, when the danger of the “new Leviathan” has passed and the reign of democratic order has prevailed, political curiosity revolves within the boundaries of individual and group freedoms. Where are the boundaries of individual freedoms and rights in a democracy? This question became relevant after the rapid and unexpected collapse of communism in 1989 and even more rapid democratic changes in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula.

In modern democratic countries, freedom is understood as two classical opposing concepts: 1) freedom - the ability to say and do anything; 2) freedom - the ability to say and do what is good and fair. Both understandings of freedom in a democratic order are tested by relation to the political form, or procedure as well as attitude towards political personality.

Criticism of power in a democratic state is ensured by the freedom of political life of citizens. But if this state is undemocratic, then the basis of the criterion of freedom is the attitude towards the procedure of political struggle. If the procedure of political struggle is not respected, then disorder and chaos arise in society. This is especially clearly reflected in the manner of personal changes in the ruling elite. Demands for its replacement can be democratic if they occur according to an accepted procedure. It can hardly be admitted that the verbal crimes of functionaries, and not their violation of laws, are a sufficient reason for their removal. This only contributes to the political opposition’s assertion that “one should always oppose the authorities.”

Another danger threatens democracy from personal and group freedom in a situation where the moral authority of the individual political opponent is destroyed. Is it possible to say whatever you want about a political opponent? There are boundaries that protect the moral authority of an individual from slander and insults of the enemy. The attempts of each speaker to hide behind politics inevitably lead to an anarchic understanding of freedom. When an elected parliamentary majority is called an “anti-people regime,” then, unless we are talking about a political amateur, this should be regarded as an incorrect use of freedom of political speech in a democracy.

Freedom of speech and press have their own instincts and passions, said Tocqueville. Freedom of the press is “an exceptional force, it has such a strange mixture of good and evil intentions, but without it it could not exist, and with it it is hardly possible to maintain order” (Tocqueville, 1990:161). Such a press can help incite hatred towards a political opponent, or towards another ethnic community in multi-ethnic states. Passions are an integral part of politics and democracy. And here the influence of psychology and the subconscious factor begins. Freedom is not only a child of consciousness; it is also a consequence of the subconscious in the thinking and behavior of an individual and a group. Freedom to express one's own opinion does not provide an unconditional right to reason and logic. The freedom to behave in accordance with the law does not mean that the law must be respected in all circumstances. The problem arises when the irrational and hyper-legal justify freedom.

If power and force are components of any social relations, then democratic power is based on freedom of choice, relations of hierarchy, subordination, and subordination. In all these relationships there is fear. Does democracy help neutralize fear?

There is no doubt that political fear is widespread in totalitarian systems of power (fascism, nationalism, Stalinism). A democratic system reduces political fear, but does not remove it from real political life. Democracy must be based on freedom; moreover, it is unthinkable without freedom. But the institutionalization of a democratic system of power does not solve the problem of fear and freedom - a person does not get rid of fear and does not become free. Here we are talking not only about the “fear of freedom” (Erich Fromm), but about real fears in any socio-political relations.

The feeling of fear belongs to the so-called basic feelings and is an integral part of the individual psychological structure of the individual, as well as various social relations. If fear refers to the biological and social reaction of individuals and groups to situations that pose a danger to them, then the question arises of what exactly is meant by danger. Using this criterion, one can assess whether fear is real and whether it is a psychopathological manifestation. There is a boundary line here, but within the real manifestation of fear there are real dangers of various kinds. Fear of hunger, cold, loss of home, death is a biological type of fear. The survival instinct automatically reproduces fear when an individual faces a threat to his own life.

In democratic institutions, when it comes to fear, we mean various assessments of danger. Individuals and groups fear for their values, interests and needs. And when it comes to discussion as a form of decision-making, reasons for the manifestation of fear arise. At the decision-making level, there is always concern about whether the right decision has been made. It is never possible to definitively foresee the extent to which a decision is justified. The possibility that the position of a subordinate will not be liked by a superior causes him fear and reluctance to express his own opinion.

When roles are divided in institutions of power (state, government, court, police, army, party), failure to comply with an order can damage the status and existential position of the individual.

Therefore, in thinking, behavior and decision-making, fear is a factor in democratic life.

Fear is an integral part of democratic institutions, as well as part of the structure of the human personality. Every individual harbors a fear of the new and unknown, a fear of isolation, a fear of injury, and also causes potential aggression and self-destruction. The need for aggressiveness is also an integral part of life in a democracy, and it requires an outlet. For example, in political competition - party struggle for power.

Freedom of competition and release from pressure helps to get rid of fear. But this is not enough to completely free the individual and group from fears. Democracy as a system of equal conditions in the struggle for power inevitably includes a wide variety of feelings, including the fear of being defeated in elections to political and non-political institutions.

If all these ills of freedom in democracy - the right choice, real opportunities, feasibility, fears - are transferred from the domestic field to interstate relations in conditions where democracy is imposed on non-democratic or anti-democratic countries, then what consequences should be expected? Can the expansion of democracy be successful if it ignores all internal democratic contradictions and inconsistencies, especially if democracy is introduced through military force? We can answer this question if, under the declared, rhetorical desire to liberate other peoples from dictatorship, and sometimes from unwanted power (from the point of view of the governments of the most developed democracies), we discern latent, primarily economic and geopolitical intentions. This type of interest is often decisive, but in appeals to different sections of the population the talk of democracy for an unfree nation acts as an anesthetic. At the same time, it is impossible to neutralize internal problems with the freedom of countries on a global scale through the intervention of “democratic” countries with a democratic mission. Freedom does not rest on its laurels, especially in democratic systems. It would be interesting if sociologists would analyze and interpret the causes and consequences of modern democratic expansionism, or the democratic colonization of the world.

Democracy of the Western type in its pure form is possible only in the West, or in non-Western countries on which the West has had a critical influence: Japan, South Korea, etc. In principle, with many but, such democracy is possible in Latin America, where it is developing successfully in some places. In a weaker form, such democracy can develop in some former European colonies (India, Indonesia) or countries that have experienced European influence (Thailand).

European democracy is not only the English magna carta, which concerned exclusively the rights of the nobility, but also, for example, Magdeburg city law or the royal courts in France, to which a peasant (!) could theoretically appeal and win a case against his landowner. That is, the foundations of what we call Western democracy were formed over centuries, or even millennia, in a rather unique cultural and historical environment, which has not been reproduced almost anywhere else in the world.

Actually, in its current form, Western democracy and, in general, “that’s all” in Europe were formed in modern times, and the great German sociologist Niklas Luhmann called these changes (what he called “differentiation of social systems”) “impossible” - they were so unique in their compared to other regions of the world.

Russia is a non-Western country, with a Westernized elite, which throughout history has repeatedly tried to modernize the territory under its jurisdiction according to external Western models, without fundamentally changing the foundations of the socio-political structure. The first such attempt can be called the Livonian War of Ivan the Terrible, who tried to reorient trade policy from the southern to the northwestern direction, but failed, partly because he was never able to completely break the resistance of the boyars and consolidate the forces of the state (although he actively tried, for example, with the help of oprichnina). Peter I acted in the same direction, but more successfully, as an autocratic sovereign, actively modernizing the state economy and “building” the boyars according to his own understanding, but without changing the foundations of the economic and social life of the bulk of the population.

Later, the spinning class continued its elite modernization, at a certain point firmly adopting the Western picture of industrial modernity. which penetrated into his consciousness as a rigid, unconditional matrix, a model of worldview. That is, at a certain point in time, a certain picture was chosen, or even, one might say, taken out of context, which later became a role model. But the problem is that the West is constantly changing and now it is both externally and internally completely different from the West during the Industrial Revolution. But this is precisely the peculiarity of the West - to constantly change, this is precisely what distinguishes it from non-Western static societies. And Russia is just such a static non-Western society, which periodically takes examples from the West to follow (fortunately, the West is close). Imagine that you bought a license for Windows 95 in the mid-90s and since then you have been using only it and, moreover, you relate all other programs only to it. This is how Russia adopted the classical European modernism of the 19th century. But I learned it very well, primarily at the level of humanitarian consciousness and culture, which was copied so meticulously and efficiently that it even began to resemble the original (Bolshoi ballet).

Then a revolution happened in Russia, the ruling elite was swept away by the new government, which, at the same time, the names had some relation to it - the ideologists of the revolution were intellectuals and commoners, who mastered this very project of European modernity very well. But here a funny thing happened: being isolated from the rest of the world, primarily cultural and humanitarian-scientific, the Bolshevik intellectuals treasured the very “great Russian culture” as the apple of their eye, that is, that image of modernity from the times of the European industrial revolution, which (of course in a form revised taking into account the Orthodox consciousness) was imprinted in their memory forever.

This image of 19th century modernity in its most reactionary form - in the form of imperialism and crude capitalism with the construction of gunboats, cannons and railways about which Pushkin and Fet wrote poems :) - continues to remain basic for Russian cultural consciousness. At the same time, it is mixed with the vulgarly adopted socialist collectivism and with the socialist apathy and isolation from each other of simple “cogs”, on whom “nothing depends” and for whom “they can always come”, so it is better to sit quietly, so that “unless something happens” came out."

With such basic attitudes of mass consciousness, one cannot talk about any democracy - even if Navalny and Shenderovich accidentally come to power, nothing much will change. As Zhvanetsky said: “...and the nanny will live forever!”

• In Russia, democracy comes down to the single act of voting.
• Young people vote as actively as people of the older generation (VTsIOM).
• Just as the majority of older people voted for Putin, the majority of young people (in approximately the same percentage) followed their example (VTsIOM).
• Russia is a totally depoliticized country. Anyone who tries to state any alternative is designated as an enemy of the people, a fifth column, and thus domestic policy is recoded into foreign policy.
• A new generation came out to protest rallies; they were taught at school how to love the state, and they began to become ideologically intoxicated.
• The image and style of modern life encourage the establishment of democratic values. However, the mechanisms of representation may change.

Tamara Lyalenkova: Today we will talk about why democracy, which gives every citizen the opportunity to express their point of view, is not taking root in Russia. Over the past four years, 66 regions have abandoned direct elections of heads of municipalities; local deputies will now also vote for the mayor of Yekaterinburg.

The low turnout and political indifference of a significant part of the population seem to confirm the unpopularity of the very principle of elections, at least in Russian circumstances. On the other hand, in Russia elections remain perhaps the only confirmation of democracy.

We discuss the tyranny of the majority, the effectiveness of debate, the boundaries of personal freedoms and public interests with the professor of the Moscow Higher School of Economics and Social Sciences. Grigory Yudin, journalist Anton Krasovsky, Project Manager of the Department of Socio-Political Research at VTsIOM Yulia Baskakova and postgraduate student at the National Research University Higher School of Economics Albert Sarkisyants.

Tamara Lyalenkova: Grigory, there is a feeling, with the obvious unanimity of the electorate, that something is wrong with the elections in Russia, wrong. Why do you think?

However, in Russia there are much more problems with democracy than with elections. The most important thing is missing here - there is no culture of political discussion, no culture of self-government. And without this, democracy really turns into a single vote, into opinion polls, which are now so popular, although they have lost their purpose.

Svyatoslav Elis: Anton, you advised Ksenia Sobchak in the current presidential elections and headed Prokhorov’s headquarters in the last ones. These are liberal candidates, who, however, were perceived as proteges of the Kremlin, who confirm the legitimacy of what is happening. Do you think that the participation of such candidates is beneficial for the authorities, even if they say things that are unpleasant for them?

Anton Krasovsky: By power, do you mean Vladimir Putin?

Svyatoslav Elis: Yes.

Anton Krasovsky: Of course, for Vladimir Putin, until some point, it was beneficial for the participation of absolutely all the clowns who are going to these elections - and it doesn’t matter whether it’s Sobchak, Prokhorov or Zhirinovsky and Grudinin. In the world of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, they are absolutely identical people.

A colleague believes that democracy will become possible if we hold debates...

Grigory Yudin: Democracy is possible if people govern themselves. This implies civic participation, municipal self-government, including debate. Unfortunately, there are no debates in Russia today.

Anton Krasovsky: What is the connection between debates and municipal self-government?

Grigory Yudin: Debate assumes that there are different points of view: they clash; people argue with each other; they can listen to each other; they can decide something together.

Anton Krasovsky: Do you think so. I don't agree with you. An important component of democracy is something that Russia does not have. There is no commune in Russia; people here do not live by public interests. And you can have endless debates. The debates were shown on all federal channels and on 85 regional channels for two weeks on a daily basis - here, watch, enjoy these troubles.

Grigory Yudin: Well, we understand that this is clowning, not a debate. They were only missing one member.

Anton Krasovsky: I think that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin did not come to this debate for one simple reason: not because he was afraid to come there, but because he believed that, God forbid, he would come there, and then he would have 86% of the votes , as in Uzbekistan. The problem is not the debate, but the fact that people are not accustomed to solving the issues of their small collective farm using public institutional principles, the election of the collective farm chairman. They don’t understand how to do this, they don’t understand that the money they hand over to some general cash register is their money, for example, money for repairing the same residential entrance.

Grigory Yudin: Look what changes when we debate. We begin to participate in discussions of common problems. And when we get involved in the discussion, we begin to express some points of view about how we can be here together. You say one thing, I say another. We still have some audience. And we are forced to argue with each other, prove something to our audience, and decide something together. The whole problem with the current government in Russia is that it doesn’t want to tell or prove anything to anyone. When you talk about Vladimir Putin, we understand how Vladimir Putin works. He would never in his life allow anyone to ask him a question without careful preparation.

Tamara Lyalenkova: But could it happen that out of urban public interest, of a purely social nature, which we recently observed during the elections to local councils, such a grassroots, Athenian democracy will arise?

Grigory Yudin: Of course, the fact that new active people become municipal deputies helps a lot in solving specific targeted issues. However, you need to understand that here we are starting more or less from scratch. Until now, interest in municipal self-government has been very low, and young people who are now going there will have to take this into account. They will also have to cope with the fact that people don’t particularly believe that something can be changed in this way. But if they are persistent enough, then, of course, certain connections will appear between them and their voters, and then it will not be so easy to kick them out.

Svyatoslav Elis: A modern young man has the experience of making choices, unlike his parents. On the other hand, no one trusts politicians anymore...

Grigory Yudin: The most important thing that can now be said about Russia is that it is a completely depoliticized country. We have practically no internal politics. Anyone who tries to state any alternative is immediately and deliberately labeled as an enemy of the people, a fifth column. That is, all domestic policy is being recoded into foreign policy, and this is a conscious line that the Kremlin has been pursuing for almost 20 years. The political space is filled with clowns, from Zhirinovsky’s security guard to the Freemasons, right down to people like Ksenia Sobchak, who is associated with the frivolous program “Dom-2”. And this is a conscious strategy that pushes people out of politics, especially young people who have never seen anything else.

Svyatoslav Elis: I didn’t go to the presidential elections because, firstly, no one represented me there. But besides that, I need to make a choice - and I don't understand the consequences.

Grigory Yudin: It's no coincidence that people don't know what they want. We need to discuss what seriously concerns us. Is anyone saying that Russia is the country with the most gigantic inequality? Is anyone seriously discussing during the election campaign that Russia has practically lost any allies in foreign policy? And these are problems that should be discussed.

Tamara Lyalenkova: On the other hand, democracy in the Athenian understanding is simpler and tougher than what exists in the world today. And perhaps Russia is closer to it than, say, Europe with libertarian views, which regulates more subtle settings, but sometimes has the opposite effect?

Grigory Yudin: In this sense, Russia actually has some advantage. Of course, democratic debate in Europe today is greatly stifled by the idea that

in Russia there is no culture of argument and public discussion

You can’t say anything bad about these people, and you can’t say anything bad about these people, and you can’t say anything bad about these people either. If you say anything bad about migrants, then you need to be thrown out of the public sphere immediately. In America it turns into medicalization. People say that if I took part in a discussion and my opponent insulted me, then that’s it - I have a moral injury. But democracy, meanwhile, presupposes open, free discussion between people who very often do not agree with each other. On the other hand, in Russia, unfortunately, there is no culture of argument and public discussion for historical reasons, so we, on the contrary, tend to perceive any criticism as an insult.

Tamara Lyalenkova: Yulia, it seems that opposition youth have become very active lately. Is it so? And did she go to vote?

Yulia Baskakova: This year, for the first time, we placed interviewers with tablets at the exits of polling stations so that they could record the gender and age of those leaving them. And we learned that young people (this came as a surprise to us) vote just as actively as older people. Because when we conduct surveys of the population by telephone or in person at home, and we ask: “Are you going to vote in the election or not?” young people are much less likely to answer that they are going to vote than, for example, older people.

About 80% of older people say they intend to vote, compared with about 60% of young people. According to the results of the exit poll, it turned out that representatives of all ages vote equally, and the turnout is approximately equal. This means that young people, contrary to stereotypes, are interested enough in politics to go to the polls and express their preferences, which are very similar to those of older people.

young people are similar to their elders in political views

Just as the majority of older people voted for Putin, the majority of young people voted for him in approximately the same percentage. True, among young people the proportion of those who voted for Ksenia Sobchak is slightly higher, although this difference is not colossal or fundamental. In general, we can say that young people are very similar to the older generation in their political views.

Svyatoslav Elis: This was quite unexpected to hear. Because it is generally accepted that the generation of young people is more oppositional. Albert, what do you think about our generation?

Albert Sarkisyants: It seems to me that the reaction to the new protesting youth was due to the fact that these were not the people who came out in 2011, but those who came later and for some, apparently, other reasons. After all, after Ukraine the situation changed. The rhetoric has changed a lot, and so have the tasks of the opposition. A generation has come to whom they began to teach at school how to love the state. When I was studying, there was no ideological intoxication yet, I don’t remember pressure in terms of the ideology of love for the state, there was no talk of patriotism. Those guys who came out in the last two years, 16-17 year olds, they just took a sip of this. And it turns out that they came out for some reasons of their own, which, perhaps, are not so closely related to our past moods. But we, rather, came through some organizations, through adults, we did not have an independent agenda.

Tamara Lyalenkova: Is there a request for some democratic things, perhaps related to freedom of speech, some things understandable to a young man?

Yulia Baskakova: The request is formed through an assessment of what is happening, how young people feel freedom of speech. A young man has the opportunity to speak out on social networks, search for information that interests him, and in this way he realizes his feeling and his request for freedom of speech.

Albert Sarkisyants: Indeed, we are quite capable of living an individual life up to some limits, living our own interests and

own calculations. But individualism itself is a form of social life that does not always work successfully. This is a special form of self-presentation, a form of talking about oneself. And it is alive as long as our social energy fits into this form. Accordingly, such a moment is possible, and it periodically occurs in the life of society, when this form - individual existence - turns out to be too narrow for the potentialities and desires that circulate in society. Desire and social potency are more than just individuals. As long as these desires and potencies coincide with the individual form, there are no problems. When friction between these forms arises, then protests arise.

Tamara Lyalenkova: You said that a certain apathy had set in, including among people of your generation. Do you understand what this is connected with?

in 2012 there was a feeling that there was some kind of us, and we could

Albert Sarkisyants: There is a whole group of reasons here: something lies in our own failures and defeats, something is explained by the successes of the authorities, which opposed our agenda with some other meanings. This is especially noticeable in the example of events in Ukraine, how all attention turned in that direction. And all the little gains that we thought we had gained were suddenly spent, everything went to the bottom. In 2012 there was a feeling that we can, that there is some kind of us, and we can. Then a series of events related to Ukraine made it clear that, no, we can do very little. And now, rather, the prevailing desire is to forget this experience of a joint joyful political existence, so that we would not be so ashamed that we lost.

Svyatoslav Elis: Yulia, to what extent does the average Russian perceive himself as a government? How aware is he of democracy as the power of the people, of his responsibility for what is happening in the country?

Yulia Baskakova: Things are not going well with this yet. Still, many of our compatriots, perhaps due to habit, and the older generation due to their experience of life during the Soviet period, look with hope at the state, expecting it to solve the problem. When we ask the question of who is responsible for the state of affairs in the country, all citizens or those who voted for this particular government answer that it is the government, the one who is vested with authority, and in this sense abdicate their share of responsibility. I think this is some kind of symptom.

Tamara Lyalenkova: Albert, maybe democracy is already an outdated construct, at least in its current format, and some updating is required?

Albert Sarkisyants: Yes, that would be entirely possible. Mechanisms for presenting the people's will or what is called the people's will: something happened, someone was chosen, and then it turned out that it was someone's desire, someone's interest, the will of the people themselves - to believe in this procedure, I have to think that the people are united, that every opinion means approximately the same. And you need to believe that these designs reflect some kind of reality, that they are called to something. But the fact is that many theorists, usually of a radical bent, today are trying to separate the mechanisms of representation, the mechanisms of representation and democracy itself. Because, in the end, the representation (the Duma, the president, all these bodies) is not the people. Their power over us has nothing to do with our self-government. And the less we feel our involvement in them, the less we recognize ourselves in them, the less we think that there is any kind of people at all, that there is some kind of us. But this does not mean that the loss of faith in the efficiency of these mechanisms, in the existence of some kind of people, this very faith, its exhaustion, means that we have exhausted democracy itself, because democracy has always been something more. After all, representation is only one form of democracy. It turns out that the ideal of democracy is more than just representation. It seems to me that the value of democracy, namely self-government, freedom, rights, has not gone away, and, perhaps, is becoming more and more important. Because the very image and style of our life pushes us to consider this a value. And we will look, it seems to me, for the best mechanisms for implementing democracy. But the current mechanisms may well die out.

What is democracy?

Democracy is the personification of freedom. A democratic system implies election and freedom to elect and be elected. Democracy as a political system has 3 elements:
- State leaders are appointed by citizens through fair and competitive elections.
- the people are the only legitimate source of power. Power acquired except through elections is not recognized.
- the people exercise self-government, striving for the common good.

From here we can identify the characteristic features of democracy. Firstly, this is the election of the main government bodies, or rather the persons who are appointed to these bodies. Election can be carried out both directly (presidential elections) and through representatives (first you choose representatives, and they choose others).

Secondly, democracy implies a change of power. The president and the main authorities must change every few years. This principle makes it possible to prevent the authorities from “staying too long” in place.

Thirdly, democracy most often involves decentralization. Those. regions should not be dependent on the center. Naturally, regions must cooperate and strive for the common good, but at the same time the regions are free in most political and internal economic issues.

Democracy is not respected in Russia

If you look at our political system, you can see that democracy is poorly developed in Russia. Our head of state practically does not change. We don’t know many deputies, although we elect them ourselves. There is a lot of information that the elections are being rigged. There is poverty, corruption, and so on in Russia. In addition, basic freedoms are missing. Freedom of speech is often limited by censorship. You are free to talk about anything except politics.

If you watch TV, you get the impression that people are being oppressed. Rich officials fatten on the bones of poor workers. The media tells us that there is almost totalitarianism in Russia. This is indeed true. Many good jobs and educational positions are occupied by relatives of high-ranking officials. You can get a job in government agencies only through relatives or only for money.

As a result, it turns out that Russia has a kind of monarchy. Where deputies are an aristocracy (in the bad sense of the word). All elections are rigged. After all, it doesn’t matter how they vote, it’s important how these votes are counted. The length of the president’s “reign” has increased and will increase again. And Putin, sitting at the “throne” for his third term, looks more like a monarch than a president.

Does Russia need democracy?

Now forget about the previous section. Everything described above is just stereotypes that the media likes to push. The topic that there is no democracy in Russia is very popular not only in Russia, but throughout the world. Just give Western countries a reason to accuse Russia of violating human rights.

Russia is no better than other countries, but not worse either. Russia doesn't need democracy. Democracy has too many disadvantages.

Firstly, democracy is only possible in small towns and areas where everyone knows each other. After all, in order to choose someone, you must know everything about him. There's no point in choosing from 4 presidential candidates if you don't know anything about anyone. In Russia, elections are just like Russian roulette. In a small town where everyone knows each other, democracy makes sense. After all, you know everything about your neighbors. You know that Ivan is an alcoholic and you don’t need to choose him. But Peter is a hard-working family man, and therefore is well suited for the role of leader.

This is why people choose not those they know, but those they are used to seeing. United Russia and Putin are elected not because the elections are rigged, but because only their people know. If we don’t choose Putin, then who should we choose? Even though not everything is all right with Putin, there is simply no real alternative. It's like in a canteen where they serve nothing but pasta. Although you don’t like pasta, you will eat it because you have no choice.

Secondly, Russia has always been a centralized country. If you give a lot of power to the regions, they will begin to separate. Russia cannot afford to be divided. Territorial unity is our main weapon. That is why we are so actively fighting for the small Kuril Islands. You ask: “Why did Russia give Alaska to the Americans?” Many believe that Alexander II then made a big mistake by selling Alaska. Russia sold Alaska because there were no planes, no phones, no Internet back then. Therefore, it is very, very difficult to control a territory that is located thousands of kilometers away. If real democracy had existed then, we would not have sold Alaska, but it would have been taken away or recaptured anyway (remember what happened to distant colonies, such as America?).

Thirdly, democracy carries the seeds of moral decay. Democracy tells us about freedom. Most people believe that democracy is the only regime that gives freedom. Britain has a monarchy, but their democracy works more effectively.

Democracy tells us that we are free and can do whatever we want. Freedom is generally a fiction. A person a priori cannot be free. After all, in addition to the laws of the state, there will always be moral laws, the laws of the crowd, the laws of physics. The fact that you have the opportunity to study exactly where you want, work where you want, do what you want - this is freedom. Freedom should not limit the freedoms of other people. But freedom gives rise to pedophilia and homosexuality. After all, if you are free, you can do what you like. As a result, propaganda begins. The state is trying to prohibit such antics by blocking the legislative ban on gay pride parades and other things.

And democracy also produces unemployed and stupid people. After all, no one is obliged to work or study. That’s why you can increasingly hear that modern children are sitting on the necks of their parents.

Fourth (or fifth), democracy affects the penetration of the Market into the country’s infrastructure. The market is the new God. Nobody controls the market anymore; it controls everyone. If a country has democracy, then it must introduce market relations. As a result, instead of schools and hospitals, we are building supermarkets. As a result, in democracy a person becomes free. But in reality - addicted to money. All our lives we strive to earn more money - this is what democracy dictates.

Sixth, democracy implies the rule of the people. In reality, this is the power of the crowd. The people do not understand anything about politics, but they vote for certain candidates. And those 5% who are well versed in politics and know how to make the state prosper are lost among the 95% of idiots (sorry: not idiots, but ordinary citizens).

Seventh, the frequent change of president and people in the state apparatus is a guarantee of destruction. The President does not manage to do anything in 6 years. On a national scale, this is simply impossible. Imagine the case that the owner of the restaurant changes every 6 weeks. Naturally, the restaurant will most likely collapse in six months. Because the new owner will not have time to do everything he planned.

In addition, a person who realizes the temporary nature of his tenure begins to steal. If you are put in a barn for life, you will not steal grain. Otherwise you won't last your whole life. But if a person is placed in a barn for a couple of days, he will decide that he needs to take away more in such a short period of time. Corruption thrives precisely because people think of life as something temporary. If an official or president knew that he would remain in his post all his life, then he would not become a corrupt official. After all, he would understand that if he did not follow moral rules, his people would simply kill or overthrow.

Yes, life is a temporary phenomenon. There is most likely no God, which means you will die and rot in the ground. But that doesn't mean you have to do whatever you want. After all, true democracy does not imply chaotic freedom, but a common desire for well-being.

What's the end result?

There is no democracy in Russia, but there is no totalitarianism or monarchy either. Russian democracy may be crooked, but it works. We have our own unique system. And even if we don’t live as we would like, it’s good that we don’t live worse. And all sorts of words about the fact that it is impossible to live in Russia are just made up. So many people live in Russia, and judging by the statistics, most of them are happy with life. Hence the question: Why is there so much noise around the fact that there is no democracy in Russia?

The answer is simple. Stupid people who blame the authorities for their lack of freedom are more active. Normal people don't need to write angry messages on the Internet. Those 20–30% who are confident in Russia’s totalitarianism shout more than others. Hence the impression that this topic is popular.

People! In Russia so far everything is at the very least, but it works. At the same time, one cannot fail to notice positive changes. And it is not the state that is to blame for the rise in prices for food and gasoline, but the Market. And there is no need to blame the Market for this, people invented it.

P.S. Many will think that this article was written at the request of the intelligence services. Naturally, this is not so. I'm not praising the president. To be honest, I see myself as president, not anyone else. But no one cares about this, because democracy implies loneliness in freedom. I don’t criticize democracy, but there’s nothing to praise it for either. And if you want to live better, then you need to strive not for democracy, but for something else.

Thank you for your attention!