July battles. Battle of Bayin-Tsagan Mountain
After the defeat on Mount Bayin-Tsagan, the Japanese command no longer
tried to cross Khalkhin Gol. It put before its troops
more limited goals - the destruction of Soviet-Mongolian troops in
east bank of the river.
After a long respite, having regrouped and pulled up fresh
the enemy launched a surprise attack on the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment
and the battalion of the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade, only a few days ago
back to the combat area. The blow was unexpected, and two
battalions of the 149th Infantry Regiment began to retreat. Only at dawn
Soviet troops managed to gain a foothold in the area of the regiment command post,
about three to four kilometers from the river. Died heroically in a night battle
commander of the 149th Infantry Regiment, Major I.M. Remizov. He was posthumously
awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the height at which he was
command post was named "Remizovskaya".
In the morning, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and two battalions approached the battle site
5th rifle and machine gun brigade. After a short artillery preparation
Soviet troops launched a counterattack and pushed the enemy back.
Enemy attacks continued for a number of nights.
the Japanese managed to oust one of the battalions of the 5th rifle and machine gun
brigades and capture the heights. Their further progress was stopped
artillery fire and infantry counterattacks supported by tanks.
Only one Japanese company managed to penetrate the gap between our
troops and penetrate deeply into the Soviet defenses. The enemy tried
break through to the crossing. This idea failed, the company gained a foothold on one of
dunes. The rapid attack of Soviet tanks and infantry was completely
destroyed. In this battle, the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade died a heroic death.
brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev. He personally led a group of tanks of the 1st battalion. When
the infantry following the tanks lay down under enemy fire, he climbed out
cars and with grenades in their hands raised the soldiers to attack. Wounded, he continued
lead the battle until he was hit by an enemy bullet.
Back in early July, to the combat area from the Ural military
units of the 82nd Infantry Division began to arrive in the district, replenished
transferred to the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and took up the positions assigned to it.
In the morning, the Japanese opened heavy artillery fire on him. Young, not yet
The fired Red Army soldiers were confused. Selfless
Through the efforts of commanders and political workers, the resulting confusion was quickly
liquidated. Enemy attacks were repulsed with the active assistance of artillery.
After the battle, the regiment was transferred to reserve. We spent with the Red Army soldiers
training close to combat conditions. Subsequently, the 603rd Regiment bravely
fought and performed well during the August operation.
suspended, and the Japanese were forced to go on the defensive. Relative
the lull lasted only ten days.
fire along the entire front. At the same time, large forces appeared in the air
enemy aircraft to strike the battle formations and rear of the Soviet-Mongolian
troops. They were met by Soviet fighters. Fierce battles ensued in the sky
air battles.
The Soviet artillery was silent, not giving away its location. Hour
Japanese guns roared. Then the infantry rose up in the southern sector. AND
only then did the Soviet guns enter the battle. Artillery and machine gun fire
the enemy was scattered and his attack was thwarted.
In the northern sector, the Japanese began their attack an hour and a half later. This
gave the Soviet artillery the opportunity to first, concentrating all fire on
southern sector, repulse the attack there, then transfer fire to another
direction. All enemy attempts to advance were repulsed.
offensive... All their attacks were repelled by the fire of the Soviet-Mongolian troops
with significant losses for the Japanese.
In a number of areas, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion,
caused by well-aimed artillery fire, Soviet troops went into successful
counterattacks. Convinced of the futility of the attacks, the Japanese command was
forced to go on the defensive.
The defeat of the Japanese group in the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan
demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet-Mongolian troops over the Japanese,
boasting of their invincibility.
The July battles showed that the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the area
the conflict is not enough, they are significantly inferior in number to the Japanese,
although they are superior in number of tanks and armored vehicles. Small number
Soviet infantry often led to the fact that in our defense system
there were vulnerabilities. The enemy took advantage of this by sending his troops here.
blows, especially during night attacks.
Soviet and Mongolian soldiers and commanders in difficult July battles
thwarted the plans of the Japanese command, which sought to seize a bridgehead on
eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. Only lack of strength did not allow them
completely defeat the enemy and throw him back to Manchuria. However
the retained bridgehead provided the Soviet-Mongolian troops with advantageous positions
for further transition to the offensive.
Japanese troops took up defensive positions on a line of sand dunes in five -
eight kilometers east of the Khalkhin Gol River. Digging trenches in loose sand
and building shelters, they began to prepare for a new offensive.
6th Army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo. She was given the task
encircle and destroy the Soviet-Mongolian troops located on
eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. It consisted of the 23rd and 7th Infantry
divisions, fully staffed according to wartime staff, separate
infantry regiment and four separate infantry battalions, three Bargut regiments
cavalry, seven artillery regiments (of which four are heavy), two tank
regiment, mixed Manchukuo brigade, two engineer regiments, a number of separate
anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries, numerous auxiliary troops.
A total of 55 thousand people, more than 300 guns and mortars, 1283 machine guns, 135
tanks and armored vehicles, about 350 aircraft.
Such a concentration of large military forces forced the Soviet
The government will provide significant assistance to the fraternal people of the Mongolian People's Republic.
From the deep regions of the Soviet Union they are moving towards Khalkhin Gol
new connections and parts. By mid-August there were
three rifle divisions, a rifle and machine gun brigade, an airborne brigade, three
motorized armored, two tank brigades, six artillery regiments (including
including four as divisions), two separate artillery divisions and
one long-range battery, two communications battalions, a pontoon battalion, two
hydraulic companies. A total of 57 thousand people, 634 guns and mortars, 2255
machine guns, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 aircraft.
The Soviet-Mongolian troops had a slight superiority in manpower
strength, almost double in artillery and machine guns, six times in tanks and
armored vehicles, more than one and a half times in aviation.
concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area, the 1st Army Group was formed
Council of Divisional Commissar M.S. Nikishev, Chief of Staff of the Brigade Commander
M.A. Bogdanova. To coordinate the actions of Soviet and Mongolian troops on
a front group was formed at the base of the Trans-Baikal Military District
led by Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern (member of the Military Council of the group -
divisional commissar N.I. Biryukov, chief of staff - divisional commander M.A. Kuznetsov).
The 1st Army Group was tasked with conducting an operation to
encirclement and complete destruction of the troops of the Japanese invaders, treacherously
invaded the land of the Mongolian People's Republic, and restore it
state border.
According to the plan of the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov, it was decided
pinning down the Japanese from the front, deliver powerful converging attacks on both flanks
enemy group to encircle and destroy Japanese troops between
the Khalkhin Gol River and the state border.
Preparations for the operation took place under very difficult conditions. First of all
due to the remoteness of the theater of military operations from the railway. Troops,
military equipment, ammunition, food had to be transferred to
cars on dirt roads. Moreover, from the nearest final unloading point
The station was more than 700 kilometers away from the combat area. Volume
the upcoming transportation was colossal. To carry out the operation it was necessary
deliver only 24.5 thousand tons of artillery and aviation ammunition,
food 4 thousand tons, fuel 7.5 thousand tons, other cargo 3
thousand tons. Timber, firewood, and even
In the most difficult off-road conditions and sweltering heat, Soviet drivers
showed miracles of endurance, endurance and heroism. A flight of
1300 - 1400 kilometers lasted five days.
Movement of vehicles and military equipment, as a rule,
were carried out only at night with the strictest observance of blackout. At
combined marches were widely used in the transfer of new units - part
The soldiers traveled the route in cars, and covered the rest on foot.
The troops carefully prepared for the offensive operation. In the near future
in the rear, warriors were trained in close combat techniques. Introduced to the features of tactics
and enemy defense. Particular attention in the classes was paid to
interaction in combat between infantry and tanks, artillery and aircraft.
The Military Council of the 1st Army Group developed a detailed plan
preparation of the operation. Deception activities occupied an important place in it
enemy.
Every effort was made to give the enemy the impression that
preparing our troops for long-term defense. For this purpose it was printed and
"Memo to a soldier in defense" was sent to the troops. It was done so that
Several of them seemed to have accidentally fallen into the hands of the enemy. Powerful sound broadcasting
the station imitated the production of fortification works. On the radio open
reports on constructed firing points were transmitted in text or simple code
and shelters. Applications were made for timber, cement and other property,
necessary for defensive structures. Requirements were sent for the winter
uniforms and stoves...
Meanwhile, all orders related to the preparation of the upcoming
offensive, were given only orally. Troops moved to their original areas,
usually at night.
The movement of tanks was masked by flights of night bombers,
reinforced machine gun and rifle fire. To accustom the enemy to
noise, 10 - 12 days before the start of the offensive several tanks with removed
silencers constantly cruised along the front.
In units concentrated on the flanks, work was completely prohibited
radio stations. Communication here was carried out only by messengers. On the contrary, on
in the central sector of the front, not only did they operate already known to the enemy
radio stations, but also new ones appeared. All this was supposed to create
the enemy's impression of strengthening the center of defense of the Soviet-Mongolian
Much attention was paid to organizing a reliable system
management. An officer service was created at the headquarters of the 1st Army Group
communications. A clear system of codes and call signs has been developed for radio stations.
The group command post was connected to the commanders of divisions and brigades
line of telephone wires.
By mid-August, Japanese troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol
occupied a fortified line that ran along sand dunes at a distance
from two to ten kilometers west of the Mongolian state border
People's Republic.
Enemy positions consisted of resistance nodes and strongholds with
a dense network of trenches, located, as a rule, on dunes and connected
between themselves by means of communication. Many dugouts and shelters were built for
manpower and military equipment. The trenches were torn off in full profile, and the dugouts
withstood a direct hit from a 152 mm projectile.
Ahead of the resistance nodes at a distance of 150 - 200 meters were
single trenches for snipers, flammable liquid bottle throwers and
suicide bombers armed with anti-tank mines
two to three meter bamboo poles. The paired trenches housed
soldiers pulling an anti-tank mine on a belt under the tracks of combat vehicles
Enemy defenses were well adapted to
terrain and camouflaged. The fire system was carefully thought out and
organized. All this presented a strong obstacle to the attackers.
Simultaneously with the construction of fortified positions, the Japanese
the command was preparing for a general offensive. It was supposed to lure
Soviet-Mongolian troops into the valley of the Khaylastyn-Gol river and a strong blow to
By mid-August, Soviet-Mongolian troops occupied positions on
the bank of Khalkhin Gol two to six kilometers east of the river. On the right
the flank of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was defended by the 8th Cavalry
MNRA division. To the northeast were two regiments of the 82nd Infantry
divisions. North of the mouth of Khaylastyn-Gol, the 5th Rifle and Machine Gun was defending
The 6th Cavalry Division of the MPRA was located. The rest of the 1st Army troops
the groups were located on the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
According to the plan of Corps Commander G.K. Zhukov, three groups of troops were created. South, under
under the command of Colonel M.I. Potapov, consisted of the 57th Infantry Division,
8th motorized armored brigade, 6th tank brigade (less one battalion),
tank and rifle-machine gun battalions of the 11th tank brigade,
division of the 185th artillery regiment, anti-tank battalion and
a separate company of flamethrower tanks. The group was supposed to advance
direction Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo with the immediate task of destroying the group
enemy, located south of the Khaylastyn-Gol River, and later in
interaction with the troops of the Central and Northern groups to encircle and
destroy Japanese troops north of Khaylastyn-Gol. In case of
enemy reserves from Manchuria, the troops of the Southern Group were supposed to
repulse their attacks. The right flank of the group was secured by the 8th Cavalry
MNRA division. She had to push back parts of the Khingan cavalry
enemy divisions, occupy and firmly hold the heights of Eris-Ulyn-Obo.
The artillery of the Southern Group, consisting of 72 guns, was supposed to suppress and
destroy enemy personnel and their firing points at Peschanaya heights and at
area of Big Sands, accompany tanks and infantry with fire. 185th Division
The regiment, in addition, was entrusted with shelling the enemy's rear.
Northern group, commanded by Colonel I.V. Shevnikov, consisting of
601st Regiment, 82nd Infantry Division, 7th Motorized Armored Brigade, two
tank battalions of the 11th tank brigade, 87th anti-tank division
and the 6th Cavalry Division of the MPRA was to lead an offensive in
in the direction of nameless lakes, which are several kilometers northeast
Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, with the immediate task of mastering the sand dunes in
four kilometers west of this height. Subsequently, in collaboration with
3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the Central Group and troops of the Southern Group
encircle and destroy enemy troops north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River.
Artillery group consisting of 24 guns (not counting regimental and
battalion) occupied firing positions north of Mount Bayin-Tsagan and should
was to suppress manpower, machine guns and enemy guns at the height of the Finger
Troops of the Central Group (tasks were assigned directly to the corps commander
G.K. Zhukov) consisted of the 602nd and 603rd regiments of the 82nd Infantry Division,
24th and 149th regiments of the 36th motorized rifle division and the 5th
rifle and machine gun brigade. Advancing in the center, the group had to attack
pin down the main enemy forces from the front and prevent the transfer
reinforcements on the flanks. The immediate task is to master the heights of Peschanaya and
Remizovskaya. Subsequently, in cooperation with the troops of the Southern and Northern
groups to take part in the encirclement and destruction of Japanese troops in the southern and
northern banks of the Khaylastyn-Gol River.
The central group had the most artillery: 112 barrels. This
artillery was supposed to destroy manpower and firepower at the heights
Peschanaya and Remizovskaya, support the attack of tanks and infantry, suppress the Japanese
artillery, hinder the approach of reserves, actively take part in
repelling enemy counterattacks.
The reserve of the commander of the 1st Army Group was six kilometers away
southwest of Mount Khamar-Daba and consisted of the 9th motorized armored brigade, 4th
battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade and the 212th Airborne Brigade. Greatest
the density of troops and artillery was created in the center and on the right flank.
The left flank group was significantly weaker.
For artillery support of the offensive, all divisional artillery
constituted the PP (infantry support) groups. They had to destroy and
suppress Japanese fire weapons at the front line and in the depths of defense in
the division's offensive zone, accompanying the advance of tanks and infantry with fire.
Special batteries were allocated in advance for promotion immediately after
advancing infantry to support it with direct fire. Groups
infantry support was created in each rifle regiment. Besides,
long-range artillery groups were created.
In total, the 1st Army Group had 286 guns of caliber 75 mm and above.
In addition, there were 180 anti-tank guns.
Soviet-Mongolian troops covered themselves from enemy aviation
anti-aircraft artillery regiment and three separate divisions - 16 in total
batteries - 96 guns. The main part of them stood to cover the crossings across
Khalkhin Gol and the command post on Mount Khamar-Daba.
Engineering troops of the 1st Army Group by the beginning of the August
offensive had three divisional sapper battalions, two separate
sapper companies of tank and motorized armored brigades, pontoon battalion, two
separate hydraulic engineering companies. To build pontoon bridges there were two
a heavy ferry park and two inflatable boat parks.
During the fighting at Khalkhin Gol in May - July, engineering troops
played a significant role. First of all, they ensured the transfer of troops to
eastern bank of the river. Sappers not only directed crossings under fire, but also
repeatedly defended them, repelling the fierce attacks of the enemy. In the middle
July there were only two crossings across Khalkhin Gol, including a track bridge,
built by sappers of the 11th Tank Brigade back in May.
part of it was flooded as a result of Japanese artillery shelling. Then
made an original decision: to flood it all. The pontoons sank to the bottom, and
the water passed 30 - 40 centimeters above the flooring. Crossings along it
was initially carried out only at night, and the Japanese for a long time considered this bridge
inoperative and out of order. The resourcefulness of Soviet sappers gave
the ability to uninterruptedly transfer troops, military equipment, ammunition and
food to the east coast.
Sappers did a lot of work to provide the troops with water. Behind
In a short time, under difficult conditions, about 60 wells were installed.
The sappers were also preparing command and observation posts for
headquarters of the 1st Army Group and division commanders. We worked especially hard
engineering troops in the first half of August. Several were found in advance
fords and a number of pontoon crossing points are planned. Equipped with more than 20
kilometers of access roads, and a clear commandant service has been organized on
crossings By the beginning of the offensive, 12 bridges had been built across Khalkhin Gol.
The offensive operation of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was being prepared in
deep secret. All reconnaissance was carried out by commanders disguised as
in Red Army uniform. Moreover, the tankers wore infantry tunics.
A strictly limited number of people developed the offensive plan: the commander
group, member of the Military Council, chief of staff, chief of operations
department. Commanders and chiefs of military branches were only acquainted with the issues
plan affecting them. As the deadline approaches, a circle of people
privy to the various details of the plan expanded. Red Army soldiers and juniors
The commanders learned about their tasks three hours before the start of the offensive.
An extremely difficult task faced the intelligence officers: to determine
the enemy's defense system, the location of his fire weapons. Relatively
the high density of Japanese defense made it almost impossible for small forces to operate
reconnaissance groups, their penetration into the depths of the defense.
Bargut prisoners and defectors usually told everything during interrogations
willingly, but little did they know. The scouts took the Japanese as a “language”
rarely, and even those intoxicated by chauvinistic propaganda, as a rule,
didn't say anything.
It gave good results in pinpointing the enemy’s front line
reconnaissance in force. Soviet intelligence also provided considerable assistance here.
aviation that took hundreds of aerial photographs.
During the period of preparation for the offensive, commanders and political workers among
personnel widely organized the exchange of combat experience, promoted
military feats of Soviet and Mongolian soldiers. A significant contribution has been made here
Soviet military seal of the 1st Army Group. This is primarily an army
newspaper of the "Heroic Red Army" group, divisional and brigade newspapers
“For the Motherland”, “Voroshilovets”, “Attack”.
In short intervals between battles in the trenches, among the sand dunes,
At field airfields, small sheets of military newspapers were eagerly read. Their
always looked forward to it. Newspapers promptly reported on the latest
events at the front, talked about exploits...
The newspaper "Heroic Red Army" devoted entire pages to
propaganda of combat experience. So, under the general heading "The enemy is afraid of the bayonet
attacks, hit harder with the Russian bayonet!” notes from the junior political instructor are included
A. Ivanov “And the bullet is not stupid and the bayonet is a fine fellow,” Red Army soldier F. Ivanov “Faithful
the Russian bayonet has never failed and will never fail." With great interest
Everyone read the selection “Stronger than the combat bond of infantry and tank crews.”
On the pages of the "Heroic Red Army" soldiers shared their
experience. Thus, pilot P. Solntsev wrote: “In an air battle, I noticed one
a Japanese who was attacking my comrade. The samurai made a loop and went
for cunning. He turned upside down and fired from this position.
I was above and behind the Japanese and immediately guessed his maneuver. By adding
gas, I went on the attack. Fifty meters from the enemy, he pressed the general trigger and
fired a long line at the samurai's "belly". The enemy plane immediately began to smoke
and flew to the ground. The new technique of the Japanese pilots did not bring them success..."
The writer V. Stavsky not only talked about the exploits of Soviet
pilots, but also tried in his correspondence to give instructive
examples of mutual assistance: “Pilot Murmylov rushed to the rescue
a Soviet fighter that strayed from the general formation and was attacked
Japanese. Then Akimov saw that for Murmylov’s comradely dedication
risks paying with his own life... A samurai is tailing him.
Akimov immediately makes a decision: to attack the Japanese. The moment when
the Japanese made a U-turn to open fire on Murmylov, Akimov gave two
short queues. Having caught fire, the Japanese went to the ground... Murmylov, before
the last moment, unaware of the presence of a samurai behind him, in
in turn, he saved the pilot, and rushed to his rescue.
In this battle, Akimov finally believed in the principle of mutual gain. A
the next battle convinced him that he could not break away from his own people, that
We must fight wing to wing with our comrades!”
In "Heroic Red Army", which was edited by the regimental
Commissioner D. Ortenberg, in addition to V. Stavsky, writers actively collaborated
B. Lapin, L. Slavin, K. Simonov, 3. Khatsrevin. They could often be seen in
trenches of the front line on the right bank of Khalkhin Gol.
At the same time as the Soviet soldiers, the Cyrics were also preparing for decisive battles.
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army. By mid-August in the area
During the conflict there were the 5th, 6th, and 8th cavalry divisions and the armored brigade of the MPRA.
At the same time, the 5th Division covered the borders of the Tamtsag-Bulak bulge of the MPR in
area of Lake Buir-Nur. Their actions in the conflict area were led by the commander in chief
MNRA Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic X. Choibalsan with the help
operational group consisting of division commander J. Tseren, colonels B. Tsog and
G.Erendo.
The troops of the flanking groups began to secretly occupy the initial areas
The concentration of troops of flank strike groups was completed on the night of
decisive offensive. The artillerymen finished shooting. At the guns
Stacks of shells towered. Fueled at airfields
bombers with bombs attached to them. Fighters are ready to take off...
On May 25, 1939, the Japanese began to concentrate large forces in the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area from the 23rd Infantry Division and Manchurian cavalry, united in a consolidated detachment under the command of the commander of the 64th Infantry Regiment Yamagata.
By May 27, the Japanese brought the 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two battalions), a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division, the 8th Manchurian Cavalry Regiment, part of the 1st and 7th Cavalry Regiments to the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area and up to 40 aircraft.
At dawn on May 28, the Japanese-Manchus launched a surprise attack and, pushing back the Mongolian 15th Cavalry Regiment and the left-flank company of Bykov's detachment, deeply engulfed the left flank of all units located on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, threatening the crossing. The Mongol-Soviet units, poorly controlled, retreated in disarray to the Sandy Hills, 2–3 km northeast of the mouth of the Khaylastyn-Gol River, where they delayed the enemy’s advance.
At this time, the 149th Infantry Regiment, which arrived in vehicles from Tamtsak-Bulak, without waiting for the concentration of all forces, entered the battle on the move. Units of the 149th Regiment acted unorganized, without interaction with artillery. Control of the battle was poorly organized, and with the onset of darkness it was completely lost. The battle with separate groups lasted all night.
At dawn on May 29, contact was established with the command post of the 57th Special Corps, which at that time was located in Tamtsak-Bulak.
On the morning of May 29, the units, brought into order, resumed the offensive with the goal of pushing the enemy beyond the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. By 16:00 on May 29, the 149th Infantry Regiment reached Remizov Heights, but could not advance further.
At this time, observers reported that enemy convoys were approaching from the east. The head of the task force concluded that the enemy had brought in fresh forces and gave the order to withdraw to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. This order was approved by the commander of the 57th Special Corps. The units began to retreat to the west bank in a disorganized manner; when leaving the battle, no one controlled them. The corps command was not aware of the ongoing battle.
In operational report No. 014, the staff reporter reported that our units retreated to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River under enemy pressure, while the enemy, exhausted by the battles, leaving behind cover of snipers, himself hastily went abroad in those vehicles whose approach was detected by observers. Our reconnaissance was unable to reveal the enemy’s departure abroad until June 3, and only on June 3, reconnaissance of the 149th Infantry Regiment established that there was no enemy on the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic.
The very first air battles revealed the superiority of Japanese aviation. The first combat clash between Soviet fighter aircraft and enemy fighters occurred at 12:20 p.m. 22nd of May. On the Soviet side, three I-16 and two I-15 fighters took part in the battle, and on the Japanese side, five I-96 fighters. In this battle, one I-16 and, presumably, one Japanese fighter burned out.
On May 27, an I-16 squadron consisting of eight aircraft was in an ambush with the task of taking off and destroying an enemy air force when it appeared. In total, during this day the squadron made four alert sorties. During the first three flights there were no encounters with the enemy, but two pilots burned out the engines of their cars. During the fourth flight, the squadron commander's engine did not start. He ordered the pilots who started the engines to take off before him. The pilots took off and headed towards the front. The squadron commander, having started the engine, was the last to take off. Six I-16 fighters followed to the front one or two at a time, gaining altitude along the route to the front. At the front, these single aircraft, being at an altitude of 2000–2200 m, met with two flights of enemy fighters that were in formation. After the first attacks carried out by our planes, the battle turned into pursuit, since our planes, after the first attack, made coups and began to leave, and the enemy, being higher, pursued them to the airfield and even shot them after landing.
As a result, of the six crews that took off, two pilots were killed (including the squadron commander), one pilot was wounded, two pilots burned out their engines, and one pilot landed on the airfield with holes in the plane.
On the same day, May 27, the command of the 57th Special Corps had an unpleasant conversation over a direct line with the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, who expressed Moscow's great dissatisfaction with the losses of Soviet aviation.
The next day, May 28, two squadrons flew to the combat area: one consisting of ten I-15 fighters and the second - consisting of ten I-16s. While in the air, the chief of staff received an order from the air brigade commander to put 20 I-15 aircraft on combat readiness, which was carried out. After some time, a new order was received: “Planes should fly to the area of operation of ground troops.” After the first flight took off, the order came: “Stop the flight.” The chief of staff reported that one flight had already taken off. The order “Stop the flight” was confirmed and carried out (instead of twenty fighters, an I-15 flight flew out, which did not return from the front).
Two squadrons I-15 and I-16, flying to the front, did not meet the enemy and returned to their airfield. After their landing, the regiment commander received the order: “Prepare for a second flight in the same composition.” Before the regiment commander had time to give instructions to the squadrons to prepare for departure, he received an order for the immediate departure of two squadrons. The regiment commander reported that the I-15 squadron was not yet ready to take off, but despite this, the order to take off was confirmed: “The I-16 squadron should take off without waiting for the I-15 squadron to be ready.” This order was carried out. After 25–30 minutes, ten I-15s took off, led by the assistant regiment commander.
The ten I-16 fighters that took off did not meet the enemy and returned to the airfield, and the ten I-15s remaining in the air met 15–18 enemy aircraft and entered into battle with them.
According to reports from pilots and eyewitnesses who watched the battle from the ground, after the first attack the Japanese managed to set fire to the plane of the assistant regiment commander. The pomcomm put out his car, but the Japanese who was pursuing him at low level attacked him and shot him down.
The squadron commander was wounded in the head and lost consciousness. Almost at the very ground, he regained consciousness, managed to level the car and returned safely to his airfield.
After the lieutenant commander and squadron commander left the battle, the remaining I-15 fighters scattered, began to leave the battle and return to their airfield. According to eyewitnesses who watched the battle from the ground, the Japanese began to pursue single Soviet aircraft and shoot them down. If the I-15s had not fled in panic from the battle, but had fought, supporting each other, such losses would not have occurred. As a result, of the ten pilots who took off, four were killed in action, one was missing, two were wounded, one pilot jumped out of a burning plane with a parachute and appeared in his unit two days later, and one pilot returned to his airfield with numerous holes in the plane. The enemy still had no losses.
By the end of June, the Japanese concentrated in the combat area the entire 23rd Infantry Division, the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments, the 26th Infantry Regiment and part of the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division, the 4th, 5th the 1st and 12th Manchu Cavalry Regiments and the remnants of the 1st, 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. They reinforced these units with artillery from units of the Kwantung Army. In addition, the Japanese pulled in at least two hundred aircraft from different areas of Manchuria, from the Chinese front and from Japan.
The enemy's goal was a sudden and quick defeat of the Soviet units and a strike with the main forces through Mount Bain-Tsagan on the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
According to the plan of the Japanese command, the offensive of ground forces should have been preceded by the defeat of Soviet aviation at airfields and the conquest of air supremacy. The strike group under the command of Major General Kobayashi, consisting of the 71st and 72nd infantry regiments, reinforced with artillery, had the task of crossing Khalkhin Gol north of Mount Bain-Tsagan on the night of July 2-3 and moving south, cutting off the escape route to our units. The 26th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel Sumi, mounted on vehicles, had the task of operating on the advancing flank of the strike group and preventing the approach of our reserves, and if our units retreated, pursuing them. The crossing and advancement of the strike group was ensured by the 23rd Engineer Regiment. The crossing was covered by a detachment consisting of one squadron of the 23rd Cavalry Regiment, an infantry platoon and a machine gun company of the 64th Infantry Regiment.
The pinning group under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka, consisting of the 64th Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion), a battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment, the 4th, 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments of the Khingan Division, the 3rd and 4th th tank regiments had the task during July 1 and 2 to provide a flank march and concentration in the initial area for the attack of the strike group, and on July 3 to advance, covering the left flank of the Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol with infantry and tank regiments, and the right flank with cavalry , and destroy Soviet units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol.
July 1939 Khalkhin-Gol. Soviet pilots play dominoes during a break between battles. I-16 fighter in the background
D4Y2 dive bomber
A reserve detachment under the command of Colonel Ika, consisting of one battalion of the 64th Infantry Regiment, the 23rd Cavalry Regiment and one battery, moved behind the strike group.
The command of the 57th Special Corps had information about the concentration of the enemy in the area of Jinjin-Sume and Lake Yanhu and expected the enemy to attack. It was only unclear where the enemy would direct the main blow. Therefore, it was decided to pull up reserves from Tamtsak-Bulak and concentrate them by the morning of July 3 in the area of Mount Bayin-Tsagan.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command is taking emergency measures to strengthen the Air Force. On May 29, a group of ace pilots led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from the Central Moscow Airfield on three Douglas transport aircraft to the site of hostilities. Another group of experienced pilots, who had already fought in Spain and China, was sent by train. In Chita, the pilots received planes, flew around them and went to the front line.
By June 22, 1939, the Air Force of the 57th Special Corps included: 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment - 60 I-16 fighters and 24 I-15 fighters; 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment - 35 I-16s and 32 I-15s; 150th mixed air regiment - 57 SB bombers and 38th medium bomber regiment - 59 SB. A total of 267 aircraft.
The enemy air force included: 1st combat detachment - 25 I-97 fighters and 19 reconnaissance aircraft; 11th combat detachment - 50 I-97; 24th combat detachment - 25 I-97; 59th combat detachment - 25 I-97; 10th mixed combat detachment - 27 scouts; 15th mixed combat detachment - 30 scouts; 12th and 61st combat detachments - 19 heavy bombers each. A total of 239 aircraft.
In the twentieth of June 1939, major air battles broke out in the area of Lake Bunr-Nur, in which Soviet aviation took revenge on the Japanese. On June 22, three air battles took place involving 95 Soviet fighters against 120 Japanese. On June 24, three air battles also took place involving 96 Soviet fighters against 60 Japanese. On June 26 there was one air battle of 50 Soviet fighters against 60 Japanese. In these battles, the Soviet side lost 23 fighters, mainly I-15s, and the Japanese lost 64 aircraft.
The Japanese, stunned by such an unexpected outcome of the air battles, decided to respond with a surprise attack on Soviet airfields. Early in the morning of June 27, 23 Japanese bombers, covered by 80 fighters, attacked the aircraft stands of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment in the Tamtsak-Bulak area. The Japanese managed to achieve tactical surprise, and our I-16s took off during the raid. According to Soviet data, only three aircraft were lost in the air battle, and the Japanese had five aircraft shot down.
At the same time, the parking lot of the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment was attacked. The telephone line connecting the air surveillance posts and the command of the 70th Air Regiment was cut by Japanese saboteurs. As a result, according to Soviet data, 16 I-15 and I-16 aircraft were destroyed, but the Japanese had no losses.
Soviet tank crews inspect a Japanese Type 95 Ha-go tank abandoned on the battlefield. Khalkhin Gol. July 1939
The Japanese began their ground offensive on the night of July 2-3. At 9 o'clock in the evening, Soviet units - the 3rd battalion of the 149th rifle regiment and the 6th battery of the 175th artillery regiment, which were in combat guard - were attacked by tanks and infantry. The 6th battery of Senior Lieutenant Aleshkin opened fire. In a stubborn battle, the artillerymen knocked out 15 Japanese tanks, but superiority remained on the enemy's side. The tanks broke through to the firing position and tried to crush the guns and fill up the cracks with the soldiers hiding in them. But the light Japanese tanks were unable to cause significant damage. Having broken the rules of the guns and ironed out the cracks with the soldiers, the tanks began to leave. Then the artillerymen jumped out of cover and opened fire on the retreating tanks, knocking out several more vehicles. Turning around, the tanks again attacked the battery. This was repeated three times. Finally the attack was repulsed. About thirty enemy tanks remained on the battlefield, the rest went to Manchurian territory.
The 6th Cavalry Division fought a heavy battle with Japanese troops all night from July 2 to 3 and by dawn retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. Under attacks from the tank regiments of the Yasuoka group, the left flank battalion of the 149th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Tank Brigade were forced to retreat to the river, turning their front to the north.
Kobayashi's strike group, having broken the weak resistance of the 15th Mongolian cavalry regiment, approached the river in the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan and began crossing. By 8 a.m. on July 3, the Japanese had crossed to the other side and quickly moved south. The position of the troops located on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol became threatening, since there were no Soviet-Mongolian units on the western bank, except for the 3rd division of the 185th artillery regiment and the command post of the 175th artillery regiment. But the determination and resourcefulness of the commander of the 175th artillery regiment, Major N.I. Polyansky saved the situation. As the senior commander who was there, he ordered the commander of the approaching armored division of the 6th Cavalry Division to cover the crossing and the road to Tamtsak-Bulak. The armored division acted boldly and decisively. Instead of defending himself, he attacked the advancing Japanese troops, sowing panic among them and forcing them to stop. Having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, the division retreated and occupied a position convenient for defense.
At 10 a.m. on July 3, the 11th Tank Brigade began its offensive. The brigade attacked in two groups - from south to north along the Khalkhin Gol River with one battalion and from west to east with two battalions supporting the brigade's artillery division. At that time, the artillery division had six SU-12 self-propelled guns, which were an unarmored GAZ-AAA vehicle with a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 on a pedestal installation.
Together with the 11th tank brigade, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and a detachment of Mongolian cavalry were supposed to advance, but they launched the attack “without interaction with the tank brigade organized in time and place.” There was no artillery support for the tank brigade at the beginning of the attack, and only at the end of the battle “weak” artillery fire was opened.
Nevertheless, the attack by 132 tanks made a great impression on the Japanese - they had never seen anything like it in China. The tanks passed through the Japanese positions and turned back near the Japanese crossing of Khalkhin Gol. This raid cost the brigade 36 damaged and 46 burned tanks, and more than two hundred crew members were killed.
Meanwhile, the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment left in a completely different place, called “Ruins,” and only in the afternoon turned south. At 13:30, having deployed into battle formation south of Lake Khuhu-Usu-Nur, the 24th Regiment went on the offensive, striking from west to east. At 15:00 the 7th motorized armored brigade under the command of Colonel Lesovoy entered the battle.
Japanese aircraft continuously attacked our positions. The enemy found himself surrounded in the area of Mount Bayin-Tsagan from the northwest, west and south. A river flowed from the east. But the Japanese managed to quickly gain a foothold on Mount Bain-Tsagan, organized an anti-tank defense and put up stubborn resistance. The battle lasted all day on July 3. At about seven o'clock in the evening, Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a simultaneous attack from three sides, but the Japanese repelled it. The battle continued after dark.
On the morning of July 4, the Japanese attempted to launch a counterattack, while a large group of Japanese aircraft attempted to attack the Soviet-Mongolian units from the air. But Soviet pilots entered the battle and forced the Japanese planes to return to their airfields. The Japanese, who launched a counterattack, were met by hurricane fire from Soviet artillery and quickly retreated to their fortifications.
On the evening of July 4, Soviet-Mongolian units launched a third general attack along the entire front. The battle lasted all night, the Japanese tried to hold Mount Bain-Tsagan at all costs. Only by 3 o'clock in the afternoon on July 5 was the enemy's resistance broken. Unable to withstand the onslaught of Soviet-Mongolian units, especially Soviet tanks, the Japanese fled in disarray to the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. But the only pontoon bridge built by the Japanese for the crossing had already been blown up by the Japanese themselves. In panic, Japanese soldiers and officers rushed into the water and drowned in front of the Soviet tank crews. The remnants of the Japanese on the west bank were destroyed in hand-to-hand combat. Only the swampy banks and the deep riverbed of Khalkhin Gol prevented our tanks and armored vehicles from crossing to the eastern bank.
After the Bain-Tsagan battles, the Japanese command tried more than once to defeat the Soviet-Mongolian units on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. So, on the night of July 7-8, the Japanese launched a strike from the Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo area on the right-flank 2nd battalion of the 149th Infantry Regiment and on the battalion of the 5th Rifle-Machine-Gun Brigade, which by this time had approached the area military operations. This battalion defended to the left of the 149th Infantry Regiment. The blow was unexpected, and the 2nd battalion with the 5th battery attached to it began to retreat, while the 1st battalion with the 4th battery continued to repel enemy attacks. At dawn, this battalion was forced to leave the occupied line.
Thus, as a result of these battles, the Soviet-Mongolian units retreated and took up positions at heights 3–4 km from the river.
On July 11, the Japanese launched a new attack in the direction of Remizov Heights. Having a significant superiority in forces, the enemy captured the heights, but his further advance was stopped by artillery fire and tank counterattacks.
After July 11, the sides, taking up defensive positions, continued to concentrate additional troops. Thus, units of the 82nd Infantry Division began to arrive in the combat area from the Ural Military District. The division included two artillery regiments. The 82nd light artillery regiment consisted of twenty 76-mm guns mod. 1902/30 g and sixteen 122-mm howitzers mod. 1910/30, and the 32nd Howitzer Regiment had twelve 152 mm howitzers.
Somewhat later, the 57th Infantry Division with the 57th Artillery Regiment, the 212th Airborne Brigade, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 85th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, and the 37th and 85th separate anti-tank artillery divisions arrived.
Corps artillery also appeared for the first time: the 185th Corps Artillery Regiment, consisting of twenty-four 107-mm guns mod. 1910/30 and twelve 152-mm guns mod. 1934; 1st division of the 126th artillery regiment (twelve 107 mm guns) and 1st brigade of the 297th heavy artillery regiment (four 122 mm guns model 1934).
On June 1, the deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District, G. K. Zhukov, was urgently summoned to Moscow. The next morning he was received by Voroshilov and received orders to fly to Mongolia. On the same day, June 2, at 16:00, a plane carrying Zhukov and several General Staff officers took off from the Central Airfield. On the morning of June 5, Zhukov arrived in Tamtsak-Bulak, at the headquarters of the 57th Special Corps, where he met with N.V. Feklenko. Zhukov traditionally began with a scolding: “... is it possible to control troops 120 km from the battlefield,” etc. On the same day, Zhukov contacted Moscow. On June 6, an order from People's Commissar Voroshilov came from Moscow to release Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko from the command of the 57th Corps and the appointment of G.K. to this position. Zhukova. Soon, from all the troops concentrated near the Khalkhin Gol River, the 1st Army Group was created under the command of Corps Commander Zhukov.
In July, our aircraft attacked enemy airfields on the territory of Manchukuo several times. So, on July 27, 1939, nine I-16 fighters, under the cover of ten I-16s, took off to attack the Ukhtyn-Obo airfield, 15 km southwest of Ganchzhur, where about twenty enemy fighters were located. The Japanese clearly did not expect the attack. The cars were uncamouflaged, their engines were facing the center of the airfield. The attacking I-16s, with a turn to the left of 10–15° from an altitude of 1200–1500 m, entered a dive and at an altitude of 1000 m opened aimed fire: the leading and right link - at the southern and western groups of aircraft, the left link - at the gas tankers standing behind by planes, and by planes. Three to five long bursts were fired. At an altitude of 300–500 m, the fire was stopped and the planes were taken out of the dive.
Nine I-16s carried out only two attacks, and individual aircraft carried out two or three attacks. 9000-10,000 rounds were fired.
According to reports from the pilots who took part in the attack, four or five aircraft and two gas tankers were on fire at the airfield. All Soviet aircraft returned to base.
On July 29, aircraft of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment attacked a Japanese airfield 7 km north of Lake Uzur-Nur, that is, approximately 12 km deep into Manchurian territory. There were 8–9 fighters and 4–5 bombers at the airfield.
On the first flight at 7:15 am. 19 I-16 vehicles took part in the attack, covered by eight I-16s. The first approach was made in the direction from the sun at an altitude of 2000 m. When the target was detected, the fighters dived onto it, made a slight turn, reached the target and, descending to a height of 150–100 m, opened fire, and then left the attack with the left combat U-turn. After the first attack, two Japanese planes caught fire.
The second approach was made in the direction from south to north, from the side of Lake Uzur-Nur, along the front of the aircraft. The fire opened from a distance of 450–500 m and was conducted in short bursts, moving from one target to another. During this approach, the Japanese fired at the Soviet fighters with anti-aircraft machine guns.
The third approach was made in the direction from northwest to southeast. Before the attack, one Japanese I-97 fighter took off and left at maximum speed in the same direction in which the attack was carried out.
After the third attack, most of the planes had used up their cartridges and shells, but some pilots, including the leader (regiment commander), still had cartridges, which made it possible to make a fourth approach in the direction from southeast to northwest and from make a left turn to your airfield. During the entire attack, eight I-16s covered the assault raid of nineteen I-16s at an altitude of 3500 m.
On the same day at 9:40 a.m. a repeated assault attack was carried out, in which ten I-16 fighters (mostly cannon) took part. The first organized approach was made in the direction from west to east, subsequent approaches (from three to six approaches) were made by separate aircraft (one or two aircraft). There was also no opposition from the enemy; the attacks continued until the cartridges and shells were completely used up.
According to Soviet pilots, as a result of the attack, up to ten enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and two I-97s were shot down on takeoff.
August 2 at 7:25 a.m. The 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment, consisting of 23 I-16s, under the cover of nineteen I-16s, carried out an assault attack on enemy aircraft located at the airfield, 20 km northwest of Jinjin-Sume. The attacked objects at the airfield were aircraft, a camp and a base located 2–3 km northeast of the airfield. The Japanese planes were not dispersed, their engines were facing in different directions, and from the air it seemed that the planes formed a circle. Inside this circle there were tents and yurts, apparently it was a camp. At the base there were many cars, property and yurts, and in the center there was a brick building. All objects at the airfield were not camouflaged.
The attacks were carried out by single aircraft. The withdrawal from the attack took place at an altitude of 100–200 m. During the attack, the attack aircraft managed to fire two to four bursts and transfer fire to other targets. In total, from two to eight passes were made and up to 18 thousand rounds were fired.
According to the pilots' reports, during the attacks up to 12 enemy aircraft were destroyed, of which 6 aircraft were set on fire on the ground, 4 aircraft were set on fire in the air during takeoff, 2 aircraft did not catch fire (apparently they were without fuel), but the whole group attacked them between two and four attacks were carried out. One plane took off and flew north. Burning cars and warehouses were visible.
From August 13 to 18, there were low clouds, passing rains and poor visibility in the combat area, so Soviet aviation did not carry out active operations.
There were no night bombings by the enemy during the entire period of hostilities.
From August 18 to 26, groups of heavy bombers (from 3 to 20 four-engine TB-3 bombers) bombed enemy troop concentrations and artillery positions every night in the areas of Khaylastyn-Gol, Lake Uzur-Nur, Lake Yanhu, Jinjin-Sume and Depden- Sume. The purpose of the night bombing was to “exhaust and destroy the enemy.” Night bombing was carried out by single aircraft from 8 pm to half past three at night at intervals of 15–30 minutes, from an altitude of 500 to 2000 m. The TB-3 bomb load ranged from 1200 to 1800 kg.
An interesting assessment of the actions of the TB-3 bombers was given in a secret publication: “According to the reports of the flight crew and the observations of our advanced ground units, the results of the bombing were excellent. Night bombing exhausted the enemy and at the same time inspired our advanced units.” In one paragraph - both for health and peace! What could the flight crew observe during the bombing? And if at least some result of these bombings had become known, for example, the destruction of an enemy field gun, then this fact would certainly have been included in the report.
Notes:
Shogun is the title of the supreme ruler of the state (leader, military leader).
Melikhov G.V. Manchuria, far and near. M.: Main editorial office of Eastern literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1994. P. 52.
Air combat operations in the Mongolian People's Republic. May-September 1939. M.: Voenizdat, 1940. P. 56.
Over the last ten days of June, the size of the Soviet air group at Khalkhin Gol decreased slightly (see table). This was mainly due to the “knocking out” of obsolete I-15bis in air battles, which had proven their inability to fight on equal terms with Japanese fighters. The low combat potential of the I-15bis was well understood by the Soviet command. In July, the encores were gradually withdrawn from the regiments, forming them into separate airfield cover squadrons.
NUMBER OF SOVIET AIR FORCE IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT AS OF 07/1/39*
|| I-16 | I-15bis | Sat | R-5Sh | TOTAL ||
70th IAP || 40 | 20 | – | – | 60 ||
22nd IAP || 53 | 25 | – | – | 78 ||
38th SBP || – | – | 59 | – | 59 ||
150th SBP || – | – | 73 | 10 | 83 ||
TOTAL || 93 | 45 | 132 | 10 | 280 ||
*Only combat-ready vehicles are shown.
In early July, Soviet aviation in Mongolia received the first samples of new equipment. A squadron of the latest I-153 Chaika fighters, consisting of 15 aircraft, flew from the Union to the Tamsag-Bulak airfield. True, they can be called the newest only by the years of development and production, but in fact they were another modification of the I-15 biplane with retractable landing gear, a more powerful engine and a number of other improvements. But in terms of speed and climb rate, the Chaika was noticeably superior to its predecessor I-15bis, and this could not but affect the results of the battles.
The “Chaika” squadron was headed by Captain Sergei Gritsevets, and at first it was called “Gritsevets Squadron” ‹8› in staff documents.
Participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol (from left to right): Gritsevets, Prachik, Kravchenko, Aorobov, Smirnov.
Subsequently, several dozen more “Seagulls” arrived. For some time they were considered strictly secret, and their pilots were strictly forbidden to fly behind the front line, but by the end of the month this ban was lifted.
Another Soviet novelty that arrived at the front in early July was a squadron of seven I-16P fighters, armed, in addition to two synchronized machine guns, with two wing-mounted 20-mm ShVAK cannons. They decided to use cannon fighters primarily as attack aircraft, for attacks against ground targets. The squadron was included in the 22nd IAP. Its first commander was Captain Evgeny Stepanov ‹23›, already familiar to us.
Colonel Alexander Gusev and commander of the 20th IAP, Major Grigory Kravchenko.
The strength of Japanese aviation at the beginning of July was estimated by our reconnaissance at 312 aircraft: 168 fighters and 144 ‹4› bombers. These figures, as before, were inflated almost three times. In fact, compared to mid-June, no new air units were added to the 2nd Hikoshidan, and taking into account losses, the number of combat-ready aircraft by the end of the month was no more than 100-110 units.
On July 2, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army began an operation codenamed “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” During it, it was planned to cross Khalkhin Gol and, moving along the western bank of the river from north to south, capture crossings, encircle and destroy Soviet troops on the eastern bank.
On the night of July 3, units of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions crossed the river using a pontoon bridge. Having gained a foothold on Mount Bain Tsagan, the Japanese installed artillery and began to quickly build defensive positions. At the same time, two regiments of the 23rd division, as envisaged by the plan, moved along Khalkhin Gol to the south, towards the Soviet crossings. Meanwhile, on the east bank, other Japanese units carried out a diversionary attack.
At dawn, aviation entered the battle. Bombers from the 10th, 15th and 61st Sentai attacked and scattered Mongol cavalry from the 6th MPRA Cavalry Division, thwarting the intended counterattack. Japanese pilots made several flights that day to support ground troops, losing four aircraft to anti-aircraft fire and fighter attacks: two Ki-15s, one Ki-30 and one Ki-21.
At 11.00, tanks from the 11th Tank Brigade, having just arrived at the front and immediately entered the battle, moved to Bayin-Tsagan. The famous “Bain-Tsagan massacre” began, in which Soviet tankers, at the cost of several dozen burned vehicles, broke into the hastily created Japanese defense. At the same time, 73 SB from the 150th and 38th regiments dropped bombs from a height of 3000 m on enemy positions at Khalkhin Gol, Khaylastyn Gol and Lake Yanhu. In the target area they were attacked by Japanese fighters and one plane was shot down.
In addition to the bombers, the Japanese on Bain-Tsagan were attacked several times during the day by I-15bis from the 22nd IAP. With machine-gun fire they shot the infantry in shallow, hastily dug trenches and dispersed the servants of the artillery guns.
At 16.45 the bombers of the 150th Rifle Regiment carried out a second raid. This time their target was the Japanese reserves at the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo hill. One plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire, killing the crew. On the way back, another car became a victim of fighters.
In the reports of Japanese pilots, the two SBs they shot down during the day turned into four. In addition, the Japanese said that they shot down six I-16s, but the Donkeys had no losses that day.
On July 4, Japanese troops, having been defeated in the “Bain-Tsagan massacre,” began to retreat to the eastern bank. Crowds of soldiers gathered at the crossing came under attack from Soviet artillery and aircraft, suffering heavy losses. The first raid by bombers of the 150th SBP under the cover of I-16 took place at 11.00, the second at approximately 15.40.
In both cases, the bombers were subjected to deadly attacks by the Ki-27. Our fighters entered the battle, but were unable to reliably cover their “clients,” although they declared the destruction of five enemy aircraft. In two battles, the Japanese shot down seven bombers and damaged two I-16s (the pilots were injured). 10 SB crew members were killed.
At 16.45 another air battle took place with the participation of 24 I-16s. According to Soviet pilots, in this battle they shot down 11 Japanese fighters. Our pilot Kochubey has gone missing.
The Japanese announced that on July 4 they did not lose a single aircraft, having shot down 10 Soviet bombers, 35 fighters and one P-Z.
On the same day, the first flight of seven I-16Ps to attack enemy positions took place. All vehicles returned to the airfield, but one cannon fighter (possibly damaged by anti-aircraft fire) crashed upon landing.
Airplanes of the 70th IAP at one of the Mongolian airfields.
On July 5, the bombers continued to “work” against enemy troops. They again had to endure a heavy battle with the fighters of the 1st Sentai, in which two SBs from the 38th regiment were shot down. Five crew members were killed.
According to the Japanese, they shot down five SBs and seven I-16s without losses, but Soviet documents say nothing about the participation of our fighters in the battles on July 5 and about any losses among them on that day.
Further, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army announced that on July 6, fighters of the 1st and 24th Sentai fought against 60 Russian fighters and bombers, shooting down 22 I-16s and four SBs. According to Soviet documents, 22 I-16 and 23 I-15bis from the 22nd IAP, flying on an attack mission, were attacked by about thirty I-97 fighters in the area of Lake Uzur-Nur. According to the flight crew, 21 Japanese aircraft were shot down in the battle. Our losses were two I-15bis and two pilots missing: Solyankin and Silin. They were later declared dead. In addition, 18 vehicles returned with holes, and two of them required major repairs.
The bombers lost one vehicle on July 6, but not in battle with the Japanese, but due to an error by the navigator and their own anti-aircraft gunners. The crew of pilot Krasikhin and navigator Panko (the radio operator's last name is not mentioned in the documents), returning from a mission at an altitude of 200 meters, lost their course and came under fire from an anti-aircraft machine gun installation. One of the engines caught fire. Krasikhin made an emergency landing without releasing the landing gear. The pilots were practically unharmed, but the plane burned down.
In total, according to official Japanese data, during the “Second Stage of the Nomonhan Incident,” that is, from July 2 to July 6, fighters of the 1st, 11th and 24th Sentai scored 94 aerial victories. Another five aircraft were assigned to anti-aircraft gunners. Real Soviet losses amounted to 16 vehicles. Over the same five days, our fighters were credited with 32 victories, however, the Japanese admitted the death of only four aircraft ‹33›.
Red Army soldiers watch the air battle.
On July 7, the first combat mission to intercept a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft that appeared over Tamsag-Bulak was made by four I-153s. The flight was unsuccessful: while the Seagulls were gaining altitude, the Japanese managed to disappear into the clouds. From July 8 to July 12, I-153 took off several more times on alert when enemy “photographers” appeared over their airfield, but none of the interceptions were successful. A much better chance was given by the constant duty of fighters in the air, but this would lead to rapid wear of the engines, and therefore was considered inappropriate.
Due to heavy losses in early July, Soviet bombers had to subsequently increase their operational ceiling from 2500-3000 meters to 6800-7500. At these heights they became invulnerable to both anti-aircraft guns and fighters for a long time. True, the accuracy of bombing naturally decreased. On July 8, 9, 13, 14 and 15, SB crews bombed Japanese troops on the front line and in the operational rear. All these raids took place without losses, and it is difficult to say how effective they turned out to be.
On the night of July 7-8, the first combat sorties on Khalkhin Gol were carried out by TB-3 heavy bombers. Three planes dropped 16 100-kilogram bombs on the city of Ganzhur. According to crew reports, as a result of the bombing, “the city center was covered in smoke.” A few days earlier, the “TB Third” squadron from the 4th heavy bomber regiment (4th heavy bomber regiment) of the Trans-Baikal Military District flew to the Mongolian Obo-Somon airfield. The squadron included six “warships,” as these huge machines were called in documents of that time. Later, several more squadrons were added to them, so that by the end of July, 23 four-engine giants were already operating in the Khalkingol theater of operations. The squadron, and subsequently the TB-3 group, was headed by Major Egorov.
Since low flight performance combined with its large size made the TB-3 too vulnerable to both anti-aircraft guns and fighters, these bombers were used only at night. Combat sorties were usually carried out by single vehicles, less often in pairs. As a rule, the crews started at 17-18 hours, that is, before darkness, and crossed the front line as night fell. The average duration of a combat mission was 7-8 hours.
Bombs were dropped from heights of no more than 2500 meters (usually 1000-1500 m). Mostly small-caliber ammunition was used (FAB-10, FAB-32, FAB-50 and illumination), less often FAB-100. They bombed the squares. The main task was to wear down the enemy, although sometimes there were successful hits, after which the Japanese collected the dead and put out the fires.
In case of emergency landings, an alternate airfield with a searchlight was equipped between Tamsag-Bulak and Mount Khamar-Daba, but it was not necessary to use it. Although in almost every raid the Japanese opened indiscriminate anti-aircraft fire and tried to catch the bombers with searchlight beams, during the entire battle they did not hit TB-3 even once. In this regard, our pilots noted the poor training of the Japanese anti-aircraft gunners and the inconsistency of actions between the anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight gunners ‹4›.
Japanese pilots from the 24th Fighter Sentai near the airfield autostarter. The starter rod is connected to the ratchet of the propeller hub of the Ki-27 fighter. The far left in the picture is Corporal Katsuki Kira, who, according to official Japanese data, won nine (according to another source - 24) air victories at Khalkhin Gol.
Only once on one vehicle was the engine damaged by a shell fragment. But the plane returned to Obo-Somon and landed normally on three engines.
The raids continued until 26 August every night when the weather permitted. During this time, TB-3s flew 160 combat missions, losing only one bomber, which crashed during landing on the night of July 28 due to the simultaneous failure of two engines. The commissar of the 100th air brigade, Kirillov, who was in the front cockpit, was killed; the remaining crew members were not injured ‹4›.
In addition to combat work, TB-3s were actively involved in transport operations. They transported the wounded from the combat area to Chita (up to 20 people could be accommodated in the fuselage and wings), and flew back with medicine, ammunition, correspondence and other urgent cargo.
Let us return, however, to the description of the combat work of fighters. On July 9, according to Soviet data, three I-97s and one I-16 were shot down in an air battle. Pilot Pashulin escaped by parachute. The Japanese report nothing about their losses that day.
On the morning of July 10, 40 I-16s and 26 I-15bis from the 22nd IAP took off to attack Japanese positions. At an altitude of 3000 m they met up to 40 Ki-27s and engaged them in battle. Soon reinforcements approached both sides - 37 I-16s from the 70th IAP and up to 20 Ki-27s that arrived from the Japanese side of Khalkhin Gol. The battle lasted approximately 20 minutes, after which the Japanese retreated to their territory. Ours announced the destruction of 11 enemy aircraft with the loss of three I-16s. Pilots of the 22nd IAP Spivak, Piskunov and Prilepsky went missing.
Four more, among them the assistant commander of the 22nd regiment, Captain Balashev, were wounded. Despite being fatally wounded in the head, Balashev managed to return to the airfield and land. On July 13, he died in hospital. On August 29, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
The Japanese announced the destruction of 64 (!) Soviet fighters on July 10 and admitted the loss of one Ki-27.
The next major air battle took place on July 12. On the Soviet side, 39 I-16s from the 22nd IAP, as well as nine I-16s and 15 I-15bis from the 70th Regiment took part in it; from the Japanese, according to our pilots, “up to 50” I-97s. Soviet pilots claimed 16 aerial victories, Japanese pilots - 11.
In fact, ours lost one plane (the pilot escaped by parachute), and the Japanese lost three. In one of them, the Japanese ace Mamoru Hamada was killed. Hamada is the first of the imperial aces who met his death at Khalkhin Gol. By the time of his death, he had 17 victories in his combat account. Another Japanese, the commander of the 1st Sentai, Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Kato, parachuted out of a burning car over Mongolian territory, but was taken out by another Japanese pilot, Sergeant Toshio Matsumura, who landed his fighter near his landing site. The lieutenant colonel, who received severe burns, returned to flying work only in 1941.
http://www.usovski.ru/
12/23/2007
Part 1 The military conflict of the summer of 1939 between the MPR and Manchukuo, in which the USSR and the Empire of Japan acted as allies of the warring parties, brought the Soviet Union, in addition to a purely military victory, also significant political preferences - in the summer of 1941, the Japanese army, which received a cruel lesson from Nomonhana was forced to cede the palm to the fleet in solving strategic problems, forget about plans for war with the USSR and agree with the southern direction of future Japanese aggression. This is all true. But there was one page left in the history of this incident, which Soviet (and Russian) historians tried to scroll through without delving into details - and this page is dedicated to the three-day battles for Mount Bain-Tsagan, battles that, although formally ended in our victory, but at the same time a time that completely crossed out all the fundamental postulates of tactics and strategy on which the Red Army was created and developed. We will carefully study this page - in order to understand why an armored armada numbering almost half a thousand armored units, which, according to Soviet strategists, should crush enemy corps and armies, could not cope with a single enemy division, and, not only that, it could not cope - was half destroyed by this division. Why, from the hot Mongolian steppes of July 1939, let us return twenty years ago, to Moscow, to the General Staff of the Red Army, where at that time the Soviet theory of the “Deep Operation” was created. The name of the Soviet military theorist of the 20s, corps commander Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafilov, became known again to the general public in the 90s of the last century thanks to the efforts of the fugitive spy (and part-time “historian”) Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who sculpted his epochal opuses under the pseudonym “Victor” Suvorov". It was thanks to Mr. Rezun that the reading public heard about the theory of “deep operations”, developed in two books by the above-mentioned outstanding theorist - “The Scope of Operations of Modern Armies,” which was published in 1925, and “The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies,” which was published four years later. This theory was declared by Mr. Rezun to be an epoch-making discovery in the field of military sciences, its developer was appointed by this author as a military genius, and all similar theories developed abroad were recognized as a pathetic copy of the creation of a tragic death in the prime of life (July 12, 1931, Corps Commander V.K. Triandafillov died in a plane crash) by Soviet Moltke. In the opinion of the above-mentioned fugitive Stirlitz, the idea of blitzkrieg developed by the German General Staff was an insignificant parody of the theory of “deep operation”, and Guderian, Manstein and Brauchitsch were, in the firm conviction of Mr. Rezun, nothing more than despicable plagiarists who stole this brilliant idea. Unfortunately, along with the military geniuses Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Yakir and Uborevich (and others like them) who were villainously shot in the basements of the Lubyanka, the Great Military Theory also sank into oblivion - which is why the catastrophe of June 1941 and all our other sorrows and misfortunes at the beginning of the war occurred. Yes, it is undoubtedly damn tempting to recognize Russia as the birthplace of the idea of lightning war. It’s nice to think that it was not seasoned military professionals - German generals - but our geniuses, former lieutenants and non-commissioned officers of the tsarist army, who found a brilliant way out of the hopeless positional impasse of the First World War. But, unfortunately, this will not be true - no matter how much we would like the opposite. And there is nothing worse than deceiving yourself... While there was no war, the theory of “deep operation”, at the very least, served as the theoretical basis for the strategy (and operational art) of the Red Army. On its postulates, the army was built, the staffs of formations and units were formed, exercises were conducted (the most famous were the Kyiv 1935 and the Belarusian 1936), military equipment was ordered and command personnel were trained. And then the war began. And not even a war, but a “military conflict” - in the distant Mongolian steppes on the border with Manchuria, near the hitherto unknown Khalkhin Gol river. From the point of view of the Soviet General Staff, this was an ideal opportunity to test in practice the theory of “deep operations” in, so to speak, laboratory conditions, without serious risk and with minimal losses. The theory of “deep operation” required creating a serious superiority in forces over the enemy - this superiority was created (against 25 Japanese battalions we had 35, against their 1283 machine guns we had 2255, against their 135 field guns we fielded 220, against their 142 anti-tank and We had 286 battalion guns). The theory of “deep operation” required concentrating large tank masses in the direction of the main attack - these masses were concentrated (against 120 light Japanese tanks and armored cars we fielded 498 tanks and 346 armored vehicles). In general, everything was done - and the result? As a result, we won. In two months of fighting, we killed 17,045 Japanese soldiers and officers, and wounded at least more than thirty thousand more, we captured almost all the heavy equipment of two Japanese divisions and two separate artillery regiments, we forever discouraged the Japanese from trying to break the Red Army and... we forever (as it seemed then) Bain-Tsagan’s theory of “deep operation” was buried in the sands. And the 11th light tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. did this. Yakovleva. On the night of July 3, General Kobayashi's strike force (23rd Infantry Division consisting of the 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments, 26th Infantry Regiment, two separate artillery divisions) began crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River in the area of Mt. Bain-Tsagan and by eight o'clock in the morning, having completely crossed, captured this commanding height, after which, having gained a foothold, she sent reconnaissance patrols to the south. In order to reverse a very dangerous situation (the Japanese were threatening the supply of all Soviet-Mongolian troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol), the commander of the 1st Army Group, Komkor Zhukov, ordered his mobile reserve to strike the Japanese and throw them back across the river. At 9 o'clock in the morning, the 11th separate light tank brigade came into combat contact with the Japanese - and from that moment the Battle of Bain-Tsagan began. What were the Japanese like when they broke through to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol? According to “Nomonhan. Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat 1939″, the 23rd Infantry Division (two of its infantry regiments crossed to the west bank) had about 12 thousand soldiers and officers, 17 37-mm Type 94 anti-tank guns, 36 75-mm field guns Type 38 cannons (a licensed Krupp gun, akin to our “three-inch”) and 12 100-mm howitzers (although it is unknown whether the Japanese transported them to the west bank), plus each infantry battalion had two 70-mm battalion howitzers howitzers. In addition, in separate divisions, the Japanese had four more batteries of anti-tank guns - in total, Kobayashi’s group could count on 33 anti-tank guns. I must say, not very much. As of the morning of July 3, the 11th OLTB had 156 BT-5 light tanks. Together with the tankers, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade (154 armored vehicles BA-6, BA-10, FAI), the armored division of the 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division (18 armored vehicles BA-6), assigned as reinforcement to the 3rd battalion of the 11th tank brigade, and the armored division of the 8th Mongolian cavalry division (19 armored vehicles BA-6 and BA-10), which assisted the 2nd battalion of the above-mentioned brigade. Thus, against one slightly reinforced Japanese infantry division, which had thirty-three anti-tank guns, the Soviet-Mongolian units fielded about three hundred and forty armored units - in other words, for each Japanese anti-tank gun there were ten of our tanks and armored vehicles. The Japanese, however, also had various kinds of exotic devices in the role of “anti-tank weapons”, such as suicide bombers with mines on bamboo poles carefully painted by Soviet propaganda - but these delights had no real combat value. If we put aside the whole heap of propaganda chaff that thickly covers the events at Bain-Tsagan, then we can sadly state an extremely unpleasant fact. The Soviet-Mongolian armored fist not only did not defeat the Japanese in the first few hours of the battle - but, in fact, was defeated by them. Yes, yes, it was destroyed, and only the help of the 149th and 24th rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and several separate artillery divisions that arrived later, helped correct the situation, which threatened to develop into a disaster. The 11th OLTB, 7th MBB and two Mongolian armored divisions spent the whole day unsuccessfully attacking the Japanese who barely had time to dig in - and by the end of July 3, having lost more than half of their tanks and armored vehicles, they were forced to abandon the idea of capturing Mount Bain-Tsagan. The 11th OLTB irretrievably lost 84 tanks that day, and the losses of the 7th motorized armored brigade and Mongolian armored divisions, according to Zhukov’s dull admission, “were even greater.” The Japanese, not only were not completely defeated by our tank ram - on the morning of July 4 they launched a counterattack - and this became the moment of truth. Thus, the whole theory of “deep operation”, which assumed that a huge numerical superiority in forces and means in itself guarantees victory, went to hell! The Japanese have completely refuted the delights of the armchair strategists of the Trotskyist school! One infantry division, very poorly equipped with anti-tank defense equipment, hastily dug in in a foreign steppe, had very limited supplies of ammunition - putting up against the enemy’s tank armada the fortitude and determination to die, but not surrender - survived and held its positions. And 340 tanks and armored vehicles could not do anything with it! Yes, by four o'clock in the morning on July 5, the Japanese resistance was finally broken. They left more than three thousand corpses on the slopes of Mount Bayin-Tsagan; most of the artillery of the 23rd division was destroyed by Soviet-Mongolian troops. Strength, as we know, breaks straw - but what is characteristic of this battle? The Japanese retreated to the eastern bank of the river, and, so that avid communist propagandists did not talk about this, they did it of their own free will. The possibilities of resistance were exhausted, the trick, as they say, failed - therefore, it was necessary to leave. No crowds of sad prisoners, no captured banners - the Japanese left only their fallen and their broken guns on the slopes of the mountain; They left, taking the wounded with them, yielding to the superior forces of the enemy, so that on the other side they could start all over again. Such a retreat is worth other victories! This did not happen at all because our tankers turned out to be weaker in spirit than the enemy - with the strength of spirit, courage and determination of the guys of brigade commander Yakovlev, everything was in order, and the terrible losses of this brigade speak precisely of this. The defeat of our armored forces at Bain-Tsagan did not happen on July 3, 1939 - it happened much earlier, in November 1931, when the future Marshal Tukhachevsky became deputy people's commissar of defense for armaments, and when the theory of “deep operation”, somehow imperceptibly suddenly became the brainchild of Mikhail Nikolaevich, it was firmly established in Soviet military doctrine. And it is precisely this theory that the Red Army owes to the appearance in its ranks of huge numbers of T-26 and BT tanks with “cardboard” armor! The Soviet Union, straining all its strength, built the tank hordes ordered by Marshal Tukhachevsky (by 1939, more than 11,000 T-26s and about 6,000 BTs were built) - which, according to the outstanding strategist, should fall on the enemy on M-Day and crush him with their mass. It was precisely according to this scenario, by the way, that the famous maneuvers of 1935 and 1936 were built - in them, colossal tank armadas appeared before the eyes of amazed foreign observers, breaking into the “enemy’s” defenses with extraordinary ease. The theory of “deep operation” seemed to have finally acquired flesh and blood, or rather, steel and fire - and, in the opinion of Trotskyist military leaders, there was no force in the world capable of withstanding the blow of these colossal tank masses. Why the battle on July 3, 1939 was so catastrophic for the Soviet armored forces - we will tell you in the second part of this essay. Being an instrument of permanent revolution, the theory of “deep operation” suffered from the same thing as the entire Trotskyist-Marxist ideology - isolation from life, scolding, dogmatism, and most importantly - the fallacy of the initial data. Why did Soviet Russia miserably lose the Polish war? Why did Comrade Tukhachevsky’s “campaign on the Vistula” end in the almost complete extermination of the troops of the Western Front? Why did the Soviet government have to sign the disgusting Peace of Riga, which left half of Ukraine and half of Belarus under the heel of the Polish interventionists? Because of fatal errors in basic planning. Blinded by successes in Russia, the Bolsheviks extrapolated the experience of their struggle with the “internal” counter-revolution to the conflict with the newborn Poland - and they lost, they could not help but lose. Hoping for a “revolutionary explosion” among the poor strata of Polish society, the Bolshevik leadership deliberately did not notice the national factor - which, to the deep regret of Messrs. Trotsky and Co., turned out to be much stronger than the class factor; moreover, it was the national factor, or, in other words, the national self-awareness of the Polish people, the threat to their national self-identity, the threat of losing their newly gained independence - that allowed Pilsudski to mobilize the hitherto fleeing Polish army and, hitting the flank of Tukhachevsky’s hordes approaching the Vistula, defeat the Western front, capturing more than a hundred thousand people as prisoners alone; The losses of the Red Army in heavy weapons and ammunition could not be counted at all. But since ancient times, repeatedly attacking a rake has been considered a national sport in Russia; and the military theorists of the young Red Army, having set out to create a theory of the coming war, again repeated this maneuver - how could it be otherwise? After all, their supreme guru was the Great and Terrible Walker on the Vistula - Comrade Tukhachevsky! This comrade was a well-known theorist of a future war and the revolutionary liberation of Europe and Asia from the “oppression of capital” - to whom other propagandists of the permanent revolution, such as Ilya Dubinsky (who in his book “Rising India” glorified the future campaign of the Red Army for the Hindu Kush) or Vitaly Primakov ( after serving as a military attache in Kabul, he burst out with the opus “Afghanistan on Fire”, in which he demanded the immediate introduction of a “limited contingent of Soviet troops” - note that this book was written in 1930!). Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideological basis of the theory of “deep operation” belonged entirely to Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky - behind whose left shoulder Lev Davydovich Trotsky’s beard loomed... What were the ideas of Comrade Tukhachevsky in relation to the analysis of a future war? Comrade Tukhachevsky did not bother himself with questions of the balance of forces, studying mobilization resources, analyzing the staffing structures of enemy divisions and corps - why? After all, the future war will not be a war of nations, but a war of classes! Therefore, there is no point in studying the equipment and weapons of the armies of neighboring countries - it will be enough to scatter several million leaflets over their territories - and victory is in your pocket! But of course! After all, “the working class of all countries, waging a fierce class struggle with their bourgeoisie, at the same time prevents the attack of the imperialists on our Soviet Union, consciously defending it as the shock brigade of the world proletariat... The defense of the working class of the capitalist countries of their international socialist fatherland, the farm laborers and the poor of the countryside - all this will create a broad base for the revolutionary insurrectionary movement in the rear of our enemies.” Great! Therefore, in the opinion of Comrade Tukhachevsky, the Red Army will not have much need to prepare to fight the enemy seriously - after all, there is a world proletariat! It will be enough just to properly set up campaigning and propaganda - and it’s done! And it was precisely the issue of CORRECT organization of agitation and propaganda that Comrade Tukhachevsky devoted the lion’s share of his military theoretical works. “If we slowly and gradually infuse propaganda forces, their influence will be negligible. A simultaneous noisy infusion of a fresh revolutionary flow is necessary, capable of breaking apathy and spiritualizing the troops with the desire to fight and the desire for victory. But the movement of this flow must necessarily be put on rails. Slogans and theses must be developed in advance, with which the entire propaganda mass must join the troops with complete unanimity. Only under such conditions can successful propaganda be achieved. These attacks must be accompanied by the most intense campaigns - literary, poster and others. The organization of propaganda points at all stages, the widespread use of music, the widespread development of the poster system and the press, the establishment of theaters, etc. - all this can and should give brilliant results.” Instead of developing questions of tactics - “the use of music and the widespread development of a poster system”; instead of creating the theory and practice of operational art - “the simultaneous noisy infusion of a fresh revolutionary flow”; instead of preparing a clear strategy, there is an ephemeral mirage of a “deep operation”; and these people were PREPARING FOR WAR!? However, we must pay tribute to Comrade Tukhachevsky, who from 1931 to 1935 was the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments - in addition to posters and theses, ideological weapons, he still considered it necessary to arm the Red Army with tanks and guns, real weapons, so to speak. But how real? What is the quintessence of the deep operation theory? Creation of absolute superiority over the enemy in forces and means over a fairly wide sector of the front, then a massive attack of tank masses with the support of artillery and infantry to the entire depth of the operational depth of the enemy front, and after it a continuous offensive until the accumulated resources of manpower and equipment are completely exhausted with the goal of capturing enemy territory as much as possible. In which (territory) the propagandists of Comrade Tukhachevsky will immediately begin to engage in “organizing propaganda points at all stages, the widespread use of music, the widespread development of the poster system and the press, the establishment of theaters” - with the goal of the fastest possible “Sovietization” of the occupied territories in order to “expand the basis of war.” For such a modus operandi, weapons with certain properties were required - which Comrade Tukhachevsky ordered from industry; Moreover, the COMBAT capabilities of this weapon were initially sacrificed for its MASSIVENESS - because the theory of “deep operation” did not at all require the tank to be able to successfully conduct a fire battle with an entrenched enemy. The theory of "deep operation" required the tank to REACH the enemy cities deep within its territory - where, welcomed by the revolutionary proletariat, it would be a living symbol of the freedom brought to the oppressed masses. The tanks ordered by Comrade Tukhachevsky (for the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the date of birth of the T-26 is considered to be February 13, 1931, when the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR decided to adopt the Vickers E tank into service with the Red Army) were clearly divided, in accordance with English traditions, into “infantry” and "cruising". “Infantry” tanks (the English “Vickers six-ton”, which became our T-26, with a low-power engine of 90-120 horsepower), assigned to brigade-by-brigade rifle corps and battalion-by-battalion rifle divisions, were supposed to break into the enemy front along with the masses of infantry. “Cruising” (BT series tanks, the ancestor of which was the tank of the American designer Christie) were intended to enhance the blow and develop further success - for which they had powerful engines (American Liberty engines, licensed in the USSR, with a capacity of 500 horsepower) and a mixed type of propulsion - on wheels and tracks. Since the theory of “deep operation” developed by Triandafilov required the creation of maximum superiority over the enemy, these tanks were built in gigantic quantities. But were they an effective weapon against an enemy willing to fight? These tanks WERE NOT such weapons. The first anti-tank guns appeared already in 1918 - which Comrade Tukhachevsky could not help but know. He could not help but know that in the 20s and 30s anti-tank rifles became widely recognized in Europe. For example, the Swiss heavy self-loading repeating anti-tank rifle Soloturn S 18-100, which appeared in 1932, had excellent (relative to the reservation of Soviet tanks) armor penetration indicators - 40 mm armor was hit at a distance of 100 meters, an armor plate of 35 mm penetrated at a distance of 300 meters, and at five hundred meters a sheet of armor steel 27 mm thick made its way. Considering that the armor of both the T-26 and BT did not exceed 25 mm anywhere, their chance of surviving under the fire of these anti-tank rifles was zero. What about the Swiss! The Japanese 20-mm anti-tank rifle “Type 97,” which was part of the machine-gun companies of infantry battalions in pairs (a Japanese infantry division was required to have 72 anti-tank guns of this type) confidently penetrated thirty-millimeter tank armor from 100 meters. But we are only talking about anti-tank rifles! There is no need to talk about serious combat between T-26 and BT tanks and anti-tank guns - here, as they say, there are no options. T-26 and BT tanks could operate successfully on the battlefield and in the depths of the enemy’s defense only in one single case - if the enemy army was demoralized in advance, even before the first shots were fired, and propagandized by Marxist agitators; only under this condition would the gigantic hordes of Soviet cardboard tanks have a chance of victory. AND NO OTHERWISE! On July 3, 1939, one hundred and fifty-six BT-5 tanks of the Eleventh Light Tank Brigade launched an attack on the hastily dug-in Japanese, who had captured Mount Bain-Tsagan from the northwest an hour earlier. From the south, the 7th motorized armored brigade (154 armored vehicles) launched an attack on Mount Bain-Tsagan. We did not act alone - the attack of the Soviet armored fist was supported by two motorized armored divisions of the Mongolian cavalry (34 cannon armored vehicles BA-6 and BA-10). And this attack, which was supposed to wipe out the Japanese division from the face of the earth, ended in failure! The Japanese shot at our tanks from anti-tank guns, from anti-tank rifles, from battalion howitzers, from field guns - and did not retreat a single step! The Japanese did not run headlong towards the Khalkhin Gol crossings - they began to cold-bloodedly shoot our tanks, using everything they had at hand. The Soviet-Mongolian armored group attacked the Japanese from all sides. The 2nd battalion of the 11th tank brigade and the armored division of the 8th Mongolian cavalry division operating jointly with it attacked the enemy from the west, the main forces of the 11th OLTB (its 1st and 3rd battalions and the armored division of the 6th Mongolian cavalry division ) were supposed to attack the Japanese from the north, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade was given the order to strike from the south. The 185th Heavy Artillery Regiment was supposed to support the advancing tanks with fire. We had an abundance of tanks and armored cars, but there was no infantry at all: the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which was supposed to support the actions of the tankers, did not show up to the battlefield, instead going to Lake Khukhu-Usu-Nur instead of Bain-Tsagan. Turning around to attack, the 11th OLTB moved towards the enemy. The Japanese showed restraint and composure - for ten minutes their guns and anti-tank rifles were silent, allowing Soviet tanks to come within effective fire range. And when the BT-5 and BT-7 of Yakovlev’s brigade approached the Japanese trenches at 150-200 meters, they opened fire. The leading battalion, Major Mikhailov, lost 15 tanks in the first few minutes of the battle. The sand curtain raised by the tanks camouflaged the positions of the Japanese anti-tank artillery better than any camouflage nets, and allowed it to shoot our tanks from cover, as if at a shooting range. The guns of our BT-5 and BT-7 turned out to be completely unsuitable for attacking an entrenched enemy - due to the flat firing trajectory and the absence of high-explosive fragmentation shells in the ammunition racks. Not wanting to remain on the battlefield as targets to be shot at, the tanks of the 11th Brigade retreated to their original positions. The second attack of the Yakovlev brigade began at two o'clock in the afternoon, simultaneously with the 7th motorized armored brigade that struck from the south, and turned out to be slightly more successful than the first - the tankers managed to push the Japanese back from the northwestern slopes of Mount Bain-Tsagan to 500-700 meters, paying for this with the loss of more than 30 tanks. The 7th motorized armored brigade, having suffered heavy losses, did not achieve any results at all - and a third attack was scheduled for 19:00, with all the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian armored units from three directions. As one would expect, this attack failed - having lost more than forty armored units, two armored brigades of Soviet troops and two armored divisions of the Mongols rolled back to their original positions. By the end of the day on July 3, more than a hundred columns of thick black smoke rose into the sunset sky of Khalkhin Gol - our damaged tanks and armored vehicles were burning... The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, which looked great in pre-war parades, turned out to be completely useless for a real war, as well as cannon (not to mention machine-gun FAI and BA-20) armored vehicles. Poor observation devices, useless communications, imperfect sights, a meager assortment of cannon shells, the impossibility of normal observation of the battlefield, the absence of a full-fledged commander in the crew (the “commander” on our light tanks is simply a gun loader or gunner) - all this led to to the fact that, having suffered huge losses, the 11th OLTB and 7th MBB were unable to defeat the entrenched Japanese infantry. Plus, the actions of tanks and armored vehicles were not supported by infantry. At dawn on the Fourth of July, the Japanese launched a counterattack against our tanks - and were scattered by cannon and machine-gun fire. But the very fact of this counterattack speaks volumes! All day on the fourth of July and all night on the fifth, the Soviet-Mongolian troops pulled together from everywhere waged a continuous attack on the Japanese positions, and, taking advantage of a colossal superiority in manpower and equipment, by dawn on July 5, they forced the Japanese to leave Mount Bain-Tsagan and retreat to the eastern bank of the river Khalkhin Gol. There was nothing surprising or extra-heroic about this - taking advantage of their overwhelming superiority in artillery, the Soviet troops simply suppressed the defending Japanese with a mass of fire. The tanks, which, in the opinion of the command of the 1st Army Group, should have simply swept the enemy into the river with a dashing attack in a couple of hours on the morning of July 3 - for the next two days, with the infantry slowly advancing behind the barrage of fire, they played the role of assault guns, completely ignoring their tactical purpose, for the sake of which, at the expense of security, they were equipped with powerful motors. The expensive BT-5 and BT-7, thus, were forced to perform the task that the cheap T-26 could have handled quite well - in one day completely depreciating the many years of theoretical delights of the Soviet tank school. The dreams of the theorists of “deep operations” about deep breakthroughs of the enemy front and daring raids deep into its territory were shattered by the prose of life - it turned out that the BT series tanks are absolutely useless for modern warfare, and they cannot be thrown into the attack against infantry at least minimally equipped with anti-tank weapons - there is a very expensive method of suicide for tank crews, and nothing more. The theory of “deep operation” died on the banks of the Khalkhin Gol River - unfortunately, too late; there was only one year and nine months left until June 22, 1941...
The Battle of Bayin-Tsagan is the last nail in the coffin of the military doctrine of Trotsky-Tukhachevsky
The truth is that the theory of “deep operation” was developed by Triandafilov (and then, after the death of the latter, was gracefully appropriated by Tukhachevsky) in the general mainstream of the Trotskyist theory of “permanent revolution” and was, so to speak, its military-theoretical part. Initially, the theory of “deep operation” had the promise of the Trotskyist military school, and in fact came down to breaking through the positional front with monstrous material superiority and developing the operation in depth until supply possibilities were exhausted. In fact, the theory of “deep operation” was created to justify the possibility of defeating any European country in one, maximum two consecutive operations, and its main goal was to seize territory - which was radically different from the theory of blitzkrieg, the main point of which was the defeat of the enemy army. This, by the way, is not surprising - the Germans developed the theory of blitzkrieg to transfer the solution of strategically intractable problems to the operational plane, while the “deep operation” served to “expand the basis of war” by “Sovietizing” the occupied territories and using their resources to successfully end the war.
The criterion of theory is practice. And the burnt tanks of Yakovlev’s brigade, better than hundreds of clever theoretical studies, showed the command of the Red Army that the “deep operation” was a myth, a carefully developed bluff, a dummy and nothing more. And there is no need to try to explain the terrible losses of our tankers by the fact that they were not supported by the infantry, which did not reach the battlefield in time - at the Kiev maneuvers of 1935, the 45th mechanized corps of A.N. Borisenko (as part of the 133rd mechanized brigade of Y.K. Evdokimov and the 134th mechanized brigade of S.I. Bogdanov) counterattacked the “blues”, who captured positions on the eastern bank of the Irpen River, in dense tank formations - doesn’t this remind you of anything?
On May 11, 1939, an undeclared war began on Khalkhin Gol, which in its intensity and the amount of equipment thrown into battle was not inferior to many events of the Great Patriotic War.
Bayin-Tsagan
Perhaps none of the events at Khalkhin Gol in May-September 1939 causes as much controversy as the battle for Mount Bain-Tsagan on July 3-5. Then the 10,000-strong Japanese group managed to secretly cross Khalkhin Gol and begin moving towards the Soviet crossing, threatening to cut off the Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river from the main forces.
The enemy was accidentally discovered and, before reaching the Soviet crossing, was forced to take a defensive position on Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having learned about what had happened, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov ordered the 11th brigade of brigade commander Yakovlev and a number of other armored units immediately and without infantry support (Fedyuninsky’s motorized rifles got lost in the steppe and reached the battlefield later) to attack the Japanese positions.
Soviet tanks and armored vehicles launched several attacks, but, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The second day of the battle came down to constant shelling of Japanese positions by Soviet armored vehicles, and the failure of the Japanese offensive on the east bank forced the Japanese command to begin a retreat.
Historians still argue how justified the introduction of Yakovlev’s brigade into battle from the march was. Zhukov himself wrote that he deliberately did this. On the other hand, did the Soviet military leader have a different path? Continuing the Japanese movement towards the crossing promised disaster.
The Japanese retreat is still a controversial point in Bain-Tsagan. Was it a general flight or a systematic, organized retreat? The Soviet version depicted the defeat and death of Japanese troops who did not have time to complete the crossing. The Japanese side creates a picture of an organized retreat, pointing out that the bridge was blown up even when Soviet tanks drove onto it. By some miracle, under artillery fire and air strikes, the Japanese managed to cross to the opposite bank. But the regiment that remained in the cover was almost completely destroyed.
Bayin-Tsagan can hardly be called a decisive tactical victory for one of the sides. But in strategic terms, this is, of course, a victory for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.
Firstly, the Japanese were forced to begin a retreat, suffering losses and failing to complete their main task - the destruction of the Soviet crossing. Moreover, throughout the conflict, the enemy never again tried to force Khalkhin Gol, and it was no longer physically possible. The only set of bridge equipment in the entire Kwantung Army was destroyed by the Japanese themselves during the withdrawal of troops from Bain Tsagan.
Next, Japanese troops could only conduct operations against Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, or wait for a political solution to the conflict. True, as you know, the enemy expected something completely different.
Among the Soviet commanders who distinguished themselves at Khalkhin Gol, an exceptional place is occupied by Mikhail Pavlovich Yakovlev, the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, which bore the brunt of the fighting at Khalkhin Gol.
Participating in hostilities for only 10 days, Yakovlev carried out a number of operations that largely predetermined the turning point in the entire conflict.
Having been defeated in the battle of Bayin-Tsagan, the Japanese command concentrated its main efforts on actions against the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Several large-scale attacks were carried out on the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment, and on July 12, a group of three hundred Japanese with heavy machine guns managed to get to the Soviet crossing.
Zhukov instructed Yakovlev to eliminate the threat on his own responsibility. The outcome of the battle was decided by the Soviet chemical tank, sending a stream of fire into the center of the enemy position. Steadfastly withstanding artillery fire, tank and air attacks, the Japanese always retreated before flamethrower tanks.
Japanese soldiers tried to escape at the bottom of a huge basin several tens of meters in diameter, where they were surrounded and destroyed. There were no prisoners in this battle. The basin, where several hundred Japanese soldiers met their death, received the gloomy name “grave of the samurai.”
However, this battle was the last for brigade commander Yakovlev. It is often said that he died in a damaged tank - the commander’s wristwatch is kept in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, with the glass knocked out by the force of the explosion.
According to another version, Yakovlev died from a bullet from a Japanese shooter while raising infantry to attack. Posthumously, Yakovlev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The name of the brigade commander was given to the 11th brigade, which he led, and later to the tank regiment of the MPR army.
The brigade commander’s grave in Chita, unfortunately, was abandoned and forgotten, and during the construction of a health and entertainment complex on the site of the old Chita cemetery in 2009-2011, it was completely lost.
"Cannes on the steppe"
On August 20, 1939, Soviet troops launched a powerful offensive, fighting to encircle the Japanese group. The main attack was planned to be delivered from the north, however, due to inconsistency of actions, the first attacks were not successful.
Having decided that the main blow would be delivered in the southern sector, the Japanese command sent the main reserves there. Meanwhile, the Soviet troops concentrated on the northern front delivered a new powerful blow, which turned out to be fatal for the enemy. The ring has closed around the Japanese group. The battles for destruction began.
How many Japanese soldiers were surrounded? How many managed to break through? - this question still remains open. The number of people surrounded and destroyed inside the ring was often estimated at 25-30 thousand people. The Japanese themselves were very evasive about their losses. When they were allowed to take away the bodies of the dead, they did not specify how many bodies they needed to find.
In total, 6281 bodies were handed over to the Japanese, and it is no longer possible to say how many enemy soldiers remained in the sands of Mongolia. Officially, the Japanese side recognized the loss of 8,632 people killed and 9,087 wounded during the entire conflict (excluding the losses of the Barguds). Most of them fell on the 7th (a third of the personnel were lost) and 23rd divisions (more than two-thirds of the personnel were lost).
On August 28, 1939, Zhukov sent a victorious report to Moscow about the complete destruction of a large enemy group, which Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov treated very carefully, pointing out: “As expected, there were no divisions surrounded, the enemy either managed to withdraw the main forces, or, what or rather, there have been no large forces in this area for a long time, but there was a specially trained garrison, which has now been completely destroyed.”