Introduction

1. The life of the peasants before collectivization

2. Goals of collectivization

3. Implementation of collectivization

4. Chayanov's plan for the transformation of agriculture

5. How did the peasants begin to live?

6.Conclusion

6.1. Results and consequences of collectivization

6.2. Collectivization is a tragedy for the peasant worker

Applications

7. List of references

Introduction

The closer an event is to us, the more difficult it is to give it an objective assessment. That is why the events of the 20th century were not unambiguously assessed by scientists. Some events are praised by Soviet historians, while others, on the contrary, are criticized. An example of such a historical event is collectivization. So, for example, in the textbook that my mother studied, collectivization is presented as a historical merit. Collectivization is considered in our textbooks as a tragic page of the people. That is why I decided to study this page in more detail, get acquainted with the factual material, statistical data, documents.

I called my work just that: “Is collectivization a tragedy for the peasant toiler?” The name ends with a question mark, to answer this question and became purpose of my work that is, to study and conduct research on the material found, finding out whether collectivization is a tragedy for the peasant worker and what are its consequences.

To achieve this goal, I set tasks:

Compare the life of peasants before collectivization and after;

Show how the process of collectivization took place, what are its goals, methods and results.

1. Life of peasants before collectivization

So, before collectivization, the peasants showed a noticeable rise in peasant farming, indicating the beneficial results of the nationalization of the land, the liberation of the peasants from the oppression of the landowners and exploitation by big capital, as well as the effectiveness of the new economic policy. In three to four years, the peasants restored agriculture after a severe devastation. However, in 1925 - 1929. grain production fluctuated at a level slightly higher than pre-war. Growth in the production of industrial crops continued, but was moderate and unstable. The number of livestock increased at a good pace: from 1925 to 1928, by about 25% per year. In a word, small-scale peasant farming has by no means exhausted the possibilities for development. But, of course, they were limited in terms of the needs of the country that had embarked on the path of industrialization.

3. Implementation of collectivization.

Held in December 1927 The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proclaimed a "course towards collectivization." As applied to the countryside, this meant the implementation of a very diverse system of measures aimed at boosting the production of the many millions of peasant farms, increasing their marketable output and drawing them into the mainstream of socialist development. This was fully ensured on the way of their cooperation (see Fig.1- goals collectivization).

Crisis of grain procurements at the end of 1927. arose as a result of market fluctuations, and not as a reflection of the crisis in agricultural production, and even more so the social crisis in the countryside. What happened?

Why did the price of bread go up in the private market? Although the gross grain harvest in 1928 was slightly higher than in 1927, crop failures in Ukraine and the North Caucasus led to the fact that rye and wheat were harvested about 20% less than in 1927/28.

Perhaps all these circumstances would not have affected so tangibly

on the situation of grain procurements, if not for two factors. First, although the reduction in the planned grain turnover and the size of the planned supply of bread to the urban population was insignificant, this occurred in the context of a rapid growth in industry and the urban population, which presented an increasing demand for food. This is what caused the private market price spike. The second is the reduction in grain exports associated with an acute shortage of resources for the domestic market, which in 1928/29 amounted to only 3.27% of the 1926/27 level.

Grain exports have actually lost all real significance, causing extreme tension in the balance of payments. Since bread was an important export resource, providing a significant part of the currency, the program for importing machinery and equipment, and in essence the industrialization program, was jeopardized.

Of course, the reduction in state grain procurements posed a threat to plans for industrial construction, complicated the economic situation, and aggravated social conflicts both in the city and in the countryside. The situation at the beginning of 1928 seriously complicated, required a balanced approach. But the Stalinist group, which had just achieved a majority in the political leadership, showed neither statesmanship nor understanding of the Leninist principles of policy towards the peasantry as an ally of the working class in building socialism. Moreover, it went for a direct rejection of these principles, for the demolition of NEP and the widespread use of emergency measures, that is, violence against the peasantry. Signed I.V. Stalin issued directives with threats against party leaders and a demand "to raise the party organizations to their feet, pointing out to them that procurement is the business of the entire party," that "in practical work in the countryside, from now on, emphasis is placed on the task of combating the kulak danger."

Markets began to be closed, searches were carried out in peasant households, and the owners of not only speculative grain stocks, but also very moderate surpluses in the middle peasant farms, were brought to justice. The courts automatically ruled on the confiscation of both marketable surpluses of grain and stocks needed for production and consumption. Inventory was also frequently confiscated. Administrative arrests and imprisonment by court sentences complete the picture of arbitrariness and violence perpetrated in the countryside in the winter and spring of 1928/29. In 1929, up to 1,300 "kulak" revolts were registered.

An analysis of the origin of the grain procurement crisis and ways to overcome it was the focus of the April and July plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928. These plenums revealed fundamental differences in the positions of Bukharin and Stalin in their proposed solutions to the problems that had arisen. The proposals of Bukharin and his supporters to find a way out of the situation created by the grain procurement crisis along the lines of the New Economic Policy (rejection of "extraordinary" measures, maintaining the course towards the rise of the peasant economy and the development of trade and credit forms of cooperation, raising the price of bread, etc.) were rejected as concession to the kulak and manifestation of Right opportunism.

Stalin's position reflected the tendency to recklessly force collectivization. This position was based on disregard for the sentiments of the peasantry, ignoring its unpreparedness and unwillingness to give up its own small-scale farming. The "theoretical" justification for forcing collectivization was Stalin's article "The Year of the Great Change", published in Pravda on November 7, 1929. The article stated the change in the mood of the peasantry in favor of the collective farms and put forward on this basis the task of completing collectivization as soon as possible. Stalin optimistically assured that, on the basis of the collective farm system, our country in three years would become the most grain-producing country in the world, and in December 1929, Stalin addressed the Marxist agrarians with calls to plant collective farms, to eliminate the kulaks as a class, not to let the kulak into the collective farm, to dispossess kulaks an integral part of collective farm construction. With regard to agricultural production, Stalin's forecasts no longer look like an exaggeration, but an arbitrary fantasy, dreams, in which the laws of the agrarian economy, the social relations of the countryside and the social psychology of the peasantry are completely ignored. Three years later, when the deadline for the fulfillment of Stalin's promises regarding the transformation of the USSR into the most grain-producing power came up, famine raged in the country, which claimed millions of lives. We did not become the richest, or at least one of the richest countries in the world, neither 10 years later - before the war, nor 25 years later - by the end of Stalin's rule.

The next step towards intensifying the race for the "tempo of collectivization" was taken at the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the same 1929. The task of "complete collectivization" was already set "in front of individual regions." Messages from members of the Central Committee, signals from the localities about haste and coercion in the organization of collective farms were not taken into account. An attempt to introduce elements of reason and understanding of the current situation were the recommendations of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on issues of collectivization. The draft resolution worked out by her proposed to solve the problem of collectivization of "the vast majority of peasant farms" during the first five-year plan: in the main grain regions in two or three years, in the consuming zone - in three or four years. The commission recommended that the main form of collective farm construction be considered an agricultural artel, in which "the main means of production (land, implements, workers, as well as marketable productive livestock) are collectivized, while at the same time maintaining, under the given conditions, the peasant's private ownership of small implements, small livestock, dairy cows and etc., where they serve the consumer needs of a peasant family."

collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction. "As proposed by the commission, the grain regions were divided into two zones according to the terms for the completion of collectivization. But Stalin made his amendments, and the terms were sharply reduced. The North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga were to be basically completed collectivization in autumn 1930. or, in any case, in the spring of 1931", and the rest of the grain regions - "in the autumn of 1931. or at least in the spring of 1932. (see table No. 1)

"Such a short timeframe and the recognition of" socialist competition in the organization of collective farms "was in complete contradiction with the indication of the inadmissibility of" any "decree" from above of the collective farm movement. "Although the resolution characterized the artel as the most common form of collective farms, but provisions on the degree of socialization of livestock and implements, on the procedure for the formation of indivisible funds, etc. As a result of Stalin's processing, the provision was excluded from the draft resolution that the success of collectivization would be assessed by the Central Committee not only by the number of farms united in cooperatives, "but primarily on the basis of how much one or another region will be able, on the basis of the collective organization of the means of production and labor, to really expand the areas under crops, increase productivity and raise animal husbandry. "Thus, favorable conditions were created for the race for "one hundred percent coverage" instead of the transformation of collectivization into a means for increasing the efficiency of agricultural production. (Table 1)

Under the strongest pressure from above, not only in the advanced grain regions,

but in the Chernozem center, and in the Moscow region, and even in the republics of the East, decisions were made to complete collectivization "during the spring sowing campaign of 1930." Explanatory and organizational work among the masses was replaced by rude pressure, threats, and demagogic promises.

So, the planting of collective farms and dispossession of kulaks on the basis of complete collectivization were proclaimed. The criteria for classifying an economy as a kulak economy were defined so broadly that it was possible to include under them both a large economy and even a poor one. This allowed officials to use the threat of dispossession as the main lever for creating collective farms, organizing the pressure of the declassed layers of the village on the rest of it. Dekulakization was supposed to demonstrate to the most intractable the inflexibility of the authorities and the futility of any resistance. The resistance of the kulaks, as well as of part of the middle and poor peasants to collectivization, was broken by the most severe measures of violence. (See Fig 2)

The data on how many people died from the “dispossessed” side, both in the process of dispossession itself and as a result of eviction to uninhabited areas, is still unknown.

Historical sources give different data on the number of dispossessed and evicted households. The following data are called: by the end of 1930. about 400 thousand farms were dispossessed (that is, about half of the kulak farms), of which about 78 thousand were evicted to separate areas, according to other sources - 115 thousand. Although the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a decision on the cessation of the mass eviction of kulaks from areas of complete collectivization and ordered it to be carried out only on an individual basis, the number of evicted farms in 1931 more than doubled - to almost 266 thousand.

The dispossessed were divided into three categories. The first one belonged

"counter-revolutionary asset" - participants in anti-Soviet and anti-collective farm actions (they themselves were subject to arrest and trial, and their families - to eviction to remote regions of the country). To the second - "big kulaks and former semi-landowners who actively opposed collectivization" (they were evicted with their families to remote areas). And, finally, to the third - "the rest of the kulaks" (it was subject to resettlement in special settlements within the areas of its former residence). The compilation of lists of kulaks of the first category was carried out exclusively by the local department of the GPU. Lists of kulaks of the second and third categories were compiled on the ground, taking into account the "recommendations" of village activists and organizations of the village poor, which opened up a wide opportunity for rampant bureaucratic violence that broke into the village in the winter of 1929/30 (see Fig. 2)

In his article "Dizzy with Success," which appeared in "Prav-

de" March 2, 1930, Stalin condemned numerous cases of violation of the principle of voluntariness in the organization of collective farms, "bureaucratic decreeing of the collective farm movement." He criticized the excessive "zealousness" in the dekulakization, the victims of which were many middle peasants. Small livestock, poultry, inventory, buildings, It was necessary to stop this "dizziness from success" and put an end to "paper collective farms, which do not yet exist in reality, but about the existence of which there are a bunch of boastful resolutions. "In the article, however, there was absolutely no self-criticism, and all responsibility for the admitted "The mistakes were blamed on the local leadership. The question of revising the very principle of collectivization did not in any way arise. The effect of the article, followed by the Central Committee's resolution on March 14 "On the struggle against the distortion of the party line in the collective farm movement," was felt immediately. So far, local party cadres were in complete disarray, a massive output of peasants from the collective farms (only in March 5 million people). The results of the first stage of complete collectivization demanded a truthful analysis, drawing lessons from "excesses" and "struggle against excesses", strengthening and developing those collective farms that would be preserved in conditions of genuine freedom of choice for the peasant. This means the complete overcoming of the consequences of the "great change" in the Stalinist way, the choice of ways of the socialist transformation of agriculture on the basis of the restoration of the principles of the New Economic Policy, the whole variety of forms of cooperation. Of course, adjustments, at least at first, were made.

thali more actively apply economic leverage. The main forces of party, state and public organizations continued to concentrate on solving the problems of collectivization. The scale of technical reconstruction in agriculture has increased - mainly through the creation of state machine and tractor stations. The level of mechanization of agricultural work has risen markedly. In 1930, the state provided the collective farms with great assistance, they were provided with substantial tax benefits. On the other hand, for individual farmers, the rates of agricultural tax were increased, and lump-sum taxes levied only on them were introduced. The volume of state procurements, which became mandatory, also grew. All these even favorable changes give no idea of ​​the essence of the changes in the peasantry itself.

Yielding to calls to join the collective farms and socialize the means of production, it actually turned out to be deceived, as it was alienated from the means of production and lost all right to them. A powerful blow was dealt to the peasant feeling of ownership, as the peasants were deprived of the right to dispose of the results of their labor - the products produced, the fate of which began to be decided by the local party and Soviet authorities. The collective farmer even lost the right to independently decide where he would like to live and work, this required permission from the authorities. The collective farms themselves, having lost most of the properties of an agricultural artel, turned into a kind of enterprise subordinate to local authorities and the party.

By the end of the summer of 1931. grain procurements began to falter: decreased

grain receipts. As a result of the established system of procurements, the specter of famine has approached a number of regions of the country. The trouble came because bread was forcibly and, in fact, "under the panicle" was confiscated both in collective farms and in individual farms in order to fulfill the unrealistic, arbitrarily established by the Stalinist leadership in 1930. tasks of industrial development.

For the purchase of industrial equipment, currency was required. It could only be obtained in exchange for bread. Meanwhile, a crisis broke out in the world economy, grain prices fell sharply. However, the Stalinist leadership did not even think about reconsidering the installation of an industrial "jump" that was beyond the country's strength. The export of grain abroad was increasing. Despite the crop failure in the main grain regions of the country affected by the drought, a record amount of grain (22.8 million tons) was seized during grain procurements, of which 5 million were exported in exchange for equipment (from 1931 to 1936, half of all equipment imported into the USSR was of German origin). The forcible seizure of one third (and in some collective farms up to 80%) of the crop could only completely upset the production cycle. It is appropriate to recall that under the NEP, peasants sold only 15 to 20% of their crops, leaving 12-15% for seeds, 25-30% for livestock feed, and the remaining 30-35% for their own consumption.

In the summer of 1931 a rule was established according to which wages in kind on collective farms in excess of a certain norm were not merchandised with food, but were paid in money. In essence, this was tantamount to the introduction of a rationed food supply for collective farmers, especially if one takes into account the financial difficulties of many farms that were unable to make any noticeable cash payments. As a result of the current situation in the autumn and winter of 1931/32, there was a second ebb of peasants from the collective farms. The unorganized transition of rural residents to industry and construction intensified sharply. the passport system, abolished by the revolution, was introduced, which established strict administrative control over the movement of labor in cities, and especially from village to city, turning collective farmers into a population without a passport.

On the collective farms, which found themselves in an environment of extreme food difficulties and who were not at all economically interested in the delivery of grain, attempts to solve the food problem for themselves by any means, including illegal ones, became widespread. Cases of the theft of bread, hiding it from accounting, deliberately incomplete threshing, hiding, etc., were widespread. Attempts were made to distribute bread in advance on workdays, to spend it as expenses for public catering during the harvest.

It was decided to raise the low rate of grain procurements in the areas most affected by the drought by the use of repressions. They looked for "organizers of sabotage" of grain procurements and brought them to justice. In areas that could not overpower the procurement, they completely stopped the importation of any kind of goods. Lagging collective farms were put on the "black board", loans were collected from them ahead of schedule and their composition was cleaned. This further undermined the already difficult economic situation of these farms. Many collective farmers were arrested and deported. To fulfill the plan, all grain, without exception, was exported, including seed, fodder and issued for workdays. Collective and state farms that fulfilled the plan were subject to repeated tasks for the delivery of bread.

By the summer of 1932, the village of the grain belt of Russia and Ukraine, after

Meadow winter came out physically weakened. On August 7, 1932, the Law on the Protection of Socialist Property, written by Stalin himself, was adopted. He introduced "as a measure of judicial repression for theft of collective farm and cooperative property the highest measure of social protection - execution with confiscation of all property and with replacement, under extenuating circumstances, by imprisonment for a term of at least 10 years with confiscation of all property." Amnesty for cases of this kind was prohibited. In accordance with the law of August 7, tens of thousands of collective farmers were arrested for unauthorized cutting of a small amount of ears of rye or wheat. The result of these actions was a terrible famine, which killed, mainly in Ukraine, from 4 to 5 million people. Mass starvation led to the third wave of flight from the collective farms. There were cases of extinction of entire villages.

A special place among the crimes committed by the Stalinist leadership against the people is occupied by the Kazakh tragedy. In the areas of grain farming in Kazakhstan, the picture was the same as in the other regions mentioned above: the forcible seizure of grain both in collective farms and in individual farms doomed many thousands of people to extinction from starvation. The mortality rate was especially high in the settlements of special settlers in the Karaganda region. The dispossessed families brought here to develop the coal basin had neither household equipment, nor any food supplies, nor any tolerable housing.

The consequences of administrative arbitrariness were especially detrimental not even for grain farming, but for animal husbandry. Since 1931 the Stalinist leadership began to carry out the procurement of meat by the same methods as the grain procurements were carried out. In the same way, “planned tasks” that did not correspond to real possibilities were descended, which were “beaten out” mercilessly. And as a result - the undermining of animal husbandry, the deterioration of people's living conditions. The damage inflicted on animal husbandry held back the development of agriculture for decades. The restoration of the livestock to the level of the late 1920s occurred only in the 1950s.

The failures of the economic policy of 1929-1932 in the countryside were one of the main reasons for the failure of attempts to carry out the first five-year plan ahead of schedule. The main reason for the degradation of agricultural production in 1929-1932 was not even excesses in the course of various mass campaigns, but the general administrative-bureaucratic approach to establishing economic relations with agriculture. Excesses were, after all, an inevitable consequence of this approach to the rural economy. The main thing was that collectivization had by no means created a system of civilized cooperators in the countryside. The collective farm of the 1930s was not, in its most essential features, a cooperative farm.

The features of a cooperative (and even then often formally) were preserved mainly in the internal organization of the collective farm, for example, in the presence of a general meeting of collective farmers, the opportunity to leave the collective farm along with some part of the means of production, regulation of the procedure and level of wages, etc. But the collective farm, as a production unit, practically did not possess the economic independence characteristic of cooperative enterprises. Moreover, it did not lose this independence as a subordinate link in a wider cooperative system that would regulate and plan the supply and marketing, processing of agricultural products, financing, agronomic and machine-technical services. The collective farm turned out to be built into a rigid administrative hierarchy of state planning of production and procurement of agricultural products, which in practice turned cooperative ownership into a fiction.

In the existing administrative system, the collective farm found itself in a much tighter bureaucratic grip than state-owned enterprises. The latter, at least formally, were on self-financing, operated in conditions of self-sufficiency, and planned-unprofitable ones used state subsidies. Nothing of the kind existed and could not exist in the existing economic mechanism, even for the most advanced and best functioning collective farms.

One part of collective-farm production - the socialized sector - was wholly assigned to serve the needs of state centralized procurement of agricultural products. Deliveries of the products of the socialized sector were carried out on the basis of almost gratuitous withdrawal, because the procurement prices for grain, which remained approximately at the level of 1929 and at that time barely covered the costs of production, turned out to be fictitious in the 1930s due to the significantly increased cost of grain production. How big the gap between prices and cost was, it is impossible to establish precisely, since the calculation of the cost on collective farms has not been carried out since the beginning of the 30s, i.e. how much the grain cost the collective farm did not matter, the main thing was that they handed over everything that was supposed to be. The production plan of the collective farm included mainly natural indicators, financially, of course, monetary indicators, but this plan did not contain a valuation of a significant part of the collective farm's output and the costs of its production.

Approximate estimates, including comparisons with the level of state farm production costs, show that the costs exceeded the procurement prices for grain by approximately 2-3 times. The price-to-cost ratio was even worse for livestock products. At the same time, procurement prices for industrial crops were economically justified, which was forced by an almost catastrophic raw material shortage.

These circumstances forced the adoption of urgent measures to improve economic conditions for producers of industrial crops in order to avoid the imminent stoppage of light industry. For producers of grain, potatoes, vegetables, meat and dairy products, production remained deliberately unprofitable.

The production process in the collective farms was supported in different ways. Some collective farms, being forced to pay for the supply of means of production, to create seed and fodder funds, covered production costs by sharply reducing the wages of collective farmers. Thus, a part of the necessary product produced in the socialized economy acted as a source of covering losses. Some farms, the planning of procurements, put them in especially favorable conditions, which made it possible to fully fulfill the plans for the delivery of grain and other products, leaving rather large natural funds in their hands. As a rule, it was precisely from such farms that gave the state only a surplus product that advanced collective farms with a high level of wages grew up. Some farms received gratuitous financial, technical, seed, and fodder assistance from the state.

But the public sector of the collective farms could not ensure the reproduction of the labor force. There are no exact figures on this score, but collective farmers received no less than 60% of their income from personal subsidiary farming, although it was taxed and in-kind deliveries. Thus, the economy of the collective farm received a suspicious resemblance to some features of the feudal estate. The work of collective farmers acquired a clear division: in the public economy, the collective farmer works for the state almost free of charge, in the private economy, the collective farmer works for himself. Thus, not only in the consciousness of the collective farmer, but also in reality, public property was transformed for him into someone else's, "state-owned". The system of bureaucratic arbitrariness in the management of agriculture has triumphed. This system gave rise to moments of degradation in the agriculture of the USSR and a deterioration in the food supply of the population both in the city and in the countryside.

The beginning of the second five-year plan was extremely difficult for agriculture. Overcoming the crisis situation required huge efforts and time. The restoration of agricultural production began in 1935-1937. Harvests began to increase, the growth of the livestock population resumed, wages improved. The results of the technical re-equipment of agriculture also had an effect. In 1937, the system of machine and tractor stations (MTS) served nine-tenths of the collective farms. However, the increase in production over these three years did not cover the losses of the first two years. According to the Decree of January 19, 1933, blanks became an integral part of the mandatory tax levied by the state and not subject to revision by local authorities. But in fact, without reducing the amount of deductions in favor of the state, the decree only made the fate of the peasants more difficult. In addition to the tax, the collective farmers were obliged to pay in kind for the services provided to them through the MTS. This very significant collection in the 1930s provided at least 50% of grain procurements. Moreover, the state assumed full control over the size of the sown area and the harvest on the collective farms, despite the fact that, as was supposed by their charter, they were subordinate only to the general meeting of collective farmers. The size of the state tax was determined based on the desired result, and not on objective data.

Finally, in order to close any loophole through which products could escape state control, a decree was issued in March 1933, according to which, until the district fulfills the grain procurement plan, 90% of the harvested grain was given to the state, and the remaining 10% were distributed among collective farmers as an advance payment for work. The opening of collective farm markets, legalized since the summer of 1932 in order to alleviate the catastrophic food situation in the cities, also depended on whether the district's collective farms coped with the plan.

As for the collectivization of individual peasant farms, of which there were about 9 million by the beginning of the second five-year plan, the events of 1932-1933 actually stopped it. In the party environment, opinions were spreading about the need for a serious revision. In particular, recommendations were made on expanding the personal subsidiary plots of collective farmers, on stimulating individual farms.

collectivization, at which Stalin delivered a speech. He announced the beginning of a new, final stage of collectivization. It was proposed to launch an "offensive" on the individual farmer by strengthening the tax pressure, limiting land use, and so on. In August-September 1934, the rates of agricultural tax on individual farmers were increased and, in addition, a one-time tax was introduced for them, the norms for mandatory deliveries of products to the state were increased by 50% compared to collective farmers. For private traders, there were only three ways out of this situation: to leave for the city, join a collective farm, or become a hired worker on a state farm. At the Second Congress of Collective Farmers (essentially collective farm activists) held in February 1935, Stalin proudly declared that 98% of all cultivated land in the country was already socialist property.

In the same 1935 the state seized more than 45% of all agricultural products from the village, i.e. three times more than in 1928. At the same time, grain production decreased, despite the growth in sown areas, by 15% compared with the last years of the New Economic Policy. Livestock production barely amounted to 60% of the 1928 level.

In five years, the state managed to conduct a "brilliant" operation to extort agricultural products, buying them at ridiculously low prices, barely covering 20% ​​of the cost. This operation was accompanied by an unprecedentedly wide use of coercive measures, which contributed to the strengthening of the bureaucratic nature of the regime. Violence against the peasants made it possible to hone those methods of repression that were later applied to other social groups. In response to coercion, the peasants worked worse and worse, since the land, in essence, did not belong to them.

The state had to closely monitor all processes

peasant activities, which at all times and in all countries were very successfully carried out by the peasants themselves: plowing, sowing, reaping, threshing, etc. Deprived of all rights, independence and any initiative, the collective farms were doomed to stagnation. Historical experience shows that in terms of the methods and results of socialist transformations, it was hardly possible to choose the worst option. The likely path of the countryside is the voluntary creation by the peasants themselves of various forms of organizing production, free from state dictates, building their relations with the state on the basis of equal relations, with the support of the state, taking into account market conditions.

4. Consider the plan for the transformation of agriculture A.V. Chayanova

In the water chapter of the second edition of the book "Basic Ideas and Forms of Agricultural Cooperation", published in 1927, Chayanov shows us the village, having the task before him: How to introduce it to civilization?

Throughout his life, investigating this burning issue in various aspects, Chayanov saw the ways to solve it in the special economic nature of the working peasant family and in its inherent ability to enter into cooperative ties because of this.

In short, the essence of the idea that permeates many of the scientist's works is as follows. The peasant family is, first of all, an independent socio-economic unit. A family labor enterprise that lives according to its own laws, different from the laws of a capitalist enterprise based on wage labor. In the family economy, the peasant is both the owner and the worker in one person. The natural regulator of many processes here is the degree of self-exploitation of the family. And the purpose of production is not to make a profit, not so much to get a percentage of the invested capital, but to satisfy the needs of the family. In other words, if a capitalist "burns out" in some economic enterprise, then he seeks to transfer capital to another, more profitable business. The peasant in such a situation will increase labor costs, and if this is not possible, he will reduce the level of consumption of the family. In a word, in a working peasant family we are dealing with a very special social-production cell, which "is characterized by other (than a capitalist enterprise) motives for economic activity and even a different understanding of profitability."

Of course, leaving the semi-natural being, the peasant economy begins to need equipment, loans, progressive technologies. On the one hand, it is cramped for several acres, but on the other hand, the "purity" of biological processes in the care of livestock and crops requires individual attention, and limits the growth of the economy in breadth. Each industry needs its own optimum, says Chayanov's theory of differential optimums. When one or another optimum becomes larger than the size of the peasant economy, it is able to "split off" from it. Thus, individual industries or operations cooperate, reaching the level of large-scale production. That is, deprived of the opportunity, unlike industry, to limitlessly concentrate vertically one process after another. In other words. The peasants, while remaining master workers, but uniting "split off" processes and industries, jointly buying the means of production, creating machine and marketing partnerships, tribal unions, meliorative cooperatives, are qualitatively transforming economic management. This entire network is being transformed into a system of social cooperative farming in the countryside. Here social capital already rules the world. Under him, private farms perform only some processes on the basis of a technical assignment.

What is this - a system of civilized cooperators, necessary for the victory of socialism in the countryside, about which V.I. Lenin? It seems that such a system was justified in the works of Chayanov. And there were prerequisites for the implementation of this plan in Russia.

Starting from 1921, already millions of peasant farms, practically on a cooperative basis, used services for the sale and processing of products. By October 1929, there were already 165,000 different agricultural associations, 55% of peasant farms were covered by the cooperation. “Now, in terms of the scope of its work,” Chayanov wrote proudly, “Russian cooperation is the first in the world ...”

Not without her help, starting in 1923, a rapid growth in sown areas and agricultural production as a whole began. In 1925, the gross harvest of grain exceeded the level of 1913 by 11.6 percent, flax - by 12.6 percent. However, at the end of the twenties, the view of cooperation changed ... The well-known trial of the Labor Peasant Party began, in the case of which Chayanov and hundreds of others were arrested, then a death sentence. What is the reason for such severe punishment?

Could it be that Chayanov's scientific views could in no way be correlated with the political practice in the countryside of those years?

Chayanov was constantly called, and even now some people call him, an opponent of collectivization. Acquaintance with his works shows that this is not so at all. Not against collectivization - against reducing the entire wealth of cooperative forms to only one - to the collective farm. This is with our spaces, with the multi-structural economy that Lenin wrote about, with striking contrasts of conditions.

“The gradual restructuring of the countryside, based on the economic interest of the peasants and on the richest range of cooperative ties that serve this interest, is our path,” Chayanov believed.

In the “Short Course of Cooperation,” he wrote: “Only relying on the allied cooperative principle of socialized economy, the peasantry can use all the achievements of agronomic science in their fields and stalls ... throw off the burden of usury and buyers and take firm steps into a better future ... then before we are growing a new, hitherto unknown form of agriculture. Built on the principle of socialization, perfect technology and scientific organization of production. This future forces us to see, where superficial observers saw only the sale of oil and the purchase of a plow, a future, future grandiose socio-economic revolution, transforming the dispersed spontaneous peasant economy into a harmonious economic whole, into a new system of organizing agriculture, and fully agree with Lenin's dying thought. that the development of cooperation largely coincides with the development of socialism.

It was written in 1925. In December 1927, the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b) proclaimed a course towards the collectivization of agriculture. At the same time, the industrialization of industry was going on, sucking millions of peasants into the cities. In the same year, Chayanov's “basic ideas of the form of agricultural cooperation” came out in a second edition, where Chayanov directly said: “a collective farm or an agricultural commune” ... will always be weaker than a labor cooperative economy. Which it is profitable for her to organize in this way, but also those in which small-scale production is technically always more perfect.

But this was already clear as a direct action against the collective farms. In addition, many of Chayanov's worldview positions originated from the "populism" of his best time, about the Russian socialist utopians. Here you have the ready brand of a representative of the petty-bourgeois, neo-populist school," who "cannot be persuaded in any way and forced to think Marxists."

And they did not see an honest and pure scientist in Chayanov. Analyzing the simplified division of the village into kulaks, middle peasants and poor peasants, in his research he saw deeper its true stratification and divided it into six really existing social groups, unconditionally giving sympathy to the peasant to the worker. Excluding the "fist-eater" from the cooperation as a socially alien element, not seeing the possibility of involving the rural proletarian in the cooperative community, who simply has nothing to cooperate with. Chayanov considered the rest of the peasants to be vitally interested in cooperation. It should be noted that back in June 1918, committees were created to fight the kulaks. They took away from the kulaks two-thirds of the land belonging to the kulaks and confiscated other means of production. The material base of the kulaks was destroyed. And in the next three years, his defeat was completed. By 1926, 62.7% of the peasant farms that received land from the Soviet government were already middle peasants.

Therefore, at least surprising is the assertion made by Stalin in 1928 that 5% of the country's peasants are kulaks, of which 2-3% (this is 500-700 thousand households - especially wealthy ones - were subject to individual taxation. Later he said that during the years of collectivization Millions of people were dispossessed.It turns out that the middle peasants were enlisted in the kulaks, it turns out that the best productive forces in the countryside ensured these figures of dispossession.

The economic meaning of all these actions is clear. Industrialization required funds. They could be taken in the form of bread from the peasants, and 80% of it was from the middle peasants. Lenin's ideas about the tax in kind actually had to be replaced by a surplus appraisal. Agriculture has embarked on the path of extensive, extremely sluggish development. Certainly. Against the background of such “successes”, Chayanov and other agrarian economists, who not only professed the ideas of cooperation, but also operated on the calculations of their alternative implementation, became dangerous.

Today, the direction of Chayanov's thought is clearly emerging. On the one hand, he appreciated the possibilities of large agricultural enterprises and state farms. Grain factories, agro-combines (few, probably, know that by 1930 there were more than 300 of them), the advantages of mechanized technologies. And on the other hand, I also saw their troubles: equalization, day labor, uneven distribution of labor over time. Lack of pay for work and personal interest in work - that is, all that we faced during the years of the collective farm system. And even then Chayanov actually formulated the idea of ​​the self-supporting nature of socialist agricultural enterprises.

And today they sound relevant, at least. His three postulates are the optimization of decisions, the priority of the individual and the primary labor collective in the countryside, and the development of cooperation in all its forms and in all its breadth.

5 .How did the peasants live?

The thoughtless race of the pace of collectivization, as already mentioned, everywhere led to grave consequences. But in areas with the most backward forms of economy, they acquired a directly destructive character. Such a misfortune befell the areas of nomadic cattle breeding in Kazakhstan and a number of other republics and regions.

The process of collectivization, as you have already noticed, began in 1928. - the beginning of the forced creation of collective farms;

1929 - "solid collectivization", "the year of the great turning point";

1930 - liquidation of the kulaks as a class.

And as a result of the pace of collectivization in 1932-1933. famine came

Experts differ in determining the number of victims, but there is no doubt that we are talking about millions.

Famine 1923-1933

In the early 1930s, famine swept Ukraine and the northern Caucasus. Volga region, south of the Central Black Earth region, western Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan. In autumn 1932-spring 1993, at least 50 million people went hungry.

	Gross fees	blanks	Export

It is enough to compare the gross yields of grain and billets in order to find at least

one reason for hunger. The other is in the growth of exports. In 1930-1931. five times more grain was exported. Than in 1927, but we received much less income from this operation - the Great Crisis was raging in the West.

Since in 1931 the middle and lower Volga, western Siberia and some other regions were engulfed in drought, it would have been logical to lower grain procurement plans at least here, but they increased. The leading collective farms, which had already fulfilled the plan, had to hand over those who did not fulfill it. Often handed over seed grain, bread issued for workdays. In 1932, the drought area expanded. Nevertheless, both of these years did not produce a hungry harvest at all. But more and more people left the village. The drought-stricken areas had shortly before been engulfed in complete collectivization and became the scene of an active struggle by the peasantry against the planting of collective farms.

Entire regions died out. The troops were again used. But this time, in order to prevent hundreds of thousands of starving people from entering railway stations and cities.

Blanks 1932 - 19 million tons, but the plan is much higher. To fulfill it. Commissions with emergency powers were created. In Ukraine, the commission of V.M. Molotov, in the North Caucasus - L.M. Kaganovich, who was assisted by A.I. Mikoyan, M.F. Shkiryatov, Deputy Chairman of the OGPU G.G. berry, etc.

Entire villages were evicted from the Kuban, up to 50% of rural communists were expelled from the party. Those who refused to fulfill the meaningless demands of the Center. The terrible winter of 1932-1933, the spring and summer of 1933. not studied by Soviet historians. Tree bark, quinoa, roots of edible and inedible herbs. Edible clay - nothing saved from hunger. Cannibalism has become commonplace.

Experts differ in determining the number of victims: from 6 million who died of starvation in Ukraine alone to 3-4 million throughout the country. But there is no doubt. That we are talking about millions of people. In 1932-1933. 28 and 19 million centners of grain, respectively, were exported abroad. At that time, Stalin pronounces the following words: "Let's make the collective farms Bolshevik, and the collective farmers - prosperous."

Shortly before this, Stalin promised that collectivization would make it possible to turn the USSR into one of the richest countries in the world. But why did this task require such a long period of time? Stalin answered this question back in January 1933.

Document:

“The collective farms, as a form of organization, are not only not guaranteed against the penetration of anti-Soviet elements, but even for the first time they offer certain conveniences for the counter-revolutionaries to use them temporarily. While the peasants led an individual economy, they were ... separated from each other. In view of this, the counter-revolutionary encroachments of anti-Soviet elements among the peasantry could not have had much effect. A completely different picture emerges when the peasants go over to collective farming. Here the peasants already have a ready-made form of organization in the form of collective farms. In view of this, the penetration of anti-Soviet elements into the collective farms and their anti-Soviet activities can have a much greater effect.

Continuous purges fell on the collective farms and state farms, MTS. The leadership changed 3-4 times, and on the ground there was a revelry of the "struggle". The number of rural communists decreased by a third in a number of districts. Only in 1933 it was removed from work.

15% of collective farm chairmen and tractor drivers

25% foremen of tractor teams,

45% of MTS agronomists, mechanics, accountants.

Thus, not only the most economic peasants were destroyed and eliminated, but also the most capable and trained specialists. By the end of the second five-year plan, from half to two-thirds of the collective farm specialists had no special training.

And now let's see how the collective farmers began to live. In 1940, only 4% of collective farms were electrified (about 10,000). 77% of collective farms were given less than 2 kg per workday. grains, incl. in 42% - less than 1 kg. did not give out bread at all in 7% of collective farms. In almost 80%, less than 1 ruble was given out per workday, incl. in 55% of collective farms - less than 60 kopecks, and in 12% they did not give money at all. For comparison, the guaranteed minimum wage for an MTS machine operator for a collective farm set is 3 kg. grain, 2.5 rubles. for a work day.

The only salvation was that almost half of the income was received by the collective farmers from their subsidiary plots. However, the size of household plots was constantly reduced. Almost a third of collective farmers had no cows, and 12% had no livestock at all.

Rural population's consumption of basic foodstuffs.

6. Conclusion.

Thus, the collective farms turned into neighboring communities attached to state land, cultivating it with state tools and using only a small part of their output for this. Collective farmers became serfs in the countryside. There was nationalization instead of cooperation.

Forced industrialization required accelerated collectivization with all the ensuing consequences. But even within the framework of this option, Stalin chose the most inefficient and inhuman way from any point of view. Yes, with the help of administrative coercive measures, agriculture provided for industry. But the overstrain of agriculture had a negative effect on the entire economy as a whole - the reduction in food consumption led to a drop in labor productivity in industry as well. It is no coincidence that the famine of 1932-1933 coincided. and a sharp drop in the growth of industrial output in the same years. In general, during the years of the first five-year plan, with the help of the army, aviation, and barrage detachments, it was possible to take less from the village than planned. And for the peasant worker, collectivization was a tragedy. This is once again confirmed by the results and consequences of collectivization:

6.1 Results and consequences of collectivization

6.2 Collectivization is a tragedy for the peasant worker

Thus, having studied and researched all the material on this topic, I believe

that collectivization was a tragedy for the peasant laborer .

Annex 1

R

"Liquidation of the kulaks

as a class"

Socialization of funds

production

Centralization. agricultural management

Improving labor efficiency

figure 1

Obtaining funds for industrialization in the country

Annex 2

Table 1

Annex 3

Figure 2.

USING PRINT

FOR

ANTIKULATSKOI

COMPANIES

ADMINISTRATIVE

FORCE FOR PURPOSES

PARTICIPATION

IN COLLECTIVE FARM CONSTRUCTION

EVICTION OF THE KULAKS

EXCLUSION FROM COOPERATION AND CONFISCATION

CONTRIBUTIONS AND SHARES IN FAVOR OF THE FUND OF THE POOR AND EMPLOYEE

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY, BUILDINGS, FUNDS

PRODUCTION IN

FAVORING COLLECTIVE HOUSES

REFERENCE TO THE PARTY AND SOVIET BODIES OF AUTHORITY OF THE POOR STRATES OF THE POPULATION TO THE PROSISTENT PEASANTS (BET ON A SPLIT IN THE VILLAGE)

For inspiration For sweet sounds and prayers. ...

Answers to exam questions on the history of Russia Grade 11 2004-05.

Cheat sheet >> History

It became tragedy for her and triumph - for Russia. ... chiefs. Zemsky chief became for peasant and administrator, and judge ... of agricultural production - collectivization. Its essence was ... cancelled. For supplies workers the rear was introduced ...

The emergence and development of the Old Russian state IX - early XII century.

Abstract >> History

Conducting industrialization and collectivization.One-party political system... cancelled. For supplies workers rear were introduced ... armies "became tragedy for her and triumph - for Russia. ... I contributed the rest peasant. Government spending

The highest and most characteristic feature of our people is a sense of justice and a thirst for it.

F. M. Dostoevsky

In December 1927, the collectivization of agriculture began in the USSR. This policy was aimed at creating collective farms throughout the country, which were to include individual private owners of land plots. The implementation of collectivization plans was entrusted to the activists of the revolutionary movement, as well as the so-called twenty-five thousand people. All this led to the strengthening of the role of the state in the agricultural and labor sectors in the Soviet Union. The country managed to overcome the "devastation" and carry out the industrialization of industry. On the other hand, this led to mass repressions and the famous famine of 32-33.

Reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization

The collectivization of agriculture was conceived by Stalin as a last resort, with the help of which it was possible to solve the vast majority of the problems that at that time became obvious to the leadership of the Union. Highlighting the main reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization, the following can be distinguished:

• Crisis of 1927. Revolution, civil war and confusion in the leadership led to the fact that in 1927 a record low crop was harvested in the agricultural sector. This was a strong blow for the new Soviet power, as well as for its foreign economic activity.
• The liquidation of the kulaks. The young Soviet government still saw counter-revolution and supporters of the imperial regime at every turn. That is why the dispossession policy was massively continued.
• Centralized management of agriculture. The legacy of the Soviet regime was a country where the vast majority of people were engaged in individual agriculture. This situation did not suit the new government, since the state sought to control everything in the country. And it is very difficult to control millions of independent farmers.

Speaking about collectivization, it is necessary to understand that this process was directly related to industrialization. Industrialization is understood as the creation of light and heavy industry, which could provide the Soviet government with everything necessary. These are the so-called five-year plans, where factories, hydroelectric power stations, dams and so on were built throughout the country. All this was extremely important, since during the years of the revolution and the civil war, almost the entire industry of the Russian empire was destroyed.

The problem was that industrialization required a large number of workers, as well as a large amount of money. Money was needed not so much to pay workers, but to purchase equipment. After all, all the equipment was produced abroad, and no equipment was produced domestically.

At the initial stage, the leaders of the Soviet power often said that the Western countries were able to develop their own economy only thanks to their colonies, from which they squeezed all the juice. There were no such colonies in Russia, especially since the Soviet Union did not have them. But according to the plan of the new leadership of the country, collective farms were to become such internal colonies. In fact, this is what happened. Collectivization created collective farms that provided the country with food, free or very cheap labor, as well as labor, with the help of which industrialization took place. It was for these purposes that the course towards the collectivization of agriculture was taken. This course was officially reversed on November 7, 1929, when an article by Stalin entitled "The Year of the Great Break" appeared in the Pravda newspaper. In this article, the Soviet leader spoke of the fact that within a year the country must make a breakthrough from a backward individual imperialist economy to an advanced collective economy. It was in this article that Stalin openly declared that the kulaks as a class should be liquidated in the country.

On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a resolution on the pace of collectivization. This resolution spoke of the creation of special regions where the reform of agriculture was to take place first of all and in the shortest possible time. Among the main regions identified for reform were the following:

• North Caucasus, Volga region. Here the deadline for the creation of collective farms was set by the spring of 1931. In fact, the two regions had to pass to collectivization in one year.
• Other grain regions. Any other regions where grain was massively grown were also subject to collectivization, but in the period up to the spring of 1932.
• other regions of the country. The remaining regions, which were less attractive in terms of agriculture, were planned to be attached to collective farms in 5 years.

The problem was that this document clearly regulated which regions to work with and in what time frame the action should be taken. But the same document did not say anything about the ways in which the collectivization of agriculture should be carried out. In fact, local authorities independently began to take measures in order to solve the tasks assigned to them. And practically everyone reduced the solution of this problem to violence. The state said “We must” and turned a blind eye to how this “We must” was implemented ...

Why collectivization was accompanied by dispossession

The solution of the tasks that were set by the country's leadership assumed the presence of two interrelated processes: the formation of collective farms and dispossession. Moreover, the first process was very dependent on the second. Indeed, in order to form a collective farm, it is necessary to give this economic instrument the necessary equipment for work so that the collective farm is economically profitable and can feed itself. The state did not allocate money for this. Therefore, the path that Sharikov liked so much was adopted - to take everything away and divide it up. So they did. All "kulaks" were confiscated property, which was transferred to the collective farms.

But this is not the only reason why collectivization was accompanied by the dispossession of the working class. In fact, at the same time, the leadership of the USSR was solving several problems:

• Collection of free tools, animals and premises for the needs of collective farms.
• The destruction of all who dared to express dissatisfaction with the new government.

The practical implementation of dispossession came down to the fact that the state set the norm for each collective farm. It was necessary to dispossess 5-7 percent of all "private" ones. In practice, the ideological adherents of the new regime in many regions of the country significantly exceeded this figure. As a result, not the established norm, but up to 20% of the population was dispossessed!

Surprisingly, there were absolutely no criteria for defining a "fist". And even today, historians who actively defend collectivization and the Soviet regime cannot clearly say on what principles the definition of the kulak and the working peasant was based. At best, we are told that kulaks were understood as people who had 2 cows or 2 horses on the farm. In practice, practically no one adhered to such criteria, and even a peasant who had nothing behind his soul could be declared a fist. For example, my close friend's great-grandfather was called a "fist" because he had a cow. For this, everything was taken away from him and exiled to Sakhalin. And there are thousands of such cases...

Above we have already spoken about the resolution of January 5, 1930. This ruling is usually cited by many, but most historians forget about the appendix to this document, which gave recommendations on how to deal with fists. It is there that we can find 3 classes of fists:

• Counterrevolutionaries. The paranoid fear of the Soviet government before the counter-revolution brought this category of kulaks to the most dangerous. If a peasant was recognized as a counter-revolutionary, then all his property was confiscated and transferred to collective farms, and the person himself was sent to concentration camps. Collectivization received all his property.
• Wealthy peasants. They also did not stand on ceremony with rich peasants. According to Stalin's plan, the property of such people is also subject to complete confiscation, and the peasants themselves, along with all members of their family, were relocated to remote regions of the country.
• Middle class peasants. The property of such people was also confiscated, and people were sent not to distant regions of the country, but to neighboring regions.

Even here it is clear that the authorities clearly divided the people and the penalties for these people. But the authorities did not indicate at all how to define a counter-revolutionary, how to define a rich peasant or a peasant with an average income. That is why dispossession came down to the fact that those peasants who were objectionable to people with weapons were often called kulaks. This is how collectivization and dispossession took place. The activists of the Soviet movement were given weapons, and they enthusiastically carried the banner of Soviet power. Often, under the banner of this government, and under the guise of collectivization, they simply settled personal scores. For this, a special term was even coined “sub-kulak”. And this category included even poor peasants who had nothing.

As a result, we see that those people who were able to run a profitable individual economy were subjected to mass repression. In fact, these were people who for many years built their economy in such a way that it could make money. These were people who actively worried about the result of their activities. These were people who wanted and knew how to work. And all these people were removed from the village.

It was thanks to dispossession that the Soviet government organized its concentration camps, into which a huge number of people fell. These people were used, as a rule, as free labor. Moreover, this labor was used in the most difficult jobs, in which ordinary citizens did not want to work. These were logging, oil mining, gold mining, coal mining and so on. In fact, political prisoners forged the success of those successes of the Five-Year Plans, about which the Soviet government so proudly reported. But this is a topic for another article. Now it should be noted that dispossession on collective farms was reduced to a manifestation of extreme cruelty, which caused active discontent among the local population. As a result, mass uprisings began to be observed in many regions where collectivization was proceeding at the most active pace. They even used the army to suppress them. It became obvious that the forcible collectivization of agriculture was not giving the necessary success. Moreover, the discontent of the local population began to spread to the army. After all, when an army, instead of war with the enemy, fights with its own population, this greatly undermines its spirit and discipline. It became obvious that it was simply impossible to drive people to collective farms in a short time.

The reasons for the appearance of Stalin's article "Dizziness from success"

The most active regions where mass unrest was observed were the Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine. People used both active and passive forms of protest. Active forms were expressed in demonstrations, passive in that people destroyed all their property so that it would not go to the collective farms. And such unrest and discontent among the people managed to "achieve" in just a few months.

Already in March 1930, Stalin realized that his plan had failed. That is why on March 2, 1930, Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success" appeared. The essence of this article was very simple. In it, Joseph Vissarionovich openly shifted all the blame for terror and violence during collectivization and dispossession to local authorities. As a result, an ideal image of the Soviet leader began to take shape, who wishes the people well. To strengthen this image, Stalin allowed everyone to voluntarily leave the collective farms, we note that these organizations cannot be violent.

As a result, a large number of people who were forcibly driven into collective farms voluntarily left them. But it was only one step back to make a powerful leap forward. Already in September 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks condemned local authorities for passive actions in carrying out the collectivization of the agricultural sector. The Party called for active action in order to achieve a powerful entry of people into the collective farms. As a result, in 1931 already 60% of the peasants were on collective farms. In 1934 - 75%.

In fact, "Dizzy with success" was necessary for the Soviet government as a means of influencing its own people. It was necessary to somehow justify those atrocities and the violence that took place inside the country. The leadership of the country could not take the blame, as this would instantly undermine their authority. That is why local authorities were chosen as a target for peasant hatred. And this goal was achieved. The peasants sincerely believed in Stalin's spiritual impulses, as a result of which, after only a few months, they ceased to resist the forcible entry into the collective farm.

The results of the policy of complete collectivization of agriculture

The first results of the policy of complete collectivization were not long in coming. Grain production in the country decreased by 10%, the number of cattle decreased by a third, the number of sheep by 2.5 times. Such figures are observed in all aspects of agricultural activity. In the future, these negative trends were overcome, but at the initial stage, the negative effect was extremely strong. This negative resulted in the well-known famine of 1932-33. Today, this famine is known largely due to the constant complaints of Ukraine, but in fact, many regions of the Soviet Republic suffered greatly from that famine (the Caucasus and especially the Volga region). In total, the events of those years were felt by about 30 million people. According to various sources, from 3 to 5 million people died from hunger. These events were due to both the actions of the Soviet government on collectivization, and a lean year. Despite the weak harvest, almost the entire stock of grain was sold abroad. This sale was necessary in order to continue industrialization. Industrialization was continued, but this continuation cost millions of lives.

The collectivization of agriculture led to the fact that the rich population, the middle-class population, and activists who simply cared for the result completely disappeared from the village. There were people who were forcibly driven into collective farms, and who absolutely did not worry about the final result of their activities. This was due to the fact that the state took away most of what the collective farms produced. As a result, a simple peasant understood that no matter how much he grew up, the state would take almost everything. People understood that even if they grow not a bucket of potatoes, but 10 bags, the state will still give them 2 kilograms of grain for this and that's it. And so it was with all products.

Peasants received payment for their work for the so-called workdays. The problem was that there was practically no money in the collective farms. Therefore, the peasants received not money, but products. This trend changed only in the 1960s. Then they began to give out money, but the money is very small. Collectivization was accompanied by the fact that the peasants were given something that simply allowed them to feed. Special mention deserves the fact that during the years of the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union, passports were issued. The fact, which today is not customary to talk about en masse, is that the peasants were not supposed to have a passport. As a result, the peasant could not leave to live in the city, because he did not have documents. In fact, people remained attached to the place where they were born.

Final results

And if we move away from Soviet propaganda and look at the events of those days independently, we will see distinct signs that make collectivization and serfdom similar. How did serfdom develop in imperial Russia? The peasants lived in communities in the village, they did not receive money, they obeyed the owner, they were limited in freedom of movement. The situation was the same with collective farms. The peasants lived in communities on collective farms, for their work they received not money, but food, they were subordinate to the head of the collective farm, and due to the lack of passports they could not leave the collective. In fact, the Soviet government, under the slogans of socialization, returned serfdom to the village. Yes, this serfdom was ideologically consistent, but the essence of this does not change. In the future, these negative elements were largely eliminated, but at the initial stage, everything happened just like that.

Collectivization, on the one hand, was based on absolutely anti-human principles, on the other hand, it allowed the young Soviet government to industrialize and stand firmly on its feet. Which of these is more important? Everyone must answer this question for himself. It can only be said with absolute certainty that the success of the first Five-Year Plans is based not on the genius of Stalin, but solely on terror, violence and blood.

Results and consequences of collectivization

The main results of the complete collectivization of agriculture can be expressed in the following theses:

• A terrible famine that killed millions of people.
• The complete destruction of all individual peasants who wanted and knew how to work.
• The growth rate of agriculture was very low because people were not interested in the end result of their work.
• Agriculture has become completely collective, destroying everything private.

Introduction

1. The life of the peasants before collectivization

2. Goals of collectivization

3. Implementation of collectivization

4. Chayanov's plan for the transformation of agriculture

5. How did the peasants begin to live?

6.Conclusion

6.1. Results and consequences of collectivization

6.2. Collectivization is a tragedy for the peasant worker

Applications

7. List of references

Introduction

The closer an event is to us, the more difficult it is to give it an objective assessment. That is why the events of the 20th century were not unambiguously assessed by scientists. Some events are praised by Soviet historians, while others, on the contrary, are criticized. An example of such a historical event is collectivization. So, for example, in the textbook that my mother studied, collectivization is presented as a historical merit. Collectivization is considered in our textbooks as a tragic page of the people. That is why I decided to study this page in more detail, get acquainted with the factual material, statistical data, documents.

I called my work just that: “Is collectivization a tragedy for the peasant toiler?” The name ends with a question mark, to answer this question and became purpose of my work that is, to study and conduct research on the material found, finding out whether collectivization is a tragedy for the peasant worker and what are its consequences.

To achieve this goal, I set tasks:

Compare the life of peasants before collectivization and after;

Show how the process of collectivization took place, what are its goals, methods and results.

1. Life of peasants before collectivization

So, before collectivization, the peasants showed a noticeable rise in peasant farming, indicating the beneficial results of the nationalization of the land, the liberation of the peasants from the oppression of the landowners and exploitation by big capital, as well as the effectiveness of the new economic policy. In three to four years, the peasants restored agriculture after a severe devastation. However, in 1925 - 1929. grain production fluctuated at a level slightly higher than pre-war. Growth in the production of industrial crops continued, but was moderate and unstable. The number of livestock increased at a good pace: from 1925 to 1928, by about 25% per year. In a word, small-scale peasant farming has by no means exhausted the possibilities for development. But, of course, they were limited in terms of the needs of the country that had embarked on the path of industrialization.

3. Implementation of collectivization.

Held in December 1927 The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proclaimed a "course towards collectivization." As applied to the countryside, this meant the implementation of a very diverse system of measures aimed at boosting the production of the many millions of peasant farms, increasing their marketable output and drawing them into the mainstream of socialist development. This was fully ensured on the way of their cooperation (see Fig.1- goals collectivization).

Crisis of grain procurements at the end of 1927. arose as a result of market fluctuations, and not as a reflection of the crisis in agricultural production, and even more so the social crisis in the countryside. What happened?

Why did the price of bread go up in the private market? Although the gross grain harvest in 1928 was slightly higher than in 1927, crop failures in Ukraine and the North Caucasus led to the fact that rye and wheat were harvested about 20% less than in 1927/28.

Perhaps all these circumstances would not have affected so tangibly

on the situation of grain procurements, if not for two factors. First, although the reduction in the planned grain turnover and the size of the planned supply of bread to the urban population was insignificant, this occurred in the context of a rapid growth in industry and the urban population, which presented an increasing demand for food. This is what caused the private market price spike. The second is the reduction in grain exports associated with an acute shortage of resources for the domestic market, which in 1928/29 amounted to only 3.27% of the 1926/27 level.

Grain exports have actually lost all real significance, causing extreme tension in the balance of payments. Since bread was an important export resource, providing a significant part of the currency, the program for importing machinery and equipment, and in essence the industrialization program, was jeopardized.

Of course, the reduction in state grain procurements posed a threat to plans for industrial construction, complicated the economic situation, and aggravated social conflicts both in the city and in the countryside. The situation at the beginning of 1928 seriously complicated, required a balanced approach. But the Stalinist group, which had just achieved a majority in the political leadership, showed neither statesmanship nor understanding of the Leninist principles of policy towards the peasantry as an ally of the working class in building socialism. Moreover, it went for a direct rejection of these principles, for the demolition of NEP and the widespread use of emergency measures, that is, violence against the peasantry. Signed I.V. Stalin issued directives with threats against party leaders and a demand "to raise the party organizations to their feet, pointing out to them that procurement is the business of the entire party," that "in practical work in the countryside, from now on, emphasis is placed on the task of combating the kulak danger."

Markets began to be closed, searches were carried out in peasant households, and the owners of not only speculative grain stocks, but also very moderate surpluses in the middle peasant farms, were brought to justice. The courts automatically ruled on the confiscation of both marketable surpluses of grain and stocks needed for production and consumption. Inventory was also frequently confiscated. Administrative arrests and imprisonment by court sentences complete the picture of arbitrariness and violence perpetrated in the countryside in the winter and spring of 1928/29. In 1929, up to 1,300 "kulak" revolts were registered.

An analysis of the origin of the grain procurement crisis and ways to overcome it was the focus of the April and July plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928. These plenums revealed fundamental differences in the positions of Bukharin and Stalin in their proposed solutions to the problems that had arisen. The proposals of Bukharin and his supporters to find a way out of the situation created by the grain procurement crisis along the lines of the New Economic Policy (rejection of "extraordinary" measures, maintaining the course towards the rise of the peasant economy and the development of trade and credit forms of cooperation, raising the price of bread, etc.) were rejected as concession to the kulak and manifestation of Right opportunism.

Stalin's position reflected the tendency to recklessly force collectivization. This position was based on disregard for the sentiments of the peasantry, ignoring its unpreparedness and unwillingness to give up its own small-scale farming. The "theoretical" justification for forcing collectivization was Stalin's article "The Year of the Great Change", published in Pravda on November 7, 1929. The article stated the change in the mood of the peasantry in favor of the collective farms and put forward on this basis the task of completing collectivization as soon as possible. Stalin optimistically assured that, on the basis of the collective farm system, our country in three years would become the most grain-producing country in the world, and in December 1929, Stalin addressed the Marxist agrarians with calls to plant collective farms, to eliminate the kulaks as a class, not to let the kulak into the collective farm, to dispossess kulaks an integral part of collective farm construction. With regard to agricultural production, Stalin's forecasts no longer look like an exaggeration, but an arbitrary fantasy, dreams, in which the laws of the agrarian economy, the social relations of the countryside and the social psychology of the peasantry are completely ignored. Three years later, when the deadline for the fulfillment of Stalin's promises regarding the transformation of the USSR into the most grain-producing power came up, famine raged in the country, which claimed millions of lives. We did not become the richest, or at least one of the richest countries in the world, neither 10 years later - before the war, nor 25 years later - by the end of Stalin's rule.

The next step towards intensifying the race for the "tempo of collectivization" was taken at the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the same 1929. The task of "complete collectivization" was already set "in front of individual regions." Messages from members of the Central Committee, signals from the localities about haste and coercion in the organization of collective farms were not taken into account. An attempt to introduce elements of reason and understanding of the current situation were the recommendations of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on issues of collectivization. The draft resolution worked out by her proposed to solve the problem of collectivization of "the vast majority of peasant farms" during the first five-year plan: in the main grain regions in two or three years, in the consuming zone - in three or four years. The commission recommended that the main form of collective farm construction be considered an agricultural artel, in which "the main means of production (land, implements, workers, as well as marketable productive livestock) are collectivized, while at the same time maintaining, under the given conditions, the peasant's private ownership of small implements, small livestock, dairy cows and etc., where they serve the consumer needs of a peasant family."

collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction. "As proposed by the commission, the grain regions were divided into two zones according to the terms for the completion of collectivization. But Stalin made his amendments, and the terms were sharply reduced. The North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga were to be basically completed collectivization in autumn 1930. or, in any case, in the spring of 1931", and the rest of the grain regions - "in the autumn of 1931. or at least in the spring of 1932. (see table No. 1)

"Such a short timeframe and the recognition of" socialist competition in the organization of collective farms "was in complete contradiction with the indication of the inadmissibility of" any "decree" from above of the collective farm movement. "Although the resolution characterized the artel as the most common form of collective farms, but provisions on the degree of socialization of livestock and implements, on the procedure for the formation of indivisible funds, etc. As a result of Stalin's processing, the provision was excluded from the draft resolution that the success of collectivization would be assessed by the Central Committee not only by the number of farms united in cooperatives, "but primarily on the basis of how much one or another region will be able, on the basis of the collective organization of the means of production and labor, to really expand the areas under crops, increase productivity and raise animal husbandry. "Thus, favorable conditions were created for the race for "one hundred percent coverage" instead of the transformation of collectivization into a means for increasing the efficiency of agricultural production. (Table 1)

Under the strongest pressure from above, not only in the advanced grain regions,

but in the Chernozem center, and in the Moscow region, and even in the republics of the East, decisions were made to complete collectivization "during the spring sowing campaign of 1930." Explanatory and organizational work among the masses was replaced by rude pressure, threats, and demagogic promises.

So, the planting of collective farms and dispossession of kulaks on the basis of complete collectivization were proclaimed. The criteria for classifying an economy as a kulak economy were defined so broadly that it was possible to include under them both a large economy and even a poor one. This allowed officials to use the threat of dispossession as the main lever for creating collective farms, organizing the pressure of the declassed layers of the village on the rest of it. Dekulakization was supposed to demonstrate to the most intractable the inflexibility of the authorities and the futility of any resistance. The resistance of the kulaks, as well as of part of the middle and poor peasants to collectivization, was broken by the most severe measures of violence. (See Fig 2)

The data on how many people died from the “dispossessed” side, both in the process of dispossession itself and as a result of eviction to uninhabited areas, is still unknown.

Historical sources give different data on the number of dispossessed and evicted households. The following data are called: by the end of 1930. about 400 thousand farms were dispossessed (that is, about half of the kulak farms), of which about 78 thousand were evicted to separate areas, according to other sources - 115 thousand. Although the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a decision on the cessation of the mass eviction of kulaks from areas of complete collectivization and ordered it to be carried out only on an individual basis, the number of evicted farms in 1931 more than doubled - to almost 266 thousand.

The dispossessed were divided into three categories. The first one belonged

"counter-revolutionary asset" - participants in anti-Soviet and anti-collective farm actions (they themselves were subject to arrest and trial, and their families - to eviction to remote regions of the country). To the second - "big kulaks and former semi-landowners who actively opposed collectivization" (they were evicted with their families to remote areas). And, finally, to the third - "the rest of the kulaks" (it was subject to resettlement in special settlements within the areas of its former residence). The compilation of lists of kulaks of the first category was carried out exclusively by the local department of the GPU. Lists of kulaks of the second and third categories were compiled on the ground, taking into account the "recommendations" of village activists and organizations of the village poor, which opened up a wide opportunity for rampant bureaucratic violence that broke into the village in the winter of 1929/30 (see Fig. 2)

the rear was introduced ...

The emergence and development of the Old Russian state IX - early XII century.

Abstract >> History

Conducting industrialization and collectivization.One-party political system... cancelled. For supplies workers rear were introduced ... armies "became tragedy for her and triumph - for peasant. Government spending peasant must...

Answers to exam papers on the history of Russia Grade 9 2005-06.

Cheat sheet >> History

Army" became tragedy for her and triumph - for Russia. ... I contributed the rest peasant. Government spending peasant must ... carry out industrialization and collectivization. The one-party political system... was cancelled. For supplies workers the rear was introduced ...

History lectures

Synopsis >> History

Control. violent collectivization turned for power in ... in relation to the simple workers. In such ... accepted with the mentality of a Russian peasant, like promiscuity and... . M., 1992. Volkogonov D. Triumph and tragedy: political portrait of Stalin. Book 1. Ch. ...

Plan for studying the topic The concept of collectivization Prerequisites for collectivization Causes and tasks of forced collectivization Progress of collectivization Results of collectivization Lesson plan Concepts of the topic Stalinist collectivization

Collectivization - the policy of forcible transformation of agriculture in the USSR at the end of the years on the basis of dispossession and planting of collective farms, the nationalization of a significant part of peasant property

Plan 1 of the five-year plan Cooperation Kolkhozes % 18-20% Forms of cooperation TOZArtelkommun Stalin I.V. Bukharin N.I. Production cooperation Normalization of the economy Collective farmsIndividual farms Displacement of kulaks by economic methods Increase in manufactured goods. XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1927 - a course towards collectivization

Industrialization (grain procurement crisis - reduction of exports by 8 times) The need for large investments, the influx of labor the need for an increase in food Restructuring of the agricultural sector: from small and backward individual farming to large-scale advanced collective farming as a source of financial resources

Article 107 - for speculation (for refusing to hand over surpluses) Confiscation of bread (25% - to the poor) Prodrazverstka (state planning task) Prohibition of trade in bread Introduction of detachments "Second serfdom" 1928 Kulak - an economically free producer using hired force

The main stages of collectivization attack on the village "Year of the great turning point", the slogan "complete collectivization". "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" - "25-thousanders", forced socialization mass dispossession, uprisings Stalin I.V. "Dizzy with success" 1931 - the second wave of dispossession, "the year of complete collectivization" - "Holodomor". Cards. August 7, 1932 - "Law on the protection of socialist property" ("law on those spikelets") 1934 - the final stage of collectivization (93%)

1929 - the slogan of complete collectivization "Pravda" - Stalin I.V. “Year of the Great Break” 1930 Northern Caucasus, Volga region, 1931 Central Chernozem, Ukraine 1932 Grain regions of Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan districts"

January 1930 resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction 1 million farms - 5 million people (20%) - 2 thousand “anti-collective farm” unrest - passive forms of protest: slaughter of livestock, destruction of equipment - Act of terrorism

During the period of collectivization, "... hundreds of the most industrious, diligent, intelligent peasants, those who carried the stability of the Russian nation, were uprooted." A. Solzhenitsyn 1934 - the final stage of collectivization installation "stepping on the individual farmer", a mandatory minimum of workdays the right of collective farmers to have a personal subsidiary plot (25 acres) resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On anti-Soviet elements" lack of passports for collective farmers

Diversion of huge funds from the development of agricultural production. Conditions for an industrial leap have been created. Alienation of peasants from property and the results of labor, the elimination of economic incentives in agriculture. Independence gained from imports of important agricultural crops Mass “leaving” of peasants from the countryside, shortage of labor force Additional labor force to the city Strengthening the social base of the Stalinist dictatorship Increased level of mechanization of agricultural labor Outcomes, consequences

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Posted on http://www.allbest.ru/

Federal Agency for Railway Transport

Ural State University of Communications

ESSAY

By discipline: History

On the topic: Collectivization - the tragedy of the peasant - the worker?

checked

Konov A.A.

Fulfilled

Student gr. UP-115

No. of graduation book 15-UP-815

Volfart Yu.V.

Yekaterinburg

Collectivization - tthe tragedy of the peasant-worker

The collectivization of the peasants can be called, perhaps, the most dramatic period (not counting the wartime), as people had to experience many difficulties, innovations, violence, and a decrease in the quality of life.

Herlimitations

In my opinion, Stalin's actions were very cruel.

1. He dispossessed kulaks, as it seems to me, the "color of the nation" of the best, smartest, most efficient. He sought a gray faceless mass, which he dreamed of making happy. At the same time, he did not always dispossess kulaks, very often they were ordinary peasants.

2. Stalin did not just put people in prison, but also sent them to the north with their families, where they simply died of diseases, especially children, shot them for dissent. He jailed workers for mistakes and failures, considering this to be deliberate wrecking.

3. Introduced unbearably high taxes "especially on kulaks and individual farmers who did not want to join the collective farm" even for the collective farm, these taxes were high.

4. People, as soon as possible, fought with taxes, hid grain, then they came to them, searched them, found grain and shot violators who just wanted to feed their families. He even punished for the fact that after the harvest, someone collected small leftovers on the ears.

5. Because of the repressions, people began to work worse, a famine year came, a lot of food was taken from the collective farms and people were simply starving.

6. In addition to the increase in taxes, the wages of the workers did not grow, and the prices of food rose significantly.

7. Forced the workers to work 8 hours a day and 7 days a week, people simply had neither the strength nor the desire to work more and be activists, especially since people were simply afraid to do something wrong.

The results of such a harsh repression were very sad:

The number of livestock in the country has drastically decreased

Distortion of the principles of the cooperative form of economy, which in fact was turned into a kind of state economy with the full command of state bodies to collective farms

Insufficient equipment of collective farms with machinery, horse labor was widely used

Forcible removal from the village of the most enterprising and economic peasants of the "kulaks"

Exorbitantly high planned targets for collective farms for the supply of agricultural products to the state

Poor organization of labor in the collective farms, the lack of self-government and democratic norms led to the fact that the self-activity and initiative of the peasants completely died out

The forms and methods of collectivization destroyed the way of peasant life developed over the centuries, the former peasant disappeared as an enterprising producer of agricultural products, he gradually turned into a hired worker, a serf of the Soviet state

Gradual increase in taxes from household plots of collective farmers who provided them with food

· A sharp reduction in the rural population as a result of repression, resettlement and the involvement of peasants in the construction of new industrial facilities

The fall in gross production and productivity according to I.E. Zelenin, the average grain yield in the years of the first five-year plan was 7.7 centners per hectare, in the years of the second five-year plan it was 7.1 centners per hectare.

Stalin set tasks that were simply impossible with the expectation that if he sets an impossible task, then even if they do not complete it completely, they will do it as well as possible.

The "revolution from above" is what historians called it, its goal was to develop society through progress, but to a large extent this did not happen. To some extent, Stalin really made a huge leap in the development of the USSR, but at what cost. Collectivization was rather a kind of "transformation", which was in strong contradiction with the objective laws of economic development and was feasible only under the conditions of a totalitarian regime, which in the process of collectivization widely used violence and repression.

I was surprised by Stalin's indifference to people during the famine, I will give an example: During the harvesting of the crop in 1932, the relevant authorities began to demand the delivery of grain, but the collective farmers and individual peasants took a wait-and-see attitude. It was proposed to deprive those who do not fulfill the plan of the right to buy manufactured goods and bring them to justice. Despite this, the plan still failed to be implemented. Additional measures have been introduced, namely, to prohibit trade for collective farmers, the termination of lending and the early collection of debts, purge, seizure, and eviction. The Communists asked for a reduction in such measures, then it was decided to purge people who were alien to the cause of communism, who were pursuing a kulak policy, who were decomposed, who were not capable of pursuing the policy of the Party in the countryside. Cleaned out to send as politically dangerous. But the plan still didn't work. As a result, punitive measures led to the fact that all the grain was taken away from collective farmers and individual farmers, dooming them to starvation. In the spring, tens of millions of people were already starving in different regions of the country. A stream of messages about a large-scale famine, calls for help went to the center from the places, but Stalin indifferently ignored these messages, calling them "fairy tales." In response, the secretary of the Kharkov regional committee heard: “You are a good storyteller - you composed such a tale about the famine, you thought to intimidate us - it won’t work!” The center did not help the starving. Moreover, an order was sent to the localities to detain starving peasants who went to other areas in search of food, and return them to their places of permanent residence. Stalin did his best to hide the fact of the famine and forbade any mention of it in the media.

No one counted the number of famine victims, but it is known that the population of the USSR decreased by 7.7 million people from the autumn of 1932 to the spring of 1933. Stalin produced an impressive amount of exports from the country, while the budget was not enough, and he took from his country, and people died ...

collectivization stalin famine

Conclusion

Based on all of the above, I have a conclusion: If you do not cling to the terms, then the collective farm as a phenomenon has been known since ancient times. This is nothing but an artel - the Bolsheviks only used the artel method for cultivating the land.

This phenomenon had many forms: agricultural cooperatives, artels, communes, partnerships for the joint cultivation of the land.

The collective farm is a modified community, with the difference that the land, livestock and implements are not divided among farms, but are used together. Thus, it is possible to get a large-scale economy on earth not across the mentality, but in accordance with it - if organizational issues are resolved. And what is even more important - the communal principle is involuntarily preserved on the collective farm: at least a black piece, yes to everyone. It was precisely such a reform that did not throw the excess population out of the production process - and in the USSR this meant throwing it out of life - but kept it, albeit starving, but alive.

All that was needed was to save the population for several years, while jobs were being prepared for them at factories and construction sites. And I am not surprised that the Bolsheviks based their agrarian reform on industrial cooperation.

Hosted on Allbest.ru

Similar Documents

The gradual development of the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet state. The beginning of the way. The problem of collectivization. Excesses, mistakes and crimes in collective farm construction. results of collectivization. Industrialization.

control work, added 08/03/2007


The beginning of collectivization and the first crises. The planting of collective farms and dispossession of kulak on the basis of complete collectivization. The use of repressive measures against the peasantry. The development of agriculture in the conditions of the NEP. Ways and rates of socialist transformations.

abstract, added 04/06/2011


The history of the emergence of the first collective farms in 1918. The goals and objectives of continuous forced collectivization. Famine of 1932-1933. Historical background on the situation in the Altai Territory at the beginning of the 20th century. Regional features of collectivization, its results.

abstract, added 10/25/2014


The state of agriculture in Belarus on the eve of complete collectivization. Features of the process of collectivization and anti-collective farm uprisings in the BSSR. The reasons for the failure and the results of continuous collectivization in the 30s. The formation of collective farm serfdom.

abstract, added 04/26/2011


Interest in the personality and biography of Kaganovich in connection with the activities of Stalin. Literature dedicated to the pre-war biography of Kaganovich. Active participation in the collectivization in the Urals. Capital redevelopment. Collectivization and dispossession.

article, added 06/14/2013


The idea of ​​collective farming. Growth in grain and food exports. The beginning of collectivization. Methods for achieving the goal. Dispossession. Famine of 1932-1933. "Success". results of collectivization. Mass exodus of the rural population to the cities.

abstract, added 09/05/2007


The beginning of the mass collectivization of agriculture. Collective-farm movement in 1930. The beginning of the implementation of the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. The resistance of the peasantry to the population in the course of collectivization. Elimination of the sole form of management.

term paper, added 10/30/2014


Reasons and goals of collectivization. The process of uniting individual peasant farms into collective farms in Siberia. Transformations in agriculture on the example of the Moshkovsky district of the Novosibirsk region. Outcomes and consequences of the current policy.

abstract, added 11/23/2011


Features of the socio-economic, political development of the Republics of the Soviet Union before the outbreak of World War II. Stages of implementation of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy, collectivization, which led to famine. Repressions and dictatorship of Stalin.

abstract, added 01/25/2010


Features of industrialization in the BSSR, evaluation of its results within 1-3 five-year periods. Background and significance of collectivization in Belarus. Analysis of the results of the implementation of the Stalinist plan for super-industrialization and complete collectivization.